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Copyright and the Moral Right:




The 1976 Copyright Act (the 1976 Act) embodies the most ex-
tensive reforms in the history of our nation's copyright laws.1 One
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1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). Perhaps the most significant reform of the 1976 Act is
the adoption of a unitary federal system of copyright protection in lieu of the prior system
under which federal law protected published works and state common law governed unpub-
lished works. See Diamond, Preemption of State Law, 25 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 204
(1978). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) ("Preemption with respect to other laws") with
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (repealed 1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. app. (1977)
(preserves common-law rights and remedies of a copyright proprietor of an unpublished
work). See infra note 374. For a detailed discussion of the application of § 301 of the 1976
Act in the context of state protection for moral rights, see infra notes 292-398 and accompa-
nying text.
In addition to the preemption provision codified in § 301, the 1976 Act made other
sweeping changes. For example, § 302 provides that the duration of copyright protection for
most forms of works consists of the life of the author plus an additional 50 year period
following the author's death, thus replacing a term of protection that consisted of 28 years
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proposed reform that is noticeably absent from the statutory
scheme, however, is the explicit adoption of protections for the
personal rights of creators2 with respect to their works. Instead,
the 1976 Act continues this country's tradition of safeguarding
only the pecuniary rights of a copyright owner. By assuring the
copyright owner the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute
the original work, to prepare derivative works, and to perform and
display publicly certain types of copyrighted works, the 1976 Act3
focuses on the inherent economic value of a copyright. Conse-
quently, the primary objective of our copyright law is to ensure the
copyright owner's receipt of all financial rewards to which he is
entitled, under the 1976 Act, by virtue of ownership.
Because copyright law protects works that are the product of
the creator's mind, heart, and soul,4 a degree of protection in addi-
tion to that which guarantees financial returns is warranted. The
1976 Act does not purport to protect the creator, but rather the
copyright owner.5 Nevertheless, a creator, regardless of whether he
from initial publication (or in some instances from registration) plus an additional 28 year
renewal term. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1976) with 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982). See
infra text accompanying notes 373-74. The 1976 Act relaxed the notice formalities, the re-
gistration requirement, and the effect of the manufacturing clause contained in the 1909
Act. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 405(a) (effect of omission of copyright notice), 407(d) (effect of
failure to register a work upon demand by the Register of Copyright), 601 (manufacture,
importation, and public distribution of certain copies) (1982); see also Nimmer, Implica-
tions of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copy-
right Law, 19 STAN. L. REv. 499 (1967) (discussion of 1976 Act changes). For a more detailed
discussion of these and other changes mandated by the 1976 Act, see Latman, A Glimpse at
the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 77 (1976). See also Katz, Copyright
Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 200, 200-01 (1978) (noting importance of the 1976 Act for visual artists).
2. The term "creators" as used in this Article includes those who produce visual art,
literature, music as well as all other categories of artistic works.
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See infra note 140 for text of § 106. See also 17 U.S.C.
§ 1 (repealed 1976) ("Exclusive rights as to copyrighted works").
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (copyright protection subsists in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, including literature, music, drama,
pantomimes and choreography, visual art, motion pictures, and sound recordings).
5. See, e.g., id. § 106 ("the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights
to do. . . the following. . . .") (emphasis supplied). The creator may transfer his copyright
in whole or in part. See infra note 192. Section 201 governs ownership of copyright:
§ 201. Ownership of copyright
(a) Initial Ownership.-Copyright in a work protected under this title vests intially
in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of
copyright in the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire.-In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instru-
ment signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
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holds the copyright in his work, has a personal interest in preserv-
ing the artistic integrity of his work and compelling recognition for
his authorship. In many European and Third World nations per-
sonal rights are protected by a legal doctrine commonly known as
the moral right.' In this country courts wishing to recognize a crea-
tor's personality interests are forced to rely upon other established
legal theories such as unfair competition law,7 contract law,8 defa-
mation, 9 invasion of privacy,10 and even copyright law" to redress
grievances implicating moral rights.
(c) Contributions to Collective Works.-Copyright in each separate contribution to
a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests
intially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the
copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the con-
tribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work,
and any later collective work in the same series.
(d) Transfer of Ownership.-
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as
personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision
of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause
(1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the
extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright
owner by this title.
(e) Involuntary Transfer.-When an individual author's ownership of a copyright,
or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other
official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of
ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copy-
right, shall be given effect under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201 (1982)
6. See infra notes 16-65 and accompanying text.
The phrase "moral right" is a translation of the French term droit moral. One student
of the moral right suggested that the English translation does not convey adequately the
idea of an "intellectual concept" of "inner meaning," which is inherent in the French term
"moral." Therefore, droit moral does not refer exclusively to rights inherent in our notion of
morality, but also encompasses a right that exists in an entity's ultimate being. Naoum,
Federal Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: Do Moral Rights Survive? (1984)
(unpublished paper in author's file). Perhaps for this reason Dr. Ladas proposed as a more
appropriate concept the German term "urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht," which translates into
"right of the author's personality." 1 S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF ARTISTIC
AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 272 (1938). Despite these criticisms, the term "moral right" is
well-accepted among the majority of scholars who write in English. See Diamond, Legal
Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADE-MARK REP. 244
(1978); Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARv. L. REV. 554 (1940).
7. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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This Article explores the interplay between the 1976 Act and
the moral right doctrine. The Article recognizes that the content of
any federal scheme adopted in this country for protecting a crea-
tor's personal rights will be influenced greatly by the 1976 Act.'2
Part II of this Article defines the moral right generally and
compares the express recognition of the moral right in foreign ju-
risprudence with the melange of alternate legal theories relied
upon by American courts. This discussion concludes that the im-
plementation of the moral right doctrine in the United States not
only would provide a uniform means of protecting a creator's per-
sonal interests, but also would free courts from reliance on legal
theories that are not adequate substitutes for the moral right
doctrine.
Part III examines the relationship between the 1976 Act and
the moral right doctrine, focusing on three distinct inquiries. The
first section of this discussion explores the scope of protection for
personal rights currently afforded by the copyright law and con-
cludes that existing copyright law is an inadequate substitute for a
cohesive moral right doctrine. The second section examines the rel-
evant statutory provisions, the legislative history, and recent judi-
cial interpretations of the 1976 Act to determine the degree of
compatibility between the copyright statute and the moral right
doctrine. This analysis demonstrates that, although the 1976 Act
has a considerable amount of unrealized potential for protecting a
creator's personal rights, the Act also contains some significant
limitations, resulting from the recognition of interests conflicting
with those of creators, that are likely to influence the scope of any
moral right doctrine adopted in this county. The last portion of
part III discusses whether section 301 of the 1976 Act,13 which gov-
erns preemption of other laws, precludes the adoption of the moral
right doctrine on a state level. Although section 301 does not pre-
empt most forms of state protection for moral rights when such
claims are within the framework of substitute legal theories, 4 state
statutes that attempt to provide comprehensive protection for
10. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 126-45 and accompanying text.
12. The adoption of personal right protection may become a reality shortly. At least
two states recently have enacted modified moral rights statutes. See infra notes 108-25 and
accompanying text; see also infra note 107 (discussing Congressman Drinan's federal
proposal).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
14. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
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moral rights are vulnerable to preemption. Therefore, the most ef-
fective means of safeguarding a creator's personal rights in this
country would be the incorporation into the 1976 Act of more pro-
visions governing the special needs of creators distinct from their
possible status as copyright owners.
15
This Article concludes with a proposal for amending the 1976
Act so as to implement an "American" version of the moral right
doctrine that would balance all the competing interests concerned
in extending protection to the personal rights of creators.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORAL RIGHT
A. Components and Attributes of the Moral Right
The moral right doctrine generally is said to encompass three
major components: the right of disclosure, the right of paternity,
and the right of integrity. Some formulations of the moral right
doctrine also include the right of withdrawal, the right to prevent
excessive criticism, and the right to prevent assaults upon one's
personality. For purposes of illustration, these components will be
explored briefly in the context of the following hypothetical. A
playwright, enthralled with the idea of writing a piece poking fun
at the evangelical segment of society, suddenly envisions a story
line through which she can communicate her ideas. In one day she
outlines the plot and sketches some dialogue so that she will have
a rough draft which she can develop further when inspiration
strikes again. At this point, the playwright's interest in her work
would be protected by an aspect of the moral right doctrine known
as the right of disclosure or divulgation. Underlying this compo-
nent of the moral right is the idea that the creator, as the sole
judge of when a work is ready for public dissemination, is the only
one who can possess any rights in an uncompleted work. Prior to
the time the playwright places her work into circulation, therefore,
she retains the same right to determine both the form of her play
before it is distributed and the timing of public circulation."6
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
The copyright clause of the Constitution provides the source of congressional authority
for enacting amendments to the 1976 Act that could extend protection for the personal
rights of creators. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a discussion of this issue, see infra
notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
16. Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under
French Law, 16 Am. J. ComP. L. 465, 467 (1968) ("Only the author can decide whether his
work corresponds to his original conception, at what moment it is completed, and whether it
is worthy of him."); see also Diamond, supra note 6, at 252-54; Merryman, The Refrigerator
1985]
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Suppose that a few days after the playwright had finished her
rough draft, she entered into an agreement with a publisher in
which she promised to produce the final publication version of the
play within six months. Subsequently, a personal crisis in the play-
wright's life triggers a deep sense of religious conviction and she no
longer wishes to finish the play. In these circumstances her refusal
to complete the play would be supported by her right to refuse to
disclose,17 a corollary to the right of disclosure. Application of this
right would preclude a judgment ordering the playwright to com-
plete the play, although a court might award the publisher dam-
ages for breach of contract."8
Some scholars believe that a second component of the moral
right doctrine, known as the right of withdrawal, would allow the
playwright in our hypothetical situation to recall all existing copies
of her work if, following actual publication, she experienced a radi-
cal change of the convictions that originally provided the impetus
for the play.' 9 Other commentators, however, have expressed
doubts regarding the viability of the moral right of withdrawal be-
cause of the practical inconsistency in assuming that the public
will forget works to which it has already been exposed.20
of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1028 (1976).
The right of disclosure frequently is intertwined with the right to create. See Strauss,
The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506, 513 (1955). Mr. Roeder notes that
the right to create remains one of our basic human rights, although the exercise of certain
sovereign powers by the state, such as incarceration, sometimes may result in a curtailment
of the right to create. Roeder, supra note 6, at 558.
17. Roeder, supra note 6, at 560. The copyright statute of the Phillipines, for example,
provides that an author has the right to make alterations of his work prior to, or to withhold
it from, publication. Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property, No. 49, Nov. 14,
1972, § 34.
18. See Sarraute, supra note 16, at 468. Mr. Sarraute noted, however, that in France
an artist's lack of inspiration to finish a work does not constitute breach of contract, because
failed inspiration is a normal risk foreseen by all parties. The artist will be held liable for
breach only upon a showing of bad faith. Id. at 468, 480, 485.
A celebrated French case concerning this aspect of the moral right is Lord Eden's ac-
tion against the American artist James McNeill Whistler, which was prompted by Whistler's
alteration of a commissioned portrait of Lady Eden and his refusal to deliver the portrait to
Lord and Lady Eden. The French courts ruled that Lord Eden should receive restitution
and damages for breach of contract, but that Whistler would not be required to restore or
deliver the portrait. Eden v. Whistler, 1898 Recueil P~riodique et Critique [D.P.] II. 465
(Cour d'appel, Paris); aff'd, 1900 D.P. I. 497, (Cass. civ.). For a more detailed discussion of
this case, see Merryman, supra note 16, at 1024, 1028; Sarraute, supra note 16, at 467-68.
19. See Merryman, supra note 16, at 1028; Roeder, supra note 6, at 561.
20. See Sarraute, supra note 16, at 477 (discussing the inadequacy of the 1957 French
law recognizing the existence of a right of withdrawal); see also Diamond, supra note 6, at
254 (the intervening rights of third parties make enforcement of the right of withdrawal
difficult); Strauss, supra note 16, at 513 (the decisions in Germany and France do not sup-
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To continue the illustration, now assume that the playwright
completes her work and subsequently visits a publisher with her
manuscript in hand and offers it to the publisher for $1500. The
publisher conditionally agrees to this arrangement, providing the
playwright makes certain revisions. When the playwright tenders
the revised manuscript to the publisher, the publisher refuses to
publish it with the playwright's name, notwithstanding the appear-
ance of the playwright's name on the original manuscript.21 In
these circumstances the playwright would be protected by another
component of the moral right, the right of paternity. As its name
suggests, the right of paternity safeguards a creator's right to com-
pel recognition for his work and prevents others from naming any-
one else as the creator. Therefore, the playwright would be able to
force publication of the work under her name. Additionally, the
right of paternity protects a creator in the event that someone
falsely attributes to him a work that is not his creation.22
Two other aspects of the moral right doctrine are the creator's
right to prevent excessive criticism and the creator's right to relief
from other assaults on his personality.23 To appreciate fully the
theoretical basis for these two rights, one must recall that the
moral right doctrine safeguards rights of personality rather than
pecuniary rights.24 The creator projects his personality into his
work, and thus is entitled to be free from vexatious or malicious
criticism 25 and from unwanted assaults upon his honor and profes-
port the view of some scholars that a right of withdrawal has been recognized by the courts
as a component of the moral right). When the right of withdrawal is recognized, however, it
is generally in connection with literary works. See Merryman, supra note 16, at 1028; Sar-
raute, supra note 16, at 477. The right of withdrawal is recognized expressly in several coun-
tries, including Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Guinea, Italy, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Portugal, and Senegal. Frequently, foreign statutes require the author to pay indemnifica-
tion. See infra Appendix of this Article.
21. See Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (1910) (court
held that author had right to receive payment for story in similar circumstances, notwith-
standing publisher's refusal to publish story with author's name); see also infra note 78.
22. Merryman, supra note 16, at 1027; Strauss, supra note 16, at 508. Mr. Diamond
notes that the right of paternity also guarantees that the use of a creator's work will appear
under an appropriate psuedonym or even anonymously, when the creator wishes to preserve
his privacy. Diamond, supra note 6, at 254-55.
23. Diamond, supra note 6, at 255.
24. Merryman, supra note 16, at 1025; see supra note 6 and accompanying text. One
scholar has defined the term "personality" in the context of the moral right as "the outward
representation of one's most innermost self." Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and Amer-
ican Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 401 (1951). Mr. Katz further
observed that any "unwarranted interference with an author's work is an invasion of his
personality." Id. at 402.
25. The right against excessive criticism does not prohibit reasonable criticism regard-
19851
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sional standing.26 By virtue of the prohibition against attacks on
the creator's personality, the creator also is protected against mis-
use of his name and work. In the context of our hypothetical situa-
tion, such misuse would occur if an antireligious organization
claimed that the playwright subscribed to antireligious views solely
by virtue of her authorship of the play.27
In the hypothetical situation, now suppose the playwright en-
ters into an agreement with a movie producer authorizing the pro-
ducer to write a screenplay based upon her play. The final version
of the screenplay, however, distorts considerably the playwright's
theme and mutilates her story line. The component of the moral
right doctrine that would grant relief to the playwright in this situ-
ation is called the right of integrity.2 This right lies at the heart of
the moral right doctrine.29 In our hypothetical case the adaptation
process naturally would require certain modifications in the play-
wright's manuscript,30 but the right of integrity prevents those who
make such alterations from destroying the spirit and character of
the author's work. Although adaptations of a work from one me-
dium to another present the most obvious potential for violations
of a creator's right of integrity, in reality, any modification of a
work can be problematic from an integrity standpoint.3 1 Any dis-
less of how severely the work is condemned. Instead, it protects the creator against criticism
whose sole object is to abuse or vex the author. See Roeder, supra note 6, at 572; Strauss,
supra note 16, at 513-14. In France the creator is protected by special legislation recognizing
his right to a published reply to the criticism. Roeder, supra note 6, at 572.
26. The prohibition against attacks on the creator's personality encompasses any act
that may damage the creator's honor, reputation, and professional standing. See Roeder,
supra note 6, at 573; Strauss, supra note 16, at 514. According to Mr. Strauss a tort or
violation of a provision in a publishing agreement allegedly constitutes a violation of this
right. Id.
27. Other examples of misuse include the use of a creator's artwork, without his con-
sent, for commercial advertising and the unauthorized use of an author's general statements
in a scientific book that he endorses a particular commercial product by virtue of those
statements. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 514 & n.37.
28. Of course, the playwright also might proceed under breach of contract theory. But
see infra notes 33, 73-78.
If a creator's name is attached to a distorted version of his work, a false attribution also
will result. In such circumstances, the right of integrity meshes with the right of paternity.
See Diamond, supra note 6, at 258; infra note 72.
29. Mr. Roeder observed the following regarding the right of integrity:
This aspect of the moral right-often deemed to constitute the whole doctrine-is at
once the oldest and best known. It is certainly the most dramatic aspect and the one,
because of its survival in the creator even after assignment of the copyright, most
sharply differentiated from the exploitive right.
Roeder, supra note 6, at 565 (footnote omitted).
30. See id. at 571; Sarraute, supra note 16, at 481.
31. Works can be modified without being adapted to a different medium. In fact, cus-
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tortion that misrepresents an artist's expression constitutes a vio-
lation of the creator's right of integrity. 2
There is, however, one rather incongruous aspect of the right
of integrity. If the artist in our hypothetical situation was a painter
rather than a playwright, the right of integrity probably would not
allow her to prevent the destruction of one of her paintings by its
owner. Perhaps the underlying rationale for this exception is that a
work which has been destroyed completely cannot reflect adversely
upon the creator's honor or reputation.3 3 Nevertheless, some com-
mentators have criticized the destruction exception on the ground
that it negates the creator's right of paternity and frustrates the
public's interest in enjoying the artist's work. 4
To summarize, the moral right doctrine encompasses several
discrete components. 5 All nations that have adopted the moral
tom and usage frequently necessitate certain types of modifications. For example, editors of
compilations alter a writer's text to insure a composite viewpoint, and textbook editors
make alterations in subsequent editions to incorporate new techniques and discoveries. See
Roeder, supra note 6, at 570-72 (discussing these and other examples). Mr. Roeder noted,
however, that the power to alter must be reasonably exercised so as to preserve the "intrin-
sic esthetic quality of the work." Id. at 571. Consider, for example, the plight of the French
artist Bernard Buffet, who decorated a refrigerator by painting a composition consisting of
six panels covering the front, top, and sides of the refrigerator. Buffet considered the six
panels to be one painting, and thus signed only one of the panels before auctioning the
refrigerator. Subsequently, the catalogue of another auction featured a painting described as
a Buffet painting on metal. An investigation revealed that this painting was one of the
panels of the auctioned refrigerator. The French court entered an order preventing the sepa-
rate sale of the panel. Buffet v. Fersing, 1962, Cours d'appel, Paris, Dalloz, Jurisprudence
[D. Jur.] 570.
32. See Diamond, supra note 6, at 257; Merryman, supra note 16, at 1027.
The Buffet decision demonstrates another important point about the right of integrity:
the right cannot always be vindicated in an action by the creator for breach of contract
because the creator may not have a direct contractual relationship with the alleged wrongful
perpetrator. Diamond, supra note 6, at 257, 261. Mr. Diamond commented, though, that
many cases in the United States that could be predicated on a right of integrity theory are
brought under breach of contract. Id. at 258; see infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
33. See Diamond, supra note 6, at 257-58; Roeder, supra note 6, at 569. Of course, a
different result might obtain if the work is destroyed in a manner that subjects the creator
to shame or embarrassment. See Amarnick, American Recognition of the Moral Right: Is-
sues and Options, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31, 56-57 (1983); Diamond, supra note
6, at 258.
34. See, e.g., Amarnick supra note 33, at 57; Merryman, supra note 16, at 1035; see
also infra text accompanying notes 399-402.
35. Dr. Ladas defined the moral right expansively to include the right to control publi-
cation of a work; the right to be credited with one's name on one's work and to prevent false
attribution; the right to prohibit all unauthorized modifications; the right against abusive
criticism; and the right to safeguard one's honor and professional standing. See 1 S. LADAS,
supra note 6, § 273.
In contrast, Mr. Strauss believes that judicial enforcement of the moral right rarely
extends beyond recognition for the right of paternity and the right to prevent modifications
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right doctrine statutorily include at least some of the above protec-
tions, but the contours of the doctrine vary among the adhering
countries. 6 Although a detailed analysis of the doctrine's applica-
tion in foreign jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article,37 a
few general observations are in order.
The 1971 revision of the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works contains a moral rights provision,
Article 6bi, which recognizes the right of paternity and a limited
right of integrity.38 The right of integrity is violated only by a dis-
which are prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation. Strauss, supra note 16, at 535. He
observed:
The other rights claimed by some writers to be components of the moral right...
either have been protected on principles other than the moral right or have not been
the subject of litigation. Thus, the right to create a work or to refuse to do so is merely
a matter of denying specific performance of a contract to create and deliver a work; and
the author is none the less liable for breach of contract. The right to publish a work
usually is considered a property right rather than a component of the moral right.
Where the author refuses to fulfill his obligation under a publishing contract, an inter-
pretation of the contract by the court is necessary to settle the question. The right to
prevent "excessive" criticism, and the right to prevent any other attack on the author's
"special" personality are enforced under the law of defamation, libel or slander, or on
some other tort principle unconnected with the copyright law. The right to withdraw a
work from circulation apparently has not been litigated in connection with the moral
right.
Id. at 536. At least one commentator has criticized Strauss for his attempts "to deprecate
the actual extent of protection provided by the [moral] right in civil law countries" and "to
find functional equivalents . . . in our law". Merryman, supra note 16, at 1037.
36. See Stevenson, Moral Right and the Common Law: A Proposal, 6 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 89, 107 (1955) (noted the "surprisingly little uniformity of either theory or
content" that exists with respect to application of the moral right doctrine in foreign juris-
prudence); see also infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Appendix of this Article for applicable moral rights protections in se-
lected countries.
38. The Berne Convention was signed initially in 1886 and thus is the oldest multilat-
eral treaty governing copyright protection. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Property, Sept. 9, 1886, 123 L.N.T.S. 233, reprinted in 3, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND
TREATIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982) [hereinafter cited as Berne Union]. The last of
multiple revisions of the Convention took place in Paris in 1971. Each revision is reprinted
in the UNESCO volume. Currently, 76 nations adhere to the Berne Convention. See 4 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 22 (1984). The United States, the Soviet Union, and
the People's Republic of China are among the nations that have never joined the Berne
Convention. Nevertheless, because the treaty provides that its protections are extended to
the nationals of any country as long as a work is published initially in a member country, or
is published simultaneously in a member and nonmember country, American authors fre-
quently have been able to secure copyright protection under the Berne Convention by si-
multaneously publishing their works in the United States and in Canada, which is a member
of the Union. See Berne Union, supra, as revised in Paris on July 24, 1971, art. 3(1)(b);
Comment, The Author's Expression: The Necessity for U.S. Protection Through Statute
and Multilateral Treaty, 9 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 137, 151-52 (1982).
The moral right doctrine was incorporated initially into the Berne Convention during
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tortion, alteration, or mutilation of the creator's work that is preju-
dicial to his honor or reputation. 9 Both of these rights are inde-
pendent of the creator's economic rights, and continue to exist
following the creator's transfer of his economic rights. Despite the
general recognition that Article 6bis affords the moral right doc-
trine, the treaty contemplates that the specific legislation of the
respective Union members will govern substantive applications of
the right.40 Some signatories to the Berne Convention are far more
its third revision in 1928. The original Article 6bis provided:
(1) Independently of the author's copyright, and even after transfer of the said copy-
right, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work, as well as the
right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the said work
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The determination of the conditions under which these rights shall be exercised is
reserved for the national legislation of the countries of the Union. The means of redress
for safeguarding these rights shall be regulated by the legislation of the country where
protection is claimed.
Berne Union, supra, as revised in Rome on June 2, 1928, art. 6bi
s. Professor Nimmer ob-
served that some interest groups in the United States regard the Berne Convention's protec-
tion for moral rights as the chief barrier to our accession to the Union. Nimmer, supra note
1, at 518.
The current Article 6bis is somewhat broader than the 1928 provision:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in rela-
tion to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall,
after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and
shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the
moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protec-
tion after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph
may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Berne Union, supra, as revised in Paris on July 24, 1971, art. 6bis
. Notably, the United
States is a member of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), which is the second ma-
jor multilateral copyright treaty. The UCC, however, embodies only limited aspects of the
moral right in the sole context of allowing member nations to enact legislation providing for
compulsory translation licenses. UCC art. V, discussed in Diamond, supra note 6, at 247.
For a discussion of the UCC, see Comment supra, at 153-56.
39. Some scholars have criticized the limited scope of the right of integrity sanctioned
by the Berne Convention on the ground that a creator should be protected against any
alteration of his work that is contrary to the creator's interests or style-regardless of
whether such alteration is prejudicial to his honor or reputation. See Micha6lid~s-Nouaros,
Protection of the Author's Moral Interests After His Death as a Cultural Postulate, 15
COPYRIGHT 35, 37 (1979), quoted in Amarnick, supra note 33, at 45.
Article 6bis does not mention the right to disclose or publish because this right was
regarded as too controversial to be included. Stevenson, supra note 36, at 108.
40. See Berne Union, supra note 38, art. 6bis(3) (reprinted supra note 38); see also
Nimmer, supra note 1, at 522.
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protective of a creator's moral rights than are others. France, for
example, awards the greatest protection, while Germany and Italy
follow closely behind.4 ' Several nations that are not members of
the Berne Convention provide extensive protection for moral rights
as part of their copyright laws. Ecuador, for example, protects an
author's rights of paternity, disclosure, integrity, and withdrawal.42
No discussion of the moral right doctrine would be complete
without addressing how foreign jurisprudence treats three issues
that arise in connection with the doctrine's application: alienability
of the right, its duration, and its exercise after the creator's death.
Although countries that have adopted the moral right do not en-
dorse a uniform position with respect to these matters, neither in-
alienability nor perpetual duration are critical to the moral right's
existence.43
Some scholars have argued that moral rights should not be
alienable because they protect personal attributes such as person-
ality, honor, and reputation. 44 France and numerous other coun-
tries expressly adhere to this position, 45 and so, theoretically, in
41. Diamond, supra note 6, at 247. The moral right doctrine evolved initially in
France, where it was nurtured by the judiciary. Surprisingly, the French legislature did not
codify the doctrine until 1957. Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property, 1957 Jour-
nal Officiel [J.0.] 2723, arts. 6, 19, 32, reprinted in 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (UNESCO 1982); see Diamond, supra note 6, at 245. For a thoughtful discussion of
the doctrine's development and application in France, see Sarraute, supra note 16.
42. Ecuador Law on Copyright, No. 610, Aug. 13, 1976, arts. 17, 18, reprinted in 1
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982). Other nonmember nations
offering protection for various components of the moral right include Bangladesh, Colombia,
El Salvador, Haiti, Panama, and Peru. See infra Appendix. One commentator has remarked
that the level of protection afforded by many developing countries contrasts sharply with
that provided by our post-industrial society. See Comment, supra note 38, at 156-57.
43. Stevenson, supra note 36, at 109.
44. See Katz, supra note 24, at 407-09; Nimmer, supra note 1, at 523 (citing GAVIN, LE
DROIT MORAL DE L'AuTEUR § 255 (1960)); Strauss, supra note 16, at 515.
45. French Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property, Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6
provides that the moral right is "perpetuel, inali6nable et imprescriptible." Other countries
in which the right is inalienable include: Brazil, Law on the Rights of Authors, No. 5988,
Dec. 14, 1973, art. 28; Chile, Law on Copyright, No. 17.336, Aug. 28, 1970, amended Oct. 18,
1972, arts. 15, 16 (inalienable but transmissible to surviving spouse and author's heirs); Co-
lombia, Law on Copyright, No. 86, Dec. 26, 1946, arts. 48, 49; Ecuador, Law on Copyright,
No. 610, July 30, 1976, art. 18; Guinea, Law No. 043/APN/CP Adopting Provisions on Copy-
right and Neighboring Rights, Aug. 9, 1980, art. 3(a); Italy, Law for the Protection of Copy-
right, No. 633, Apr. 22, 1941, amended Jan. 8, 1979, arts. 22, 142; Japan, Copyright Law, No.
48, May 6, 1970, amended by Law No. 49, May 18, 1978, art. 59; Portugal, Decree-Law No.
46980, Apr. 27, 1966, art. 57; and Senegal, Law on the Protection of Copyright, No. 73-52,
Dec. 4, 1973, art. 3(a): collectively reprinted in 1-2 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (UNESCO 1982).
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention does not take a position on alienability. See supra
note 38 for text of Article 6 b
is . See also Nimmer, supra note 1, at 524 (suggesting that in
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those countries a creator cannot waive or assign his moral rights.
Nevertheless, in adjudicating the validity of waivers as a defense in
actions for alleged right of integrity violations, the French judici-
ary tends to enforce contracts allowing reasonable alterations that
do not distort the spirit of the creator's work, particularly with re-
spect to adaptations and contributions to collective works.4 6 In-
deed, this inclination on the part of French courts, which always
have exhibited the utmost regard for the personal rights of cre-
ators,4 7 illustrates the inherent infeasibility of a truly inalienable
moral right. The interests of creators in safeguarding their reputa-
tions and professional standing must be balanced against the inter-
ests of those who perform adaptations in maintaining creative
liberty.
48
The United States balances these interests somewhat differ-
ently than those countries that recognize the moral right. Whereas
countries that have adopted the moral right generally will not in-
terpret contracts which do not address moral rights as implying a
adopting the original Article 6 bi, the Conference intended that the matter of inalienability
of moral rights would remain within the province of each signatory).
46. See Amarnick, supra note 33, at 47-48 ("in spite of the seemingly comprehensive
protection offered by the statute, a French lawyer advises authors who want to be certain of
controlling adaptations of their works that they must bargain for those rights with the pro-
ducer"); Merryman, supra note 16, at 1044-45 (noting that a waiver of the right by the artist
is not enforceable against him, but the artist's consent to reasonable modifications of his
work is effective); Sarraute, supra note 16, at 481-82; Stevenson, supra note 36, at 112;
Strauss, supra note 16, at 516-17, 537.
The seminal French case on this subject, Bernstein v. Matador et Path6 Cinema, D.H.
1933.533, D.A. 1933, 104, held that a covenant allowing all changes necessary for adapting a
play to a movie was valid, notwithstanding the author's "inalienable" moral right. For a
discussion of this and other French cases, see Sarraute, supra note 16, at 481-82; Strauss,
supra note 16, at 516-17.
France has enacted special rules governing moral rights in the motion picture industry,
which were intended to eliminate work stoppages caused by disagreements among the direc-
tor, authors, and scorers of a movie. The efficacy of these laws, however, appears questiona-
ble. See Sarraute, supra note 16, at 473-76.
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48. See Sarraute, supra note 16, at 481; Comment, Protection of Artistic Integrity, 90
HARv. L. REv. 473, 479 (1976) (noting that an inalienable moral right to prevent unaccept-
able modifications might result in less investment in and distribution of artistic works,
thereby reducing public access). The fears on the part of the American motion picture and
television industries that United States adoption of the moral right doctrine would enable a
creator to enforce component rights, notwithstanding a prior assignment for valuable con-
sideration, have inspired great opposition to our accession to the Berne Convention. Al-
though such fears are understandable, the basis for them is diminished by the failure of
Article 6 b
i, to incorporate the requirement of inalienability, and by the practice of countries
such as France, where the moral right supposedly is inalienable, to respect the interests of
those who adapt creative works. See Amarnick, supra note 33, at 46-49; Nimmer, supra note
1, at 523-24; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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tacit waiver of the creator's rights,49 the opposite is true in the
United States. Although courts in the United States rely on equi-
table principles to protect a creator against excessive mutilation of
his work, in general the creator has the burden of extracting an
agreement regarding modifications from the purchaser. Even when
the creator has secured such an agreement, the danger exists that
the contract will not bind subsequent purchasers. 50 Waivers of the
right of paternity are viewed favorably in this country, as evi-
denced by the traditional rule that a creator is not entitled to
credit, absent a contractual provision to the contrary.5 1
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention does not address the alien-
ability issue,52 but it does address a second important issue con-
cerning the moral right-duration. The 1971 Conference amended
Article 6bis to include a provision calling for the recognition of a
creator's moral rights following his death for a minimum period
consisting of the duration of his copyright. 5 Article 6b6(2) does af-
ford each member some latitude in this respect, however, by pro-
viding that those countries whose laws do not protect all of the
moral rights set forth in Article 6bis(1) on a posthumous basis may
allow some of these rights to cease following the creator's death .5
49. Strauss, supra note 16, at 516, 537.
50. See Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (al-
though contract between owner of motion picture and motion picture company gave owner
right to perform final cutting and editing, owner did not have such rights with respect to
television showings licensed by company, absent a specific contractual provision, especially
when owner was aware of industry practice of cutting a film for television commercials),
aff'd mem., 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431,
273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966); Merryman, supra note 16, at 1045 (criticizing the United States rule
for failing to protect adequately the creator); see also infra notes 73-77 and accompanying
text (detailed discussion of American law on this point).
51. See Diamond, supra note 6, at 255; see also 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, §
8.21[E], at 8-270, 8-270.5 (also noting some recent developments countering this position);
see also infra notes 72 & 78. Mr. Strauss noted that although "moral right countries" gener-
ally do not sanction tacit waivers, the paternity right is presumed to be waived with respect
to collective works such as newspapers and encyclopedias. Strauss, supra note 16, at 537.
52. See supra note 45.




Prior to 1971 the text of Article 6
bis made no mention of the moral right's duration, thereby
allowing each signatory to regulate the matter individually under subsection two of the Arti-
cle. See supra note 38.
54. Berne Union, supra note 38, art. 6 bis( 2 ). Commentators have suggested that this
minimum time period exception constitutes a concession to those countries possessing the
Anglo-Saxon tradition in which the moral right is effectuated primarily under common-law
doctrines that have no application once the injured party has died. Amarnick, supra note
33, at 58; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 41 (1978).
Some writers have distinguished "positive" components of the moral right from "nega-
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Countries that recognize the moral right can be divided into
two groups with respect to the question of the right's duration.
The first group, which includes West Germany55 and the Nether-
lands,56 follows the approach advocated by the Berne Convention
and simultaneously terminates a creator's moral rights and copy-
right. The second group adheres to the French view that moral
rights are perpetual.57 In France a creator's moral or personality
rights always have been regarded as a separate body of protections,
rather than as a component of the creator's pecuniary rights.58
Thus, in French theory no logical inconsistency results from pro-
tecting a creator's moral rights in perpetuity, despite the limited
duration of his copyright.
59
Two justifications support the survival of moral rights subse-
quent to the creator's death. First, focusing solely on the interests
of the creator, any mutilation or modification of his work that
would be detrimental to his reputation during his lifetime is
equally, if not more, injurious after his death, when he can no
longer defend the integrity of his work.60 Second, focusing on soci-
ety's interest in preserving its cultural heritage, when a creator's
work is altered after his death, society is the ultimate victim for it
tive" components with respect to the issue of posthumous exercise of the right. Thus, "posi-
tive" aspects such as the right to create, disclose, modify, and withdraw die with the creator.
"Negative" components, however, such as the right to prevent others from making detri-
mental changes do not require a personal act on the part of the author, and therefore, can
be transmitted to the author's heirs. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 517-18.
55. Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, No. 5 of Sept. 9, 1965, art. 64,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I (amended Mar. 2, 1974), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREA-
TIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982).
56. Law Concerning the New Regulation of Copyright, No. 308 of Sept. 23, 1912, art.
25, Staatsblad Voor het Koniakrisk der Nederlanden (amended Oct. 27, 1972), reprinted in
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982).
57. France, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property, Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6,
Journal Officiel de Ia R16publique Frangaise, reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF
THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982). Countries that have adopted this approach include: Ecuador,
Law No. 610 on Copyright, No. 149 of Aug. 13, 1976, art. 18, Registro Oficial; Guinea, Law
No. 043/APN/CP Adopting Provisions on Copyright, Aug. 9, 1980, art. 3(a); Ivory Coast,
Law No. 78-634 on the Protection of Intellectual Works, July 28, 1978, art. 22, Journal
Officiel de la R~publique de C6te d'Ivoire; and Senegal, Law No. 73-52 on the Protection of
Copyright, No. 4333 of Dec. 4, 1973, art. 3(a), Journal Officiel de la Republique du Senegal;
collectively reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982).
58. See Diamond, supra note 6, at 247 (in France an author can obtain protection for
his moral rights even if he has not secured protection for his pecuniary rights).
59. In France copyright protection exists for 50 years after the death of the author.
France, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property, Mar. 11, 1957, art. 21, J.O., re-
printed in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982).
60. See, e.g., Amarnick, supra note 33, at 59; Katz, supra note 24, at 405.
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can no longer benefit from the creator's original contribution. 1
Adoption of these rationales helps to answer the related question
concerning power of enforcement of a creator's moral rights follow-
ing his death.2 In many countries moral rights are treated as any
other form of property, and therefore, vest in the spouse and next
of kin upon the creator's death."s This approach, influenced by the
first justification, recognizes a creator's family and descendants as
the appropriate guardians of his reputation. 4 Some countries,
however, cognizant of society's interest in maintaining its cultural
heritage, provide more extensive protection by entrusting a de-
ceased creator's moral rights to an official body designated to pro-
tect the nation's creative works. 5
61. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 6, at 249; Katz, supra note 24, at 405; Roeder,
supra note 6, at 575.
62. One commentator has suggested that in the United States "it should be made
mandatory for the author to file with the Copyright Office a written appointment of the
heirs of his moral rights." Stevenson, supra note 36, at 115.
63. See, e.g., Chile, Law No. 17.336 on Copyright, Aug. 28, 1970, arts. 15, 16, Diario
Oficial (amended Oct. 18, 1972); France, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property,
Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6, J.O.; collectively reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (UNESCO 1982).
64. See Roeder, supra note 6, at 575. Professor Roeder also noted that although the
creator's honor and reputation cannot be injured by an unauthorized alteration of his work
following his death, his family and descendants may suffer some injury and thus should
have a remedy. Id. In this regard, Katz observed that because the descendants of the creator
are able to enjoy works which the creator left to benefit them, they have a corresponding
duty to preserve these creations in the form desired by the deceased. Katz, supra note 24, at
425.
65. The circumstances under which such a public body can exercise a deceased au-
thor's moral rights vary. See, e.g., Brazil, Law No. 5988 on the Rights of Authors and Other
Provisions, Dec. 14, 1973, arts. 25(1), (2), Diario Oficial (on death of author, moral rights
pass to his heirs, but state safeguards the identify or authenticity of works that have fallen
into the public domain); Italy, Law No. 633 for the Protection of Copyright and Other
Rights Connected with the Exercise Thereof, Apr. 22, 1941, art. 23, Gazetta Ufficiale delle
Leggi e dei Decreti (amended Jan. 8, 1979) (deceased author's moral rights may be asserted
by certain close relatives, or if the public interest should so require, by the Minister for
Public Culture); Lebanon, Decree No. 2385 Providing Regulation of Commercial and Indus-
trial Property Rights in Syria and Lebanon, Jan. 17, 1924, art. 168, Bulletin Officiel des
Actes Administratifs du Haut Commissariat de la Rpublique Frangaise en Syrie et au
Liban (amended Jan. 31, 1946) (in case author dies leaving no heirs, the Director of the
Protection Office is authorized to enforce and exercise the moral rights); Portugal, Decree-
Law No. 46980 (Copyright Code), No. 99 of Apr. 27, 1966, art. 57, Diario do Governo (moral
rights are exercised by the author's heirs until the works fall into the public domain, and
thereafter by the state); collectively reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (UNESCO 1982).
In France a deceased author's right of disclosure may be exercised by the following
parties in the following order: (1) the author's executors; (2) descendants; (3) spouse; (4)
other heirs; and (5) general legatees. France, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Prop-
erty, Mar. 11, 1957, art. 19, J.O., reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD
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B. The American Response: Noncopyright Alternatives
Despite the well-entrenched, if not perfectly uniform, position
that the moral right enjoys in many European and Third World
nations, 6 creators in the United States are unable to benefit from
express applications of the doctrine. Standing alone, this fact is
neither a tribute to nor an indictment of our legal system.67 The
critical inquiry is whether our failure to embrace the doctrine has
resulted in inadequate protections for the important interests at
stake. The overwhelming number of commentators who have stud-
(UNESCO 1982). French courts can exercise a deceased author's moral right if no heirs
exist. Id. art. 20. Moreover, the National Literary Fund, created by statute in 1946, is em-
powered to protect the integrity of a deceased author's literary works that have fallen into
the public domain, regardless of their country of origin. Id. To date, however, the Fund has
been denied standing to enforce a deceased author's right of integrity if the decedent's heirs
are still alive. See Caisse nationale des Lettres c. Soc. d'Editions et de Diffusion artistiques,
Trib. gr. inst., 16 Apr. 1964, 1964 D.P. 1 746 (Fund denied standing to bring an action seek-
ing confiscation of abridged and distorted version of Victor Hugo's Les Mis~rables on
ground that the author's right of integrity is of a personal nature, and therefore, only Hugo's
living heirs could bring such an action). See generally Sarraute, supra note 16, at 483-84
(brief discussion of the French law on this subject).
66. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix.
67. Some commentators have speculated on the reasons for our country's reluctance to
adopt the moral right doctrine. Mr. Katz, outraged by our failure to adopt the doctrine,
largely blames the judicial and legislative willingness to abdicate responsibility. See Katz,
supra note 24, at 410-20. Professor Merryman, on the other hand, is not surprised by the
"underdeveloped state" of American law on this subject, given that American art only re-
cently has achieved international recognition, and that the law requires time to respond to
social and cultural changes. See Merryman, supra note 16, at 1042; see also Roeder, supra
note 6, at 557 ("Busy with the economic exploitation of her vast natural wealth, America
has, perhaps, neglected the arts; in any event American legal doctrine has done so. .... ).
In addition, the American concept of copyright law is rooted in the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion, and therefore, is greatly influenced by common-law notions of property. Consequently,
the economic aspects of copyright easily predominated over the author's personality inter-
ests. See Francione, The California Art Preservation Act and Federal Preemption by the
1976 Copyright Act-Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 18 CAL. W.L. REv. 189, 193 (1982);
Comment, supra note 38, at 141; Comment, Copyright: Moral Right-A Proposal, 43 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 793, 803-08 (1975) (discussing "evolution of the English-American concept of
copyright"). Interestingly, England, whose membership in the Berne Convention requires it
to recognize the moral right, has failed to adopt the doctrine in an explicit, systematic fash-
ion. Goldstein, Adaptation Rights and Moral Rights in the United Kingdom, the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, INT'L REV. OF INDUSTRIAL PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 43, 46-50 (1983). English copyright law, like American, was predicated on the idea that
authors and printers are entitled to secure economic rewards from the publication of works.
Id. at 46. Protection for a creator's personal rights was not part of the common-law tradi-
tion. England's position on the moral right recently was scrutinized in a government report
which concluded that "the occasion of a new Copyright Act presents a good opportunity to
clarify the position and to bring all the provisions necessary to meet the Paris Act together
in a single statute." Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Designs and Performer's
Protection, A Consultative Document 58 (Cmnd. 8302 H.M.S.O. 1981), quoted in Goldstein,
supra, at 49.
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ied this question have concluded that the scope of protection in
America for the personal rights, of creators is insufficient.6 8 The
criticism is not surprising given that patchwork measures rarely
approximate the degree of protection afforded by a cohesive legal
theory whose exclusive objective is the specific protection of pre-
cise interests.
6 9
The principal doctrines that American courts have relied upon
to protect a creator's moral rights include unfair competition,
breach of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy.70 The in-
creasingly liberal applications of unfair competition law generally
and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act71 in particular have popular-
ized these doctrines as vehicles for redressing alleged violations of
interests protected elsewhere by the rights of integrity and
paternity.72
68. See, e.g., Amarnick, supra note 33, at 60-81 (discussing the right of integrity); Dia-
mond, supra note 6, at 280-81; Krigsman, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as a Defender
of Artists' "Moral Rights," 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 251, 270-72 (1983); Merryman, supra note
16, at 1037-39; Roeder, supra note 6, at 575-78; Comment, supra note 38, at 144, 150. Con-
tra Strauss, supra note 16, at 521-38. But cf. Treece, American Law Analogues of the Au-
thor's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487 (1968-69) (concluding that although doctrine
of common-law copyright offers American creators protection equal to that of their French
counterparts during the period of creation, the American analogues offer less protection af-
ter a work is made public) (the 1976 Act has substantially preempted state common-law
copyright protection for works fixed in a tangible medium; see supra note 1; infra note 375).
69. Cf. Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D. L.
REV. 191, 206 n.68 (1983) (illustrating the right of publicity's superiority over more estab-
lished legal theories in protecting against unauthorized exploitation of an individual's name
and likeness).
70. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 2 M.
NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21[B], at 8-248; see also infra notes 126-46 and accompanying
text.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a), which creates a federal cause of action
against misrepresentation, provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall . . . use in connection with any goods or services . . . any false
description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to de-
scribe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into com-
merce. . . shall be liable to a civil action by any person. . . who believes that he is or
is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id. § 43(a).
72. The right of paternity was at issue in Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1981), in which the court upheld the plaintiff actor's § 43(a) claim on the ground that the
defendant film distributor removed plaintiff's name from the film credits and advertising
materials and substituted the name of another actor. The court determined that the defen-
dant's conduct constituted express reverse palming off, which occurs when a wrongdoer
removes the name of a trademark on another party's goods and sells such goods under a
different name. The court cited precedents establishing § 43(a)'s application to a broad
scope of deceptive practices and thus rejected the defendant's argument that § 43(a) is an
inappropriate basis for relief because its protections do not extend to claims that a movie
contains false information. Id. at 605.
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Courts rely upon express contractual provisions for granting
Professor Nimmer suggests that Montoro may be used as support for the argument that
any author may claim a violation of § 43(a) if his name is eliminated from his published
work. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21[E], at 8-267, -269; see also Follett v. Arbor House
Publishing Co., 497 F. Supp. 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (attributions of authorship that mis-
represent the contribution of the person designated as author violate § 43(a)). Montoro can
be regarded as a rejection of the traditional rule that a creator is not entitled to credit for
his work absent a contrary contractual provision. Cf. Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522, 526-27
(7th Cir. 1947) (in suit by artist to enjoin defendant's reproduction of artist's pictures with-
out his signature, court held that no unfair competition established because artist contractu-
ally relinquished all of his rights with respect to his pictures); Harris v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (plaintiff writer not entitled to screen
credit for her story because she did not retain any rights in her agreement with the defen-
dant producer), rev'd on other grounds, 139 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1943).
In some false attribution cases the right of paternity becomes intertwined with the right
of integrity. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Section 43(a) also has been used as a
basis for relief in these circumstances. In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit determined that the plaintiffs, a group of
British writers and performers known as "Monty Python," stated a cause of action under §
43(a) of the Lanham Act based on the defendant network's broadcasting of a program truth-
fully designated as having been written and performed by the plaintiffs but which had been
edited, without plaintiffs' consent, into a mutilated and distorted form that substantially
departed from the original work. Id. at 23-25. The court noted that a cause of action seeking
redress for deformation of an artist's work "finds its roots in the continental concept of droit
moral, or moral right." Id. at 24. In a concurring opinion, Judge Gurfein objected to the
majority's use of the Lanham Act to vindicate a creator's right of integrity, given that stat-
ute's concern with misdescription of origin. He observed that as long "as it is made clear
that the ABC version is not approved by the Monty Python group, there is no misdescrip-
tion of origin." Id. at 26-27 (Gurfein, J., concurring); see infra notes 84-89 and accompany-
ing text.
Other decisions have suggested that § 43(a) may be used to protect a creator's integrity
and paternity interests in the modification context. See, e.g., Jaeger v. American Int'l Pic-
tures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (in denying the defendant film distributor's
motion to dismiss complaint, the court noted that plaintiff author/director arguably had a
claim under § 43(a) on the ground that defendant represented that plaintiff was the author/
director of an allegedly mutilated and garbled version of plaintiff's film); Geisel v. Poynter
Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 351-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (in action by plaintiff artist/author
against defendants for using his pen name in connection with advertising and sales of dolls
based on his drawings, the court held that defendants violated § 43(a) because they created
a false impression that the plaintiff designed or authorized the dolls); see also Autry v.
Republic Prod., Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. ) (court left undecided whether Lanham Act
would be violated by a producer's mutilation of a motion picture, rendering it substantially
different from original), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954).
State unfair competition law provides another avenue for relief in false attribution
cases. See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952) (defendant's sale of abbre-
viated records made from plaintiff's master discs constitutes unfair competition -if defendant
described recordings as presented by the plaintiff); Jaeger, 330 F. Supp. at 278; Geisel, 295
F. Supp. at 354 n.15; Prouty v. NBC, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939) (in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss in action by plaintiff, author of novel "Stella Dallas," against
radio broadcasting company for misappropriating name of book and using personality of
Stella Dallas in skits, court stated that plaintiff would be entitled to relief on theory of
unfair competition if she showed that defendant appropriated her plot, characters, and liter-
ary production resulting in injury to her reputation and deception of the public); Shaw v.
20 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
relief to creators for violations of their integrity interests.73 In ad-
dition, many courts articulate a willingness to interpret ambiguous
contracts to vindicate a creator's interests.74 In an extremely
Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975) (affirming de-
nial of defendant's summary judgment motion in action by band leader Shaw against record
company for advertising records that it produced as "Artie Shaw versions" of Swing Era
classics); cf. Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1894) (court temporarily enjoined
defendant from selling a book incorporating incorrectly copied fragments of plaintiff's lec-
tures under a title suggesting that book contained entire lecture series in plaintiff's words;
unfair competition not discussed specifically, but court did mention prevention of fraud
upon purchasers as an incidental basis for relief). See infra notes 345-64 and accompanying
text for a discussion regarding the extent to which the 1976 Act preempts state unfair com-
petition actions. See generally Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 543, 364
N.E.2d 570 (1977) (plaintiff singing group established likelihood of success on the merits
with respect to their claim under Illinois Deceptive Trade Practice Act based on defendant's
use of plaintiff's name on an album containing plaintiff's original recordings in an unfin-
ished form, altered by the insertion of additional material by other artists).
73. See, e.g., Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978) (publisher
breached contract with author by publishing revised version of author's book under circum-
stances violative of their agreement); Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811
(S.D.N.Y. 1919) (court enjoined production of motion picture on ground that defendant
movie producer changed sequence of play during adaption process, thereby violating con-
tractual provision that "[n]o alterations, eliminations, or additions to be made in the play
without the approval of the author"); Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 207 A.D. 311, 202 N.Y.S.
164 (1923) (use of work falsely attributed to author and unauthorized use of author's name
in connection with his story under a different title violate contract); Royle v. Dillingham, 53
Misc. 383, 104 N.Y.S. 783 (1907) (unequivocal clause in contract prohibiting changes, altera-
tions and additions to play without the author's consent afforded playwright protection
against unauthorized changes and modifications); see also Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588
(2d Cir. 1952) (contractual provision requiring appropriate attribution of authorship carries
an implied duty not to make changes that convert the required attribution into a false rep-
resentation; thus a court determined that defendant's sale of abbreviated records from
plaintiff's master discs was a breach of contract).
74. See, e.g., Curwood v. Affiliate Distribs., Inc., 283 F. 219, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1922)
(court held that a renowned author's sale of motion picture rights for one of his stories did
not include author's permission to allow purchaser to attach author's name to any picture
purchaser wished to produce); Stevens v. NBC, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755, 758 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1966) (when contract between plaintiff author and defendant broadcasting company did
not contain a grant of rights to make changes in film for purpose of television exhibition,
court enjoined defendant from inserting commercials that would "alter, adversely affect or
emasculate the artistic or pictorial quality of [the film] so as to destroy or distort materially
or substantially the mood, effect, or continuity of [the film]"); see also Edgar Rice Bur-
roughs, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 2d 441, 447-48, 23 Cal. Rptr. 14,
18 (1962) (in interpreting a contract between a writer and movie company that allowed the
movie company to remake the first photoplay as long as there were no "material changes" or
"departures" from the story, court observed that changes are not material "as long as the
locus of the play, the order of sequence, the development of the plot, and the theme,
thought and main action of the story are preserved"); Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 6
Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1957) (in action brought by author against publisher for
libel based on defendant's sale of right to publish translation of plaintiff's book which re-
sulted in a distorted translation, court observed that publisher has duty to select an appro-
priate foreign purchaser and translator when author granted publisher translation rights).
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favorable decision for creators, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.,75 the Second Circuit held that extensive unautho-
rized editing of a work protected by common-law copyright consti-
tutes copyright infringement at least in the absence of a governing
contractual provision. 76 In general, however, if the contract in
question does not address modification rights, American courts will
protect a creator only against excessive mutilation of his work."
75. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
76. The following facts gave rise to the litigation in Gilliam: Monty Python, a British
group of writers and performers, had an agreement with British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) under which BBC was authorized to license the transmission of recordings of the
group's performances in overseas territories. Time-Life Films acquired from BBC the rights
to distribute the Monty Python series in the United States. The agreement between BBC
and Monty Python's scriptwriters gave BBC final authority to make changes prior to re-
cording, although the scriptwriters retained optimum control over the editing process. The
agreement did not, however, authorize BBC to alter a program once it had been recorded.
Further, the scriptwriters retained all other rights in the scripts subject to the terms of the
agreement.
Although the agreement between Monty Python's scriptwriters and BBC did not au-
thorize editing of the programs for insertion of television commercials, Time-Life was au-
thorized by BBC to perform such editing. Subsequently, ABC acquired from Time-Life the
right to broadcast two 90 minute specials containing Monty Python programs. Monty Py-
thon was "appalled" at the "mutilation" and extensive deletions that had resulted from
Time-Life's editing of one program (24 out of 90 minutes had been omitted) and sought to
enjoin further broadcasts. ABC argued that the contracts between Monty Python and BBC
permitted editing of the programs for television in the United States, reasoning that al-
though Monty Python's scriptwriters had the right to participate in the editing process prior
to recording of the programs, BBC had unrestricted authority after that point, which it
could, in turn, assign to others. The court determined, however, that "[s]ince the scriptwrit-
ers' agreement explicitly retains for the group all rights not granted by the contract, omis-
sion of any terms concerning alterations in the program after recording must be read as
reserving to appellants [scriptwriters] exclusive authority for such revisions." Id. at 22.
Thus, because BBC could not convey greater rights than it owned, its permission to allow
Time-Life to edit was a "nullity." Id. at 21; see infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 for a discussion of the unfair competition aspect of this decision.
77. In McGuire v. United Artists Television Prods., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal.
1966), the court held that a writer who had been granted an undetermined measure of "cre-
ative control" over his script still did not have the right to prevent his assignee from delet-
ing portions for the insertion of television commercials because their contract did not con-
tain such a specific prohibition. See also Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 755 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966) (when court found no specific grant of rights by a movie
producer to a television broadcasting company allowing the company to edit the movie for
television broadcasting, court only enjoined editing that would constitute a severe emascula-
tion or material distortion); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267
N.Y.S.2d 594, afld per curiam, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (although plaintiff movie
owner retained the right to final cutting and editing with respect to the movie, such protec-
tion did not extend to television exhibitions; thus, editing rights for television were governed
by prevailing industry custom absent a specific contractual provision), aff'd mem., 18
N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966). Both Stevens and Preminger reject the
view that a producer has a common-law right to have his movie shown on television as he
produced it, especially if his contract requires that his name appear on the television screen
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American creators thus fare less successfully in modification chal-
lenges than their counterparts in moral right countries. As dis-
cussed earlier, foreign courts that maintain an inalienable moral
right will uphold contractual provisions allowing reasonable altera-
tions of a creator's work in certain contexts, but they will refrain
from holding that a creator tacitly has waived his right of integrity
by signing an agreement silent on modification rights.78
The law of defamation offers creators an avenue for relief if
their works are disseminated to the public in such a manner as to
injure their professional reputations. The injury might take the
form of the publication of a mutilated version of the creator's work
under the creator's name,79 or a false attribution of authorship
credits. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Rabin in the Preminger case, 25 A.D.2d 830,
834, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, 918 (Rabin, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d
431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966).
Of course, American courts will enforce contracts in which a creator clearly waives or
assigns his right to make changes, even when such changes amount to a distortion of his
original work. See, e.g., Jones v. American Law Book Co., 125 A.D. 519, 109 N.Y.S. 706
(1908) (when contract between plaintiff writer and defendant book company clearly pro-
vided that any articles prepared by plaintiff were subject to defendant's editorial changes,
defendant cannot be compelled to attribute authorship to plaintiff); Seroff v. Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1957) (in libel action by author against his
publisher based on distorted translation of plaintiff's book, court held publisher not liable
given author's grant of translation and foreign publication rights to publisher, and pub-
lisher's subsequent sale of rights to independent foreign contractor). Mr. Strauss suggests
that even in France, an author's express contractual waiver of the moral right usually is
upheld. Strauss, supra note 16, at 516 (discussing French authority). But see Merryman,
supra note 16, at 1044 (suggesting that an artist's waiver of the right of integrity is not
enforceable against him); supra note 46 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
Waivers of the paternity right also can arise in contract cases, but the traditional Amer-
ican rule is that a creator has no right to compel recognition for his work absent a specific
contractual provision. Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (1910).
See supra note 51 and accompanying text and note 72 for a discussion of cases adhering to
the traditional view and the Ninth Circuit's implicit rejection of this approach in Smith v.
Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
The principles of contract law also may be applied to actions concerning a creator's
refusal to disclose. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. According to a black let-
ter rule of American contract law, personal service contracts are not specifically enforceable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1204
(1964); see, e.g., In re: Noonan, 17 B.R. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (contract between singer and
recording company); American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363
(1981) (contract between television network and sportscaster); DeRivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4
Paige 264 (N.Y. Ch. 1833) (singing contract); see also Treece, supra note 69, at 490.
79. See, e.g., Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979) (action
for libel may be sustained by virtue of publication of author's article in substantially differ-
ent form and content); Locke v. Benton & Bowles, Inc., 253 A.D. 369, 2 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1938)
(false statements interpolated by radio commentator in broadcasting script whose author-
ship was attributed to plaintiff could be actionable).
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with respect to a work of poor quality with which the creator was
not associated. 0 The key to any successful defamation action, how-
ever, is the creator's showing that the unauthorized acts exposed
him to contempt or public ridicule, thus injuring his professional
standing."' Alternatively, a creator whose works have been pub-
lished without his authorization or who is the victim of a false at-
tribution82 may seek to redress his injuries by suing for invasion of
privacy.8 3
Although the substitute theories discussed in this section af-
ford creators varying levels of protection for their moral rights,
American creators typically are at a relative disadvantage com-
pared to creators in moral right countries. The major difficulty fac-
ing American creators is the additional burden of molding moral
rights claims into other recognized causes of action. Given that all
of the substitute theories are supported by a theoretical basis dif-
ferent from that of the moral right doctrine, a successful claim may
require elements of proof which are not applicable directly to a
moral rights claim. The moral right doctrine is concerned with the
creator's personality rights and society's interest in preserving the
80. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643 (1960)
(editorship of compilation with numerous inaccuracies falsely attributed to plaintiff); Ben-
Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929) (publication of article under
plaintiff's name containing false information with respect to plaintiff's area of expertise).
81. Cf. Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defama-
tion claim not established when defendants exercised great care, skill, and judgment in
manufacturing dolls based on plaintiff's drawings, thereby causing no injury to plaintiff's
professional reputation).
Professor Nimmer suggests that the law of defamation, as well as disparagement and
slander of title, may safeguard, to some extent, a creator's right to prevent excessive criti-
cism. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 522; see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978) (author
stated cause of action for invasion of privacy by alleging that publisher published unauthor-
ized revisions of his works); Gieseking v. Urania Records, 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d
171 (1956) (plaintiff stated a cause of action under New York's statutory right of privacy by
alleging that defendant record company made reproductions of plaintiff's piano performance
and sold them as plaintiff's original recordings without his consent).
83. In addition, a creator may seek recovery for the unauthorized appropriation of his
name under a right of publicity theory. See Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Imple-
menting Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo.
L.J. 1539, 1545-47 (1972). Although the right of publicity is an offshoot of the right of pri-
vacy, the theoretical basis of each doctrine differs. Historically, the right of privacy has
served as a means of compensating an individual for injured feelings caused by the defen-
dant's conduct. The typical right of a publicity plaintiff, however, is not objecting to the fact
of the exploitation, but rather to the loss of financial gain associated with the unauthorized
appropriation. For a discussion of the development and application of the right of publicity
generally, see Kwall, supra note 69, at 191.
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integrity of its culture.8 4 These interests are not the exclusive, or
even the primary, focus of any of the substitute theories, all of
which developed in response to completely different social con-
cerns. Unfair competition law, as evidenced by its traditional ele-
ments of competition, passing off of one's goods or services as
those of another, and likelihood of confusion,8 5 seeks to protect ec-
onomic rights and, to a lesser extent, to prevent consumer decep-
tion.86 Similar societal concerns underlie section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, 7 through which Congress intended to vindicate a
producer's economic interests by proscribing false representa-
tions.88 Given the significantly different objectives behind the
moral right doctrine, on the one hand, and unfair competition law
and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act on the other, any protection
that a creator may receive for his personality rights under either of
these substitute theories merely is fortuitous."'
84. See supra notes 16-35 & 60-61 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., American Washboard Co v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
For a history of unfair competition law generally, see Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV.
L. REv. 1289 (1940). Some modern courts do not require an unfair competition plaintiff to
prove competition and passing off, see Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 90 Wis. 2d 379, 399,
280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (1979), but a plaintiff still must prove likelihood of confusion to prevail
under an unfair competition theory.
86. In American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), the
court observed:
[Tihe private right of action in. .. [unfair competition] cases is not based upon fraud
or imposition upon the public, but is maintained solely for the protection of the prop-
erty rights of complainant. It is true that in these cases it is an important factor that
the public are deceived, but it is only where this deception induces the public to buy
the goods as those of complainant that a private right of action arises.
Id. at 285.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (see supra note 71 for text).
88. See, e.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v.
Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). Courts now generally hold that a § 43(a)
plaintiff need not prove palming off and that § 43(a) is applicable to a wide range of decep-
tive practices. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604-05; see also supra note 72.
89. The use of unfair competition law and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act to vindicate a
creator's moral rights has been criticized by numerous authorities. See, e.g., Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1976) (Gurfein, J., concurring); Roe-
der, supra note 6, at 567-68; Annual Review Committee, The Thirtieth Year of Administra-
tion of the Lanham Trandemark Act of 1946, 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 471, 564-68 (1977); see
also Comment, Monty Python and the Lanham Act: In Search of the Moral Right, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 452, 476 (1977) (noting limited utility of Lanham Act in protecting an
artist's moral rights because it applies only in the narrow context of a distorted work that is
misrepresented as the product of the original artist). But see Comment, The Monty Python
Litigation-Of Moral Right and the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 611, 624-25 (1977)
(approving Gilliam's extension of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act to redress situations in which
an extensively edited work is attributed to its original author) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Moral Right and the Lanham Act].
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Defamation and invasion of privacy doctrines are of limited
utility in protecting a creator's moral rights. The personality rights
safeguarded by the moral right doctrine encompass more than pro-
tection for a creator's professional reputation or relief for injured
feelings.90 In addition, courts that invoke either defamation or pri-
vacy theories frequently adhere to technical rules and require-
ments that narrow the application of these doctrines in situations
concerning moral rights.91
To the extent that unfair competition law and § 43(a) are concerned with preventing
public deception, see supra note 86, they share some theoretical common ground with that
aspect of the moral right doctrine that is concerned with preserving accurately society's
cultural integrity. Indeed, the accuracy of the preservation process is threatened when the
public is deceived as to the identity of a creator by a false attribution or by the ultimate
form of a creation through distortion or mutilation.
90. See Comment, supra note 83, at 1549-50 (noting that a creator seeks to protect not
only his reputation but also his work); Comment, Moral Right and the Lanham Act, supra
note 89, at 617 (differentiating interests protected by libel and the moral right: "[t]he per-
sonality of the artist, as opposed to his exploitable reputation, and the act of creation, as
opposed to the mercenary appurtenances to that act, are the concerns of moral right.").
Compare supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text with notes 79-83 and accompanying
text. Similarly the right of publicity's primary objectives are distinct from the rationale un-
derlying the moral right. The right of publicity is concerned with preventing unjust enrich-
ment, guaranteeing an individual his just financial rewards for the fruits of his labors, and
providing appropriate economic incentives so creators will be encouraged to produce works
and thus benefit society. See supra note 83.
91. Libel per quod, which requires resort to extrinsic facts to ascertain the defamatory
meaning, and slander must fall into special categories if the plaintiff is to avoid proof of
special damages supported by specific proof and pecuniary loss. One such category includes
defamations that affect the plaintiff in his business, trade, or profession. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 (5th ed. 1984). Courts, however, exercise
their discretion in deciding whether a particular type of defamation satisfies this exception,
and thus have required proof of special damages in libel actions in which the plaintiffs al-
leged damage to their professional reputations. See, e.g., Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (court dismissed plaintiff's cause of action for
libel resulting from defendant's crediting her with "story research" rather than creative
writing for failure to plead special damages).
The use of libel to vindicate a creator's moral rights is problematic for other reasons as
well. Traditionally, courts will not grant injunctive relief to restrain a personal libel, thereby
denying the creator his most effective remedy. See Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 69-70, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577-78 (1948) (court noted traditional rule,
but stated that it would grant injunctive relief in a proper case), afl'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949); Roeder, supra note 6, at 567. In addition, a libel cause of action will be
of no avail to a creator who believes the integrity of his work has been impaired but who
cannot show damage to his professional standing. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
A creator also must be "sufficiently well-known to have a reputation before he can be li-
beled." Diamond, supra note 6, at 265. Finally, as Mr. Roeder observed, "[t]he conception of
libel would have to be strained beyond the breaking point in order to protect creators of
non-literary works, and to prevent deformation of works after the death of the creator."
Roeder, supra note 6, at 567; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 (1977) ("One
who publishes defamatory matter concerning a deceased person is not liable either to the
estate of the person or to his descendants or relatives.").
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Even contract law, which is the purported basis for decision in
many cases concerning the integrity and paternity components of
the moral right doctrine, e2 cannot function as an adequate substi-
tute. In addition to the limitations presented by the privity re-
Invasion of privacy also is of limited assistance to creators seeking redress for violations
of their moral rights. The scope of the common-law right of privacy varies from state to
state. For example, although traditionally the right of privacy has been regarded as a per-
sonal right that terminates upon the death of the individual, some courts have allowed re-
covery in invasion of privacy actions by the relatives of a decedent when the appropriation
was for commercial purposes. See Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194
(1930); Kwall, supra note 69, at 208-09. This disparity is relevant to the extent that invasion
of privacy is viewed as a substitute for moral right interests, which generally can be exer-
cised by a deceased creator's representatives and relatives. See supra notes 60-65 and ac-
companying text. In some jurisdictions, the right of privacy is statutory. See N.Y. Civi.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 839.1,
839.2 (West 1983); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-40 (Repl. 1984), 18.2-216.1 (1982). These statutes pro-
vide relief to an individual whose name or likeness has been appropriated for commercial
purposes, and thus resemble a right of publicity cause of action. See supra notes 83 & 90. In
applying the New York privacy statute, one court has denied a creator protection for his
paternity interest on the ground that the statute does not protect an artist's distribution of
his work under a pseudonym. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (court held that the name "Dr. Seuss" is an assumed name or pseudonym
rather than a surname and thus not protectable under statute). The New York statute also
contains the following exception that has proved fatal to several invasion of privacy actions
based on moral right violations:
[N]othing contained in this act shall be so construed as to prevent any person ...
from using the name, portrait or picture of any author, composer or artist in connec-
tion with his literary, musical or artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of
with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith.
N.Y. CIVL RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); see, e.g., Kamakazi Music
Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (defendant music publisher
acquired right to use plaintiff artist's name and likeness, under statutory exception, by vir-
tue of plaintiff's disposition of musical compositions to defendant); Geisel v. Poynter Prods.,
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (exception to statute satisfied when defen-
dants held the copyright in cartoons featuring characters created by plaintiff, which defen-
dants used as models for toy dolls); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 379
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975) (statute not applicable when plaintiff placed his musical arrangements
in the public domain and defendant copied them, truthfully stating they had been created
by plaintiff); see also infra text accompanying note 99. One commentator has remarked that
such statutory exceptions are indicative of a failure to recognize the moral right's fundamen-
tal premise that "certain rights stemming from the paternity and integrity interest survive
the grant of the right to use the work." Comment, Moral Right and the Lanham Act, supra
note 89, at 619.
The right of publicity also is problematic as an adequate moral right substitute. Aside
from the drawbacks stemming from the theoretical differences discussed earlier, see supra
note 90, the right of publicity is an evolving doctrine whose scope presently is undeter-
mined. Courts currently are grappling with questions regarding the proprietors of the right,
its descendibility, and its interaction with the first amendment. The descendibility issue, in
particular, has been litigated heavily during the past few years, but little uniformity has
resulted. See Kwall, supra note 69, at 191.
92. See Diamond, supra note 6, at 261.
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quirement9 3 and the judiciary's general reluctance to afford exten-
sive protections for creators absent express contractual
provisions,94 relatively unknown creators face a disparity of bar-
gaining power that frequently results in a loss of valuable
protections.
9 5
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.9 6 illus-
trates the unhappy plight of creators who cannot fit their moral
rights cause of action into any of the alternate theories discussed
above. In Shostakovich several prominent Russian composers
sought injunctive relief against the defendant's use of their music
in a film that, in the plaintiffs' view, had an anti-Soviet theme. In
addition to the use of plaintiffs' music, which was in the public
domain, the defendant used the plaintiffs' names on the credit
lines. The Shostakovich plaintiffs based their right to relief on four
grounds: (1) New York's statutory right of privacy;97 (2) defama-
tion; (3) the deliberate infliction of an injury without just cause;
and (4) violation of moral rights. 8 With respect to the privacy
claim, the court observed that "lack of copyright protection has
long been held to permit others to use the names of authors in
copying, publishing or compiling their works."9 As for the defama-
tion claim, the court reasoned that the music's public domain sta-
tus precluded any implication that the plaintiffs had approved of
or endorsed the film, and thus the court refused to sustain plain-
tiffs' claim for libel. 100 The court treated the plaintiffs' claim for
the infliction of wilfull injury in conjunction with their moral rights
claim. Although the court paid lip service to the moral right doc-
trine by noting that "conceivably under the doctrine of Moral
Right the court could in a proper case, prevent the use of a compo-
sition or work, in the public domain, in such manner as would be
violative of the author's rights,"''1 the court nevertheless declined
the opportunity to vindicate the plaintiffs' interests. In refusing to
grant plaintiffs their requested relief, the court emphasized that
the plaintiffs made no allegations of distortion and no "clear show-
93. See supra note 32.
94. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
95. See Amarnick, supra note 33, at 71-72.
96. 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948), a/i'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
97. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1948).
98. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 69, 80 N.Y.S.2d
575, 577 (1948), afl'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
99. Id., at 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 577; see also supra note 91.
100. Id., at 70, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
101. Id.
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ing of the infliction of a wilfull injury."102 Yet, an injury resulting
from an inappropriate contextual use of a creator's work is actiona-
ble under the moral right doctrine, as evidenced by the French de-
cision granting the plaintiffs in Shostakovich their requested re-
lief.03 A reading of the American Shostakovich opinion suggests,
however, that the court's discomfort with the moral right doctrine
and the difficulty of its application provided the primary impetus
for denying the plaintiffs' moral rights claims. 04
An even more fundamental drawback resulting from the judi-
ciary's reliance on alternate theories rather than a cohesive frame-
work to vindicate moral rights interests is the danger that the com-
peting interests will not receive appropriate attention. Although
the moral right doctrine seeks to protect the interests of creators
and the public in general, entrepreneurs such as publishers, motion
picture producers, broadcasters, and record manufacturers have
valid interests that may be opposed diametrically to the right's ex-
istence and application.10 5 The appropriate balancing of competing
interests in a given case depends not only upon the type of crea-
tion at issue but also upon its intended use.0' The adoption of a
102. Id., at 70-71, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79.
103. The American and French cases were litigated simultaneously. The French court
held that there was "undoubtedly a moral damage" and ordered the film seized. Soc. Le
Chant du Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe, Jan. 13, 1953, Cours d'appel, Paris, Dallez, Jurispru-
dence, [D. Jur.] 16, 80; see Strauss, supra note 16, at 534-35 n.56; cf. Rich v. RCA Corp., 390
F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff singer obtained preliminary injunctive relief against
defendant's use of a current photograph of plaintiff on a newly released album containing
songs previously recorded by plaintiff on ground that such deceptive packaging violates
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act and is likely to deceive consumers).
104. In support of this rationale, the court observed:
The application of the doctrine presents much difficulty. . . .[T]here arises the ques-
tion of the norm by which use of such work is to be tested to determine whether or not
the author's moral right as an author has been violated. Is the standard to be good
taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to be? In the present
state of our law the very existence of the right is not clear, the relative position of the
rights thereunder with reference to the rights of others is not defined nor has the na-
ture of the proper remedy been determined.
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 70-71, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575,
578-79 (1948), afl'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
105. See Roeder, supra note 6, at 577; supra note 48 and accompanying text.
106. Ms. Amarnick distinguished the following three categories of transfers of a crea-
tor's work: (1) sales of a work, such as fine art, intended primarily for the passive possession
and enjoyment of the buyer; (2) sales of a work intended to be used actively, and perhaps
transformed into another medium, by the purchaser; and (3) sales of a work for distribution
in its original medium, such as the sale of the rights to reprint a book in a paperback edi-
tion. Amarnick, supra note 33, at 40-45. Ms. Amarnick also noted that the drafting of an
American moral rights statute "must proceed on the premise that a different balance of
interests must be struck in some types of uses and not others and that the protection of the
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comprehensive moral right doctrine would provide the necessary
framework within which these interests could be balanced
effectively.
Although no comprehensive protection for a creator's moral
rights currently exists in the United States," 7 California and New
York recently have enacted statutes affording visual artists protec-
tion for certain aspects of their moral rights. The California Art
Preservation Act, which became effective on January 1, 1980, pro-
hibits the intentional "physical defacement, mutilation, alteration
or destruction of a work of fine art" by any person except the cre-
ating artist who owns and possesses the work.108 An artist may
integrity of an artwork may not be defined in the same way for all types of uses." Id. at 40.
See infra text accompanying notes 398-411 for a proposal that attempts to balance the com-
peting interests at stake.
107. Numerous attempts have been made to amend our Copyright Act by incorporat-
ing a moral rights provision, but none have met with success. For a discussion of these
efforts, see Amarnick, supra note 33, at 77-80; Katz, supra note 24, at 419. The most recent
proposal is a bill introduced by Congressman Drinan that would incorporate in § 113 of the
1976 Act, which defines the "scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works," a right to "claim authorship of such work and to object to any distortion, mutilation
or other alteration thereof, and to enforce any other limitation recorded in the Copyright
Office that would prevent prejudice to the author's honor and reputation." DRINON, VISUAL
ARTISTS MORAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, H.R. REP. No. 288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 440 (1979).
The right contemplated by this proposal would exist independently of copyright protection,
although the duration of the protection would be the same for both rights. Moreover, a
deceased artist's legal representatives would be able to exercise his rights for 50 years fol-
lowing his death. Id.; see also Amarnick, supra note 33, at 81. As of this writing, Congress
has not taken any action with respect to this proposal.
108. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West 1983). Section 987 provides in its entirety:
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or destruc-
tion of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's personality, is detrimental to the
artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of
fine art against such alteration or destruction; and that there is also a public interest in
preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) "Artist" means the individual or individuals who create a work of fine art.
(2) "Fine art" means an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original
work of art in glass, of recognized quality, but shall not include work prepared under
contract for commercial use by its purchaser.
(3) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association or other
group, however organized.
(4) "Frame" means to prepare, or cause to be prepared, a work of fine art for
display in a manner customarily considered to be appropriate for a work of fine art in
the particular medium.
(5) "Restore" means to return, or cause to be returned, a deteriorated or damaged
work of fine art as nearly as is feasible to its original state or condition, in accordance
with prevailing standards.
(6) "Conserve" means to preserve, or cause to be preserved, a work of fine art by
retarding or preventing deterioration or damage through appropriate treatment in ac-
cordance with prevailing standards in order to maintain the structural integrity to the
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waive these protections, but only by "an instrument in writing ex-
fullest extent possible in an unchanging state.
(7) "Commercial use" means fine art created under a work-for-hire arrangement
for use in advertising, magazines, newspapers, or other print and electronic media.
(c) (1) No person, except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art which
the artist has created, shall intentionally commit, or authorize the intentional commis-
sion of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine
art.
(2) In addition to the prohibitions contained in paragraph (1), no person who
frames, conserves, or restores a work of fine art shall commit, or authorize the commis-
sion of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine
art by any act constituting gross negligence. For purposes of this section, the term
'gross negligence' shall mean the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the
belief that there was an indifference to the particular work of fine art.
(d) The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or, for just and
valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art.
(e) To effectuate the rights created by this section, the artist may commence an action
to recover or obtain any of the following:
(1) Injunctive relief.
(2) Actual damages.
(3) Punitive damages. In the event that punitive damages are awarded, the court
shall, in its discretion, select an organization or organizations engaged in charitable or
educational activities involving the fine arts in California to receive such damages.
(4) Reasonable attorneys' and expert witness fees.
(5) Any other relief which the court deems proper.
(f) In determining whether a work of fine art is of recognized quality, the trier of fact
shall rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art
museums, and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art.
(g) The rights and duties under this section:
(1) Shall, with respect to the artist, or if any artist is deceased, his heir, legatee, or
personal representative, exist until the 50th anniversary of the death of such artist.
(2) Shall exist in addition to any other rights and duties which may now or in the
future be applicable.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (h), may not be waived
except by an instrument in writing expressly so providing which is signed by the artist.
(h) (1) If a work of fine art cannot be removed from a building without substantial
physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of such work, the rights and
duties created under this section, unless expressly reserved by an instrument in writing
signed by the owner of such building and properly recorded, shall be deemed waived.
Such instrument, if properly recorded, shall be binding on subsequent owners of such
building.
(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of fine art which is a part of
such building but which can be removed from the building without substantial harm to
such fine art, and in the course of or after removal, the owner intends to cause or allow
the fine art to suffer physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction, the
rights and duties created under this section shall apply unless the owner has diligently
attempted without success to notify the artist, or, if the artist is deceased, his heir,
legatee, or personal representative, in writing of his intended action affecting the work
of fine art, or unless he did provide notice and that person failed within 90 days either
to remove the work or to pay for its removal. If such work is removed at the expense of
the artist, his heir, legatee, or personal representative, title to such fine art shall pass to
that person.
(3) Nothing in this subdivision shall affect the rights of authorship created in sub-
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pressly so providing which is signed by the artist."10 9 The Act con-
tains a three year statute of limitations that runs from the occur-
rence of the act in question,110 and the artist's rights may be
exercised by his heir, legatee, or personal representative for fifty
years after his death."' Remedies under the Act include injunctive
relief,1 2 actual damages," 3 punitive damages," 4 reasonable attor-
neys' and expert witness fees," 5 and any other relief that a court
may deem appropriate." 6 The statute's protection against destruc-
tion is particularly interesting given the reluctance of foreign juris-
prudence to extend similarly the right of integrity." 7 Nevertheless,
the Act embodies a significant limitation with respect to protecting
creators' integrity interests in that it is applicable only to works of
"fine art""18 which have not been prepared under contract for com-
mercial use by the purchaser." 9 Moreover, the destructive act com-
plained of must be intentional. 20
division (d) of this section.
(i) No action may be maintained to enforce any liability under this section unless
brought within three years of the act complained of or one year after discovery of such
act, whichever is longer.
(j) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1980, and shall apply to claims
based on proscribed acts occurring on or after that date to works of fine art whenever
created.
(k) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stance is held invalid for any reason, such invalidity shall not affect any other provi-
sions or applications of this section which can be effected without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are severable.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1983).
109. Id. § 987(g)(3).
110. Id. § 987(i). The statute provides an alternative of one year after discovery of the
complained of act if this period is longer than three years after the act's occurrence.
111. Id. § 987(g)(1).
112. Id. § 987(e)(1).
113. Id. § 987(e)(2).
114. Id. § 987(e)(3).
115. Id. § 987(e)(4).
116. Id. § 987(e)(5). For a detailed discussion of this statute, see 2 M. NIMMER, supra
note 38, § 8.21[C][2], at 8-255, 8-261.
117. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text; cf. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian
Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949) (artist may not object to the destruction of
his work once it has been sold unconditionally).
118. "Fine art" is defined in the California statute as "an original painting, sculpture,
or drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality, but shall not include
work prepared under contract for commercial use by its purchaser." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 987(c)(1). An unintentional act, however, will give rise to a cause of action if
it is the result of gross negligence by a person who frames, conserves, or restores a work of
fine art, or who authorizes the commission of such an act. Id. § 987(c)(2).
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The New York statute, the Artists' Authorship Rights Act, is
similar to the California Art Preservation Act.121 Under the New
121. N.Y. ARTS & CULTURE LAW § 14.51 (McKinney 1984) (Artists' Authorship Rights
Act) provides:
Whenever used in this article, except where the context clearly requires otherwise, the
terms listed below shall have the following meanings:
1. "Artist" means the creator of a work of fine art;
2. "Conservation" means acts taken to correct deterioration and alteration and
acts taken to prevent, stop or retard deterioration;
3. "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association or other
group, however organized;
4. "Reproduction" means a copy, in any medium, of a work of fine art, that is
displayed or published under circumstances that, reasonably construed, evinces an in-
tent that it be taken as a representation of a work of fine art as created by the artist;
5. "Work of fine art" means any original work of visual or graphic art of any
medium which includes, but is not limited to, the following: painting; drawing; print;
photographic print or sculpture of a limited edition of no more than three hundred
copies; provided however, that "work of fine art" shall not include sequential imagery
such as that in motion pictures.
N.Y. ARTS & CULTURE LAW § 14.53 (McKinney 1984) provides:
1. Except as limited by section 14.57 of this article, the artist shall retain at all
times the right to claim authorship or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship
of his or her work of fine art. The right to claim authorship shall include the right of
the artist to have his or her name appear on or in connection with the work of fine art
as the artist. The right to disclaim authorship shall include the right of the artist to
prevent his or her name from appearing on or in connection with the work of fine art as
the artist. Just and valid reason for disclaiming authorship shall include that the work
of fine art has been altered, defaced, mutilated or modified other than by the artist,
without the artist's consent, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely
to result or has resulted therefrom.
2. The rights created by this section shall exist in addition to any other rights
and duties which may now or in the future be applicable.
N.Y. ARTS & CULTURE LAW § 14.57 (McKinney 1984) provides:
1. Alteration, defacement, mutilation or modification of a work of fine art resulting
from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials will not by itself create
a violation of section 14.53 of this article or a right to disclaim authorship under subdi-
vision one of section 14.55 of this article; provided such alteration, defacement, mutila-
tion or modification was not the result of gross negligence in maintaining or protecting
the work of fine art.
2. In the case of a reproduction, a change that is an ordinary result of the me-
dium of reproduction does not by itself create a violation of section 14.53 of this article
or a right to disclaim authorship under subdivision one of section 14.55 of this article.
3. Conservation shall not constitute an alteration, defacement, mutilation or
modification within the meaning of this article, unless the conservation work can be
shown to be negligent.
4. This article shall not apply to work prepared under contract for advertising or
trade use unless the contract so provides.
5. The provisions of this article shall apply only to works of fine art knowingly
displayed in a place accessible to the public, published or reproduced in this state.
N.Y. ARTS & CULTURE LAW § 14.59 (McKinney .1984) provides:
1. An artist aggreived under section two hundred twenty-eight-n or section two
hundred twenty-eight-o of this article shall have a cause of action for legal and injunc-
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York law, effective January 1, 1984, no person other than the artist
or someone acting under his authority can display publicly or pub-
lish a work of fine art or a reproduction thereof "in an altered,
defaced, mutilated or modified form if the work is displayed, pub-
lished or reproduced as being the work of the artist ... and dam-
age to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result there-
from.' 122 The New York statute guarantees the artist the right to
compel recognition for his work of fine art as well as the right to
disclaim authorship, and provides that a "[j]ust and valid reason
for disclaiming authorship shall include that the work of fine art
has been altered, defaced, mutilated or modified other than by the
artist, without the artist's consent, and damage to the artist's repu-
tation is reasonably likely to result or has resulted therefrom.' 1 23
Any artist who is aggreived under the statute has a cause of action
for legal and injunctive relief.124 Certain limitations are contained
in the statute, however, including a qualified exemption for works
prepared for advertising or trade use and the statute's narrowed
applicability "only to works of fine art knowingly displayed in a
place accessible to the public, published or reproduced" in New
York state.
125
Although both the California and New York statutes represent
a positive step for the protection of some moral rights for some
creators, much more extensive legislation is needed in the United
States so that creators of all categories can obtain a broader range
of protections. The following part examines the extent to which
such protections are compatible with our present copyright statute.
tive relief.
2. No action may be maintained to enforce any liability under this article unless
brought within three years of the act complained of or one year after the constructive
discovery of such act, whichever is longer.
122. Id. § 14.53. The New York statute clearly prohibits the public display of muti-
lated reproductions of fine art. It is unclear whether the California Art Preservation Act
protects a reproduction from mutilation or destruction, given that statute's definition of
"fine art." See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West 1983); 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, §
8.21[C][21, at 8-257 n.34.3.
123. N.Y. ARTS & CULTURE LAW § 14.55(1) (McKinney 1984). Unlike the California
law, the New York statute does not appear to prohibit destruction of works of fine art. Cf.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West 1983).
124. N.Y. ARTS & CULTURE LAW § 14.59(1) (McKinney 1984).
125. Id. § 14.57(5). For a more detailed discussion of this statute, see Comment, The
New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: Increased Protection and Enhanced Status for
Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158 (1984). See infra notes 368-97 for a discussion of
whether state statutes protecting moral rights pose preemption problems under § 301 of the
1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
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III. THE COPYRIGHT - MORAL RIGHT INTERFACE
A. Copyright Law as a Limited Substitute for the Moral Right
Courts and commentators have posited copyright law as a sub-
stitute theory for the moral right doctrine, but like the other alter-
natives discussed above, traditional copyright law is of limited util-
ity in vindicating all of the interests protected by moral rights. The
court in Gilliam v. AmericanBroadcasting Companies, Inc.126 ap-
plied the 1909 Copyright Act127 in a novel fashion to grant relief to
the plaintiffs, a group of British writers and performers whose
scripts had been edited extensively after they were produced into
British television programs but prior to their broadcast on defen-
dant's American television network. The court ultimately con-
cluded that the defendant, a remote sublicensee of the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), committed copyright infringe-
ment as a result of the extensive editing because the contract be-
tween the plaintiffs and BBC did not grant specifically to BBC the
right to edit the programs once they had been recorded. BBC,
therefore, could not grant rights that it did not possess to benefit
its sublicensee. 128 Critical to the court's ruling was its finding that
the group had retained a common-law copyright in their original,
unpublished scripts upon which BBC based the recorded television
programs.2 9 Analogizing the situation to one in which a user li-
censed to create certain derivative works from a copyrighted script
exceeds the media or time restrictions of his license in the produc-
tion of a derivative work, the court held that the extensive editing
exceeded the scope of any license that BBC was entitled to grant.
The peculiar fact situation in Gilliam arguably militates
against the decision's application in a broad range of copyright
cases concerning aspects of the moral right.1 30 In Gilliam the court
126. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
127. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (repealed 1976).
128. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976).
129. Id. at 19 n.3.
130. See Diamond, supra note 6, at 264. Professor Nimmer has accused the court of
begging the question as to whether copyright ownership includes the right to prohibit muti-
lating revisions in the work:
"[W/here, as in Gilliam, the defendant is clearly authorized to reproduce and/or per-
form, is he nevertheless an infringer if he makes unauthorized changes in the work, and
if so, what right has he infringed? Although the Gilliam court is not explicit on this
point, it apparently reasoned that absent an express authorization to make changes,
the license to reproduce and/or perform is limited to reproduction and/or performance
in the form in which the authors wrote the work, so that a material departure from
such form goes beyond the terms of the license, and hence results in an infringement of
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relied heavily upon the agreement between the plaintiffs and BBC
which provided that all rights which were not granted to BBC were
retained by the plaintiffs.13' Thus, Gilliam's ultimate moral right
significance may be that in the face of a silent contract, an artist
will not be held to have granted his licensee the right to perform
extensive editing.
132
At least one court has approved expressly Gilliam's copyright
infringement holding. In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v.
United Video, Inc.,33 WGN, an independent television broadcast-
ing company, sought injunctive relief against a telecommunications
common carrier for removing teletext material encoded in the ver-
tical blanking intervals of the television signal of the plaintiff's
copyrighted evening news program prior to retransmitting the pro-
gram.134 The Seventh Circuit determined that WGN's news pro-
gram copyright included the teletext in the vertical blanking inter-
vals. Therefore, the defendant's deletion of the teletext from its
retransmission was "an alteration of a copyrighted work and hence
an infringement under familiar principles.' 3  Curiously, the court
failed to discuss any of the "familiar principles," but relied exclu-
the reproduction and/or performance rights. This, then, relies upon finding an implied
condition which precludes exercising the rights granted if material changes are made in
the work. A less strained approach which could achieve the same result would be to
find that a grant of certain rights (e.g., reproduction and/or performance rights) does
not in itself constitute a grant of one of the other rights conferred upon an author,
namely the adaptation right.
2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21[C][1], at 8-251, 8-252 (footnote omitted).
131. See supra note 76. One commentator has argued that this contract reliance on
the part of the court was misplaced because "the reservation clause was limited to plaintiff's
scripts," and therefore, did not apply to the recorded programs. Comment, Moral Right and
the Lanham Act, supra note 89, at 630.
132. See Comment, Moral Right and the Lanham Act, supra note 89, at 631. The
Gilliam court observed that the sublicensee had deleted approximately 27% of the original
program prior to broadcast. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.
1976); see also infra text preceding and accompanying notes 155-56.
133. 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
134. The WGN court defined vertical blanking interval as:
Each picture that flashes on a television screen is generated by an electron gun
behind the screen that moves rapidly back and forth from the top to the bottom of the
screen. When the gun reaches the bottom it shuts off and returns to the top of the
screen to begin again. The interval in which the gun is shut off-an interval too brief
for the viewer to be aware of-is the vertical blanking interval.
Id. at 623. Although traditionally these intervals have been used to carry signals that in-
struct the television set how to set up the next picture on the screen, they can also be used
to carry information on the bottom of the television screen such as subtitles for deaf people,
news bulletins, or weather reports. Id. at 623-24.
135. Id. at 625.
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sively on Gilliam as support for this assertion. 3 6 A careful reading
of WGN suggests that the court believed that the defendant's lia-
bility for deleting the teletext was mandated by the spirit of sec-
tion 111 of the 1976 Act, which governs secondary transmissions. 3 7
The court was handicapped, however, by the defendant's status as
an intermediate carrier,138 given the express statutory prohibition
against cable system deletions and alterations in a "secondary
transmission to the public."'' 39 Gilliam, therefore, provided the
WGN court with useful language in support of its desired position.
Although WGN did not arise in a moral rights context, surely the
WGN court's validation of the Gilliam rationale could be used ad-
136. Quoting Gilliam, the WGN court stated:
A copyright licensee who "makes an unauthorized use of the underlying work by pub-
lishing it in a truncated version" is an infringer-any "unauthorized editing of the un-
derlying work, if proven, would constitute an infringement of the copyright in that
work similar to any other use of a work that exceeded the license granted by the pro-
prietor of the copyright."
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d at 625 (quoting Gilliam
v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976)).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982) ("Limitations on exclusive rights: Secondary trans-
missions").
138. The WGN defendant did not retransmit WGN's signal directly to the public, but
instead transmitted the signal to cable systems, which in turn, transmitted the signal to
respective subscribers. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d
at 625.
139. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3) (1982) (emphasis supplied). Section 111(c)(3) provides, in
pertinent part:
[T]he secondary transmission to the public by a cable system ... is actionable as an
act of infringement ... if the content of the particular program in which the perform-
ance or display is embodied, or any commercial advertising or station announcements
transmitted by the primary transmitter ...is in any way willfully altered by the
cable system through changes, deletions, or additions ....
Id., (emphasis supplied).
Section 111(a)(3) of the 1976 Act exempts from liability a secondary transmission by
any carrier "who has no direct or indirect control over the content or selection of the pri-
mary transmission ... and whose activities with respect to the secondary transmission con-
sist solely of providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of others
... I"!d.
In interpreting the statutory copyright sections, the WGN court concluded that the
defendant was not immune from the prohibition in § 111(c)(3) on the ground that it was an
intermediate carrier rather than a cable system that transmits signals directly to the public.
The court reasoned that the passive carrier exemption in § 111(a)(3) "would be superfluous"
if intermediate carriers such as the defendant "could never be infringers anyway because
they do not transmit directly to the public." WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., v. United
Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982). Otherwise, intermediate carriers such as the
defendant "could mutilate to [their] heart[s'] content the broadcast signal" and copyright
proprietors would be left without any viable recourse. Id. at 625. Thus, given the express
prohibition contained in § 111(c)(3) and the defendant's failure to qualify as a passive car-
rier under § 111(a)(3) by virtue of its intentional deletions, the court was not willing to
interpret § 111(c)(3) narrowly to absolve the defendant from liability.
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vantageously by creators who have retained some of the exclusive
rights embodied in their copyrights and who are seeking to use the
copyright laws to protect aspects of their moral rights.140
On the whole, copyright law cannot function as an adequate
moral right substitute. The copyright law's overriding concern for
the copyright owner rather than the creator is a significant disad-
vantage for creators whose moral right interests conflict with the
pecuniary interests of the copyright owners of their works.'
Moreover, copyright law fails to protect explicitly most interests
safeguarded by the moral right doctrine. A recent case in point is
Wolfe v. United Artists Music Co.,' 42 an action by a song writer
against his music publisher predicated, in part, on an alleged copy-
right infringement resulting from the defendants' erroneous desig-
nations of authorship credit and copyright ownership with respect
to some of the plaintiff's songs. In granting the defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the court concluded that the copyright claims did not "arise
under" the 1976 Act for purposes of conferring federal jurisdic-
tion.' 43 According to the court, the critical inquiry is "whether mis-
designation of ownership (or authorship) is an infringement of cop-
yright. 14 4 Holding that it is not "an infringement to remove a
credit to authorship in publishing a work pursuant to an otherwise
valid licensing agreement," the court observed that the plaintiff's
cause of action against the defendants was based on contract
140. Section 106 of the 1976 Act provides that the copyright owner has the "exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following":
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, least or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audicvisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Each of these rights can be separately transferred and owned. See
infra note 191; see also infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 382-84, 396 & 398-408 and accompanying text, and text preceding
note 392; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
142. 583 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1983).





rather than copyright law.145 The implicit rationale of the Wolfe
decision is that the 1976 Act does not incorporate the moral right
of paternity.
The economic interests protected by the copyright laws are in-
tertwined substantially with the personal interests that are the fo-
cus of the moral right doctrine. 146 Indeed, if the moral right doc-
trine were to become a part of our jurisprudence in the future, its
scope would be influenced significantly by the 1976 Act. The rela-
tionship between the 1976 Act and the moral right doctrine must
be examined, therefore, to assess any future development of the
doctrine in the United States.
B. The 1976 Copyright Act
The 1976 Act contains only one provision that explicitly recog-
nizes, in a limited context, an interest protected elsewhere by the
moral right doctrine. Section 115 allows the reproduction in pho-
norecords of a musical composition that has been reproduced in
phonorecords and distributed previously, provided the copyright
owner is notified and receives a specified royalty.147 Section
115(a)(2) stipulates that a compulsory license includes the privi-
lege of making a musical arrangement of the work that conforms to
the style of the concerned performance, as long as the arrangement
does not "change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
work.' 1 48 The legislative history for section 115(a)(2) reveals that
145. Id.; see also Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 32, 33
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (alleged copyright infringement claim, based in part on failure to credit
plaintiff, dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction).
146. As one commentator has observed:
[P]rotection of the artist's personal interest in preventing the distorted presentation of
his work appears to be a necessary incident of the protection, currently afforded by the
copyright laws, to the artist's economic interest in the commercial exploitation of his
work. As the Second Circuit correctly perceived, the economic incentive for the crea-
tion and dissemination of artistic work which is furnished by copyright protection is
threatened to the extent that the artist is unable to control the manner in which his
work is displayed to the public upon which he is financially dependent. In this sense,
then, an artist's "moral right" protects both his personal interest in preserving his own
artistic integrity and his economic interest in maintaining his artistic reputation and
thereby the long-run marketability of his work. It therefore seems that vindication of
this moral right, although not directly achievable under the copyright laws, is consis-
tent with the policies and objectives sought to be advanced by those laws ....
Comment, supra note 48, at 477 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original) (discussing Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1976)); see also infra text preceding and accompanying note 201.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) provides:
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the provision "is intended to recognize the practical need for a lim-
ited privilege to make arrangements of music being used under a
compulsory license, but without allowing the music to be per-
verted, distorted, or travestied."'I4 To date, no pertinent litigation
has arisen with respect to section 115(a)(2), and therefore, no con-
tent has been given to that provision's prohibition of changes in
the "basic melody or fundamental character of the work."
1. The Act's Potential for Safeguarding Moral Rights
Although the 1976 Act does not recognize explicitly any as-
pects of the moral right doctrine other than that which is incorpo-
rated in section 115, it does contain several provisions that could
have a significant effect upon the scope of a moral right doctrine in
this country. As the following discussion demonstrates, some of
these provisions have a sizable potential for vindicating the per-
sonal rights of creators. One of the most important provisions in
this regard is section 106(2), which grants to the copyright owner
the exclusive right to prepare and to authorize the preparation of
"derivative works based upon the copyrighted work."'150 Section
101 defines a "derivative work" as one that "represent[s] an origi-
nal work of authorship" but is "based upon one or more preexist-
ing works."'15 1
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of
the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation
of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a deriva-
tive work under this title, except with the express consent of the copyright owner.
149. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5659, 5724.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
151. Id. § 101. The "preexisting work" must be included within the general subject
matter of copyright delineated in § 102, regardless of whether it is or ever was copyrighted.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5671. Section 102 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis-
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A creator can prevent unauthorized alterations and modifica-
tions of his work by invoking section 106(2), for such actions pre-
sumably would result in an unauthorized derivative work.152 In this
situation the effect of section 106(2) is most obvious because there
is no dispositive contractual arrangement between the creator and
the entity making the unauthorized alterations. In addition, how-
ever, the copyright proprietor's exclusive rights relating to the
preparation of derivative works raises a fascinating issue concern-
ing a creator's paternity and integrity interests in authorized deriv-
ative works. For. purposes of illustration, return to the previously
discussed scenarios featuring our unfortunate, hypothetical play-
wright. The playwright authorizes a motion picture company to
produce a movie based on her work, but has retained all other
rights in her play. In the playwright's opinion, however, the motion
picture company's final product, which is publicized as "based
upon" her play, is a substantial distortion of her original theme
and story line. 153 Does the playwright have any recourse in this sit-
uation under section 106(2) of the 1976 Act?
The playwright could rely upon the Gilliam rationale by as-
serting that the movie company has violated the scope of their
agreement. Specifically, she could argue that in the agreement, she
assigned to the company her right under section 106(2) to prepare
a derivative work based upon her play, and to use her name in
covery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work.
Id. § 102(a).
Section 101 defines a derivative work as:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".
Id. § 101.
Section 103 governs copyrights in derivative works. Essentially, § 103 provides that a
copyright in a derivative work covers only the original material added by the adapter. The
copyright for the derivative work, therefore, does not affect the copyright or public domain
status of the preexisting material. Moreover, protection for a derivative work that employs
preexisting copyrighted material does not "extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully." Id. § 103(a).
152. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21[D], at 8-261 (arguing that the right to
prevent alterations of a creator's work "would seem to be precisely 'equivalent'" to the right
in § 106(2)); see also infra text accompanying note 389. Even if a creator has assigned all of
his copyrights in a particular work, he probably can bring an infringement action as a "ben-
eficial owner." See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 28 and preceding text and note 140 and accompanying text.
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connection therewith, but that the company violated this agree-
ment because the movie ultimately produced was so extensively al-
tered that it was not "based upon" her play within the meaning of
section 106(2). Of course, the situations in Gilliam and our hypo-
thetical case are not identical. In Gilliam a licensee of the creators
authorized the defendants to reproduce the work, but due to the
contractual agreement between the licensee and the creators, the
licensee could not have authorized the defendants to perform the
type of editing at issue. In our hypothetical case, the playwright
authorized the movie company to prepare a derivative work, which
authorization in itself necessitates a certain number of changes.5
Although Gilliam does not hold explicitly that copyright ownership
includes the right to prohibit mutilating changes in a work, the
Gilliam opinion relied upon the existence of an implied condition
of assignment that would preclude the defendants from exercising
the reproduction and performance rights which they were granted
if they made material changes in the work. 15 5 Similarly, when the
right to prepare a derivative work is at issue, the Gilliam rationale
supports an inferred condition that the right cannot be exercised if
the changes which are made constitute mutilation and the deriva-
tive work is billed as "based upon" the creator's underlying work.
Hence, the performance of such alterations and resulting false at-
tribution constitute an infringement under section 106(2), just as
the performance of the unauthorized editing in Gilliam violated
the rights granted to the defendants in that case.
156
154. Arguably if the movie company had made too many changes in the play, the play-
wright would have no action for copyright infringement because the movie version then
would not be "based upon" the playwright's work. In our hypothetical case, however, the
movie company is advertising the movie as "based upon" the play, and this assertion alone
should enable the playwright to claim an infringement under § 106(2).
155. See supra note 130 (Professor Nimmer's remarks).
156. This false attribution interpretation of Gilliam comports with the court's analogy
to situations concerning a licensee's failure to adhere to media and time restrictions in the
production of a derivative work based upon a preexisting work. See supra text following
note 129. The Gilliam court observed:
The rationale for finding infringement when a licensee exceeds time or media re-
strictions on his license-the need to allow the proprietor of the underlying copyright
to control the method in which his work is presented to the public-applies equally to
the situation in which a licensee makes an unauthorized use of the underlying work by
publishing it in a truncated version. Whether intended to allow greater economic ex-
ploitation of the work, as in the media and time cases, or to ensure that the copyright
proprietor retains a veto power over revisions desired for the derivative work, the abil-
ity of the copyright holder to control his work remains paramount in our copyright law.
We find, therefore, that unauthorized editing of the underlying work, if proven, would
constitute an infringement of the copyright in that work similar to any other use of a
1985]
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The ultimate success of the Gilliam argument depends upon
the interpretation of the phrase "derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work" as it is used in section 106(2). 57 Although the
phrase "based upon" may, at first glance, appear self-explanatory,
application of the phrase in this context is difficult because it re-
quires a determination of the degree of creative liberty that is
properly exercisable by one who transforms a preexisting work into
another medium. 158 No court has had occasion to interpret section
106(2) in this particular context, but decisions exist in which the
import of the phrase "based upon" was explored in analogous cir-
cumstances. 15 At least one court, in determining whether a defen-
dant's movie was "based upon" a particular book in the context of
plaintiffs' allegation that the movie infringed the book, invoked the
"substantial similarity" test used by the courts in deciding copy-
right infringement actions.6 0 The court ultimately concluded, as a
matter of law, that the film was not "based upon" the book be-
cause a reasonable jury could not find that the two works were
"substantially similar beyond the level of generalized ideas or
themes."161
work that exceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the copyright.
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982) (emphasis supplied). A similar phrase appears in the
definition of a "derivative work" in § 101. Id. § 101. ("A 'derivative work' is a work based
upon one or more preexisting works .... ").
158. Transformation liberties apparently are allowed even in countries that have
adopted the moral right. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
159. Professor Nimmer observed that contracts for the sale or license of an author's
work that contain an express provision entitling the author to credit usually refer "to such
credit in connection with any production based upon the author's work." 2 M. NIMMER,
supra note 38, § 8.21[E], at 8-270.3, .4 (emphasis supplied).
160. See Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 623 (2d Cir. 1982),
aft'g, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also infra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
161. 683 F.2d at 624. The facts of the plaintiffs' infringement claim were rather com-
plicated. The heirs of the author of the book in question brought an action against the
movie company with whom the author's licensee had entered into an agreement nearly 50
years earlier. That agreement granted the movie company the rights to create and write an
original story using the character Tarzan that the author had developed in prior books, and
to produce a photoplay "based" on the movie company's original story. The agreement also
provided that the movie company had the right to remake this photoplay and to "produce
additional photoplays based on said story" but that all subsequent productions had to be
"based substantially upon the same story" as the company used in connection with the first
photoplay. Id. at 615. Further, the movie company agreed that any subsequent remakes or
additional photoplays would contain "no material changes or material departures from the
story used in connection with said photoplay." Id.; see Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 14, 205 Cal. App. 441 (1962) (action brought by author's
licensee claiming that a remake of the first photoplay violated this agreement).
The Burroughs plaintiffs had terminated the copyright interest of the author's original
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Some courts facing contractual disputes apart from copyright
infringement claims have gravitated toward different standards for
determining whether a particular derivative work is "based upon"
a preexisting work.'62 In distinguishing the copyright "substantial
similarity" standard from that employed in a contract claim alleg-
ing that the defendants based their television series on a material
element of the plaintiff's program, one court remarked that the
similarities probably would not have to be as "pronounced" under
the contract standard as under the copyright standard. 6 3 In an-
other action, Weitzenkorn v. Lesser,164 the court determined that
the similarities between the plaintiff's story and the defendant's
movie were sufficient to state a contract claim, but that no sub-
stantial similarity existed between the "protectible portions" of
plaintiff's story and the defendant's movie for purposes of a com-
licensee pursuant to § 304(c) of the 1976 Act. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
Thus, the party with whom the defendant movie company had contracted had lost the un-
derlying copyright interest in the author's works. The plaintiffs, therefore, were arguing that
the defendant's new remake of the first photoplay, if it was a faithful remake of the original
film, infringed one of the author's books given the plaintiffs' exercise of their termination
rights. The movie company, however, argued that its rights under the original agreement
were not subject to the plaintiffs' termination because its original film was not "based upon"
any of the author's copyrighted works, but instead on the movie company's original story.
683 F.2d at 618. After comparing the original film to the book to determine whether the
original film was, in fact, based on the book and applying the "substantial similarity" test,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument.
162. Professor Nimmer endorsed the "substantial similarity" test to construe the
phrase "based upon" even in contractual disputes not concerning copyright infringement
claims:
[A]bsent any expressed intent to the contrary the phrase "based upon" should reasona-
bly be construed to set up a copyright infringement standard of similarity. That is, if
the final production so departs from the author's work that even if there had been no
grant of rights by the author the resulting production would not constitute a copyright
infringement for lack of substantial similarity, then the production should not be re-
garded as "based upon" the author's work.
2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21[E], at 8-270.4 (footnotes omitted).
163. See Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1008, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 679, 689 (1970). The court suggested that different standards are appropriate for con-
tract and copyright infringement claims because "the gauge on the contract counts is keyed
to the pleaded language." Id. at 1008, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 688. Commenting further upon the
significance of the different standards, the Fink court remarked: "'Based upon' does seem
to be something a little different than having substantial similarity to a material element or
qualitatively important part. The varying level of creation is clearly recognized." Id., 88 Cal.
Rptr. at 689; see also Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(court analogized phrase "based on" or the word "based" to phrases such as "derived from,"
"suggested by," or "inspired by"); cf. Hospital for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner
Theater, 516 F. Supp. 67, 73 (E.D. Va. 1980) ("[tlhe use of words such as 'based on' or
'derived from' may be sufficient to negate any false designation or description that may
otherwise be present").
164. 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953).
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mon-law copyright claim.165
One could argue that the rationale of the cases interpreting
the phrase "based upon" in the context of contractual disputes
suggests that a derivative work could still be "based upon" a pre-
existing work within the meaning of section 106(2) even if the two
works would not be regarded as substantially similar for copyright
infringement purposes. Perhaps a more stringent standard for
copyright infringement is justifiable given that a defendant in a
copyright infringement action allegedly is guilty of theft of the
plaintiff's property whereas our hypothetical motion picture com-
pany changed the playwright's story only "for the purpose of ad-
ding to the interest and profit of the story. ' 16 6 Relying on this dis-
tinction, one judge has posited the following standard:
[H]as the story been so far departed from in the play that it cannot reasona-
bly be said to be based upon the plaintiff's story, having due regard for the
rights of the plaintiff to credit for his achievement in producing the story,
and the right of the public not to be deceived by reason of credit falsely given
to an author.1 17
165. The Wietzenkorn court observed:
The charge of breach of contract, however, is dependent upon the allegation that
the motion picture "is patterned upon and copies and uses" Weitzenkorn's composi-
tion. If, as a matter of law, there is no similarity whatsoever between the productions,
the ... [contract] count does not state a cause of action. However, although there is no
similarity between protectible portions of Weitzenkorn's composition and the defen-
dant's production, similarity may exist because of the combination of characters, locale,
and myth. It is conceivable, even though improbable, that Weitzenkorn might be able
to introduce evidence tending to show that the parties entered into an express contract
whereby Lesser and Lesser Productions agreed to pay for her production regardless of
its protectibility and no matter how slight or commonplace the portion which they
used. Such evidence, together with comparison of the productions, would present ques-
tions of fact for the jury as to the terms of the contract, access, similarity, and copying.
Under these circumstances, the facts pleaded in the . . . [contract] count are sufficient
to state a cause of action and the demurrer to it was improperly sustained.
Id. at 792, 256 P.2d at 957-58 (emphasis supplied); see also Whitfield v. Lear, 582 F. Supp.
1186, 1191 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (in resolving breach of implied contract action based on defen-
dants' use of plaintiff's ideas, court invoked a more flexible standard than the copyright
requirement of "substantial similarity"); Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 505, 72
Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (1968) (although no substantial similarity between protectible portions
of plaintiff's pilot film and defendants film for purposes of sustaining common-law copyright
count, court held that enough similarities existed for a jury to infer that plaintiff's "ideas
and format were the inspiration for" defendant's work for implied contract count); cf. Weit-
zenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 798-99, 256 P.2d 947, 961-62 (1953) (Carter, J., dissenting)
(objecting to majority's standard as "too strict a test for determining the issue of similarity
between the two productions").
166. Paramount Prods., Inc. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1937) (Wilbur, J.,
dissenting) (action by writer against movie company for breach of contract based on defen-
dant's failure to credit plaintiff with authorship of story).
167. Id.
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This standard would permit more creative liberties on the part of
the adapter than would be tolerated if courts used a "substantial
similarity" test.168
On balance, however, the "substantial similarity" test is the
more appropriate standard to judge whether a derivative work is
"based upon" a preexisting work within the meaning of section
106(2). In providing that the copyright owner has the exclusive
right to prepare or authorize the preparation of any derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work, Congress, in section
106(2), contemplated that the preparation of an unauthorized de-
rivative work constitutes copyright infringement.16 9 Although the
legislative history discloses no specific guidelines for determining
when an unauthorized derivative work infringes the original
work,17 0 most courts would invoke the "substantial similarity" test
to determine infringement.17 ' Therefore, if our playwright had
168. But see id. (in rephrasing this standard, dissenting judge remarked that the film
and the plaintiffs story must be compared to determine "whether or not there is so strong a
resemblance between the two that the plaintiff was entitled to have the public informed
through the screen production of the story that he was the author of the play. . . .") (em-
phasis supplied).
169. See supra text accompanying note 150.
170. The House Report provides: "[T]o constitute a violation of section 106(2), the
infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form; for exam-
ple, a detailed commentary on a work or a programmatic musical composition inspired by a
novel would not normally constitute infringements under this clause." H.R. REP. No. 1476,
supra note 149, at 5675.
171. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[A], at 13-17 ("Just as copying is an
essential element of infringement, so substantial similarity between the plaintiffs and de-
fendant's works is an essential element of copying."). A detailed discussion of the "substan-
tial similarity" test is outside the scope of this Article. See id. § 13.03, at 13-17 to -54 for a
comprehensive treatment of this issue.
Professor Goldstein has argued that some cases alleging derivative rights infringements
actually concern the appropriation of noncopyrightable elements such as titles and character
names, and therefore, should be decided on the basis of unfair competition law rather than
copyright law. In highlighting this distinction between derivative rights and unfair competi-
tion law, he observed:
Unfair competition law's comparative advantages in resolving issues that might
otherwise be resolved through an extended application of copyright's idea-expression
distinction stem from the fact that, unlike copyright, which is concerned with expres-
sive content, unfair competition is tailored to the capacity of information-symbols,
titles and aggregates of ideas-to command public acceptance in the marketplace.
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 209,
224 (1983). Therefore, in deciding derivative rights infringement cases, courts should deter-
mine initially whether a derivative right actually is at issue "purposefully ignorfing] un-
copyrightable elements such as titles and character names, and ask[ing] whether, absent
these elements, the accused work sufficiently tracks the underlying work to infringe." Id. at
226. Only after this analysis discloses "some expressive similarities" should courts "ask
whether these similarities are sufficiently substantial for the copyright infringement claim to
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never entered into an agreement with the movie company, the
playwright would have an action for copyright infringement under
section 106(2), perhaps with a corresponding right to compel recog-
nition for her work,172 assuming she could prove that the movie
company's product was substantially similar to her own. Logically,
courts should apply the same standard in the converse situation
presented by the hypothetical case. If the movie company's prod-
uct can satisfy the "substantial similarity" test, the playwright
should not be able to rely successfully on Gilliam to support her
claim under section 106(2). 111 The alterations of the play would not
be sufficiently extreme to warrant a holding that the movie com-
pany had exceeded its derivative rights assignment. If, however,
the movie is not substantially similar to the play, the playwright
should prevail, even if it is possible that the movie satisfies the
looser "based upon" standard sometimes invoked in contract
cases.
1 7 4
Application of the "substantial similarity" test, however, is ex-
tremely problematic, particularly in the context of adaptations.
17 5
One popular method for determining substantial similarity is the
"ordinary observation or impression" test.17 6 This test requires the
ordinary observer to perceive a substantial similarity between the
two works in question, "so that the alleged copy comes so near to
succeed." Id.
172. Although the 1976 Act does not specifically provide for a plaintiff's right to com-
pel recognition for his work, a court could enjoin the defendant's use of the plaintiff's work
without an appropriate attribution. This remedy is consistent with the language of § 502(a),
which provides: "Any court having jurisdiction ... may ... grant temporary and final in-
junctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
173. See supra text preceding and accompanying notes 155-56.
174. According to Professor Nimmer, "a work will be considered a derivative work
only if it would be considered an infringing work if the material which it has derived from a
preexisting work had been taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such pre-
existing work." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 3.01, at 3-3. In other words, "[a] work is not
derivative unless it has substantially copied from a prior work." Id.; see also Eden Toys,
Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original)
(derivative works entitled to registration even though they would infringe the original copy-
righted work if created without the permission of copyright owner of underlying work).
175. Professor Nimmer remarked that "the determination of the extent of similarity
which will constitute a substantial and hence infringing similarity presents one of the most
difficult questions in copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible of helpful general-
izations." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[A], at 13-18 (emphasis in original); see also
id., § 13.03[E], at 13-44, -45 (discussing problem in context of transformations of a work
into a different medium).
176. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979); 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[E], at 13-40.
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the original as to give the audience the idea created by the origi-
nal. ' 17 7 The use of this test with respect to derivative and preexist-
ing works requires caution, however, because the technical require-
ments of a different medium usually necessitate certain changes,
which could lull an ordinary observer into believing that no sub-
stantial similarity exists.'78 In commenting on this problem, one
court noted the importance of educating the trier of fact with re-
spect to any differences that are mandated by the adaptation pro-
cess so as to preserve the creator's valuable rights under section
106(2).179
Although section 106(2) does not mention moral rights, the
foregoing analysis illustrates how section 106(2) can be utilized by
a creator to protect certain aspects of his moral rights, assuming
that he has retained some copyright in his work.180 In our hypo-
thetical situation, if the movie company had exceeded the scope of
its rights under section 106(2) by virtue of its distorted use of the
playwright's underlying work, the company would be liable to the
playwright assuming she had retained all of her other rights under
the copyright laws."8 " Suppose, however, that the playwright had
transferred to the movie company her other rights in her work, in-
cluding her right to authorize all derivative works.8 2 In this situa-
tion would the playwright be able to safeguard her personal inter-
est in preventing an unwarranted mutilation of her work by the
movie company?
Section 501(b) of the 1976 Act provides that the "legal or ben-
eficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled...
177. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp.
351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
178. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618-19
n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[E], at
13-45.
179. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618-19 n.12
(7th Cir. 1982). According to Professor Nimmer, a creator's loss may be greater when his
work is appropriated, without his permission, into a different medium "for here his work is
made available to a new untapped market whereas if the infringing work were in the original
medium, it would only attract the same persons who already had had an opportunity to
purchase the plaintiff's work." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[E], at 13-45; see also
Comment, Courting the Artist with Copyright: The 1976 Copyright Act, 24 WAYNE L. REV.
1685, 1697-98 (1978) (discussing importance of derivative rights protection for relatively un-
known artists whose works of fine art are most susceptible to being reduced in value to
"junk art" by derivatives).
180. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 140 and accompanying text, text preceding and accompanying
note 155; infra note 192.
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
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to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right
committed while he or she is the owner of it."'' Although section
501(b) does not define the term "beneficial owner," the legislative
history states that a "'beneficial owner' for this purpose would in-
clude, for example, an author who had parted with legal title to the
copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on sales or
license fees."'1 4 Consistent with this interpretation, courts have al-
lowed creators, who have assigned copyrights in their works in ex-
change for royalties, to maintain infringement actions, regardless
of whether the legal owners of the copyrights also are parties to the
actions. 85 At least one court, however, has held that the term
"beneficial owner" is not so broad to allow an exclusive sales dis-
tributor for products with copyrighted designs to maintain an in-
fringement action under section 501(b).88 Consequently, the court
rejected the plaintiff distributor's argument that it had standing
because "it receives an economic benefit from the copyright and
suffers loss from its infringement."'' 1
183. Id. § 501(b) (emphasis supplied). That section provides in full:
The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled
subject to the requirements of sections 205(d) [Recordation as Prerequisite to Infringe-
ment Suit] and 411 [Registration as Prerequisite to Infringement Suit], to institute an
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the
owner of it. The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action
with a copy of the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright
Office or otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall require that
such notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a deci-
sion in the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit the intervention,
of any person having or claiming an interest in the copyright.
Id.
184. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5775.
185. See, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (authors of musical
work who assigned the copyrights in their work to their own corporate vehicle in exchange
for payment of specified royalties have standing to sue for infringement of their beneficial
interest in their copyrights under both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts); Kamakazi Music
Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (singer Barry Manilow's
transfer of certain copyrights in his songs, in whole or in part, to music corporation, of
which he is the sole shareholder, in exchange for percentage royalty payments based on sales
or license fees did not preclude his action for copyright infringement given his status as a
beneficial owner of the copyright under § 501(b)).
In Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984), the court noted that § 501(b) of
the 1976 Act "merely codified the case law that had developed under the 1909 Act with
respect to the beneficial owner's standing to sue." See, e.g., Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d
991 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Kriger v. MacFadden Publications, 43 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) (beneficial owner of copyright must join legal owner to maintain infringement action).
186. Comptoir de l'Industrie Textile de France v. Fiorucci, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
557 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
187. Id. at 558-59. The court also remarked that "to carry plaintiffs' contention to its
logical conclusion would be to provide a basis for standing to any wholesaler or retailer in
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This analysis of section 501(b) suggests that even creators who
no longer own the copyrights in their works can maintain infringe-
ment actions to protect aspects of their moral rights by using sec-
tion 106(2), assuming they have transferred their copyright inter-
ests in exchange for a share of royalties. Most creators presumably
would not transfer these valuable rights absent some type of roy-
alty arrangement. Nevertheless, a strong argument can be made
that all creators who have transferred their copyrights should be
deemed beneficial owners within the meaning of section 501(b), re-
gardless of whether their transfer agreements contemplate royal-
ties. Although no court has had the opportunity to review this is-
sue, a grant of standing to all creators is consistent with the
legislative history, which speaks of an author who parts with legal
title in exchange for royalties merely as an example of a "benefi-
cial owner.""'
On the other hand, one can argue that a creator who retains
no economic ties to his copyrighted work should not receive the
protections afforded by the statute, which exist to safeguard eco-
nomic rights. This argument, however, ignores the application of
the termination provisions of the 1976 Act, under which all cre-
ators retain a potential economic interest in their works. In fact,
the chain of title who has an economic interest in the goods." Id. at 559.
188. See supra text accompanying note 184.
Comptoir de l'Industrie Textile de France v. Fiorucci, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 557
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), does not militate against a grant of standing to all creators under § 501(b).
Certainly the creator of the copyrighted work cannot be compared to an exclusive distribu-
tor or any other party "in the chain of title who has an economic interest in the goods." Id.
at 559; see supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. Under § 201(a) of the 1976 Act,
copyright in a protected work "vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17
U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). The plaintiff distributor in Fiorucci never owned the copyrights in
the product in question and, unlike the creator, could not exercise the termination rights
provided in the statute. See infra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
The district court in Swarovski Am. Ltd. v. Silver Deer Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Col.
1982), construing the joinder provisions that also appear in § 501(b), see supra note 183,
stated:
[Slince the Copyright Act's joinder provision was intended to supplement the federal
rules, I will assume that the term "interest" contained in § 501(b) has the same mean-
ing as in rule 19(a) [Persons to be Joined if Feasible], namely "a legally protected, not
merely a financial interest or interest of convenience."
537 F. Supp. at 1206 (quoting 3A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 19.07-1[2], at
19-129 (2d ed. 1979)) (emphasis supplied). Given that the joinder provisions appear in the
same section of the copyright statute as that which authorizes a "beneficial owner" to insti-
tute an infringement action, it is not unreasonable to construe the type of interest that one
must possess to qualify as a "beneficial owner" in accordance with the type of interest re-
quired for joinder.
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the termination provisions codified in section 203,189 which govern
189. 17 U.S.C. § 203 provides:
(a) Conditions for Termination.-In the case of any work other than a work made
for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of
any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, other-
wise than by will, is subject to termination under the following conditions:
(1) In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the grant
may be effected by that author or, if the author is dead, by the person or persons
who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of
more than one-half of that author's termination interest. In the case of a grant
executed by two or more authors of a joint work, termination of the grant may be
effected by a majority of the authors who executed it; if any of such authors is
dead, the termination interest of any such author may be exercised as a unit by
the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are enti-
tled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's interest.
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and
may be exercised, by his widow or her widower and his or her children or
grandchildren as follows:
(A) the widow or widower owns the author's entire termination interest
unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the author, in
which case the widow or widower owns one-half of the author's interest;
(B) the author's surviving children, and the surviving children of any
dead child of the author, own the author's entire termination interest un-
less there is a widow or widower, in which case the ownership of one-half of
the author's interest is divided among them;
(C) the rights of the author's children and grandchildren are in all
cases divided among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis according to
the number of such author's children represented; the share of the children
of a dead child in a termination interest can be exercised only by the action
of a majority of them.
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of
five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of
the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period
begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work
under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the
grant, whichever term ends earlier.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing,
signed by the number and proportion of owners of termination interests required
under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by their duly authorized agents,
upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination, which
shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsec-
tion, and the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years
before that date. A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright
Office before the effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking
effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service,
with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by
regulations.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future
grant.
(b) Effect of Termination.-Upon the effective date of termination, all rights
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all copyrights executed on or after the effective date of the 1976
Act, and section 304(c), 190 the comparable provision for subsisting
under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, au-
thors, and other persons owning termination interests under clauses (1) and (2) of sub-
section (a), including those owners who did not join in signing the notice of termination
under clause (4) of subsection (a), but with the following limitations:
(1) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termi-
nation may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termina-
tion, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of
other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the termi-
nated grant.
(2) The future rights that will revert upon termination of the grant become
vested on the date the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause
(4) of subsection (a). The rights vest in the author, authors, and other persons
named in, and in the proportionate shares provided by, clauses (1) and (2) of sub-
section (a).
(3) Subject to the provisions of clause (4) of this subsection, a further grant,
or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a terminated grant
is valid only if it is signed by the same number and proportion of the owners, in
whom the right has vested under clause (2) of this subsection, as are required to
terminate the grant under clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a). Such further grant
or agreement is effective with respect to all of the persons in whom the right it
covers has vested under clause (2) of this subsection, including those who did not
join in signing it. If any person dies after rights under a terminated grant have
vested in him or her, that person's legal representatives, legatees, or heirs at law
represent him or her for purposes of this clause.
(4) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right cov-
ered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective date of the
termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a further grant may
be made between the persons provided by clause (3) of this subsection and the
original grantee or such grantee's successor in title, after the notice of termination
has been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a).
(5) Termination of a grant under this section affects only those rights covered
by the grants that arise under this title, and in no way affects rights arising under
any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.
(6) Unless and until termination is effected under this section, the grant, if it
does not provide otherwise, continues in effect for the term of copyright provided
by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 203 (1982).
190. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) provides:
(c) Termination of transfers and licenses covering extended renewal term.-In the
case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal term on January 1, 1978,
other than a copyright in a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a
transfer or license of the renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before Janu-
ary 1, 1978, by any of the persons designated by the second proviso of subsection (a) of
this section, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the following
conditions:
(1) In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other than the
author, termination of the grant may be effected by the surviving person or per-
sons who executed it. In the case of a grant executed by one or more of the au-
thors of the work, termination of the grant may be effected, to the extent of a
particular author's share in the ownership of the renewal copyright, by the author
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copyrights, have been hailed as a departure from our copyright tra-
who executed it or, if such author is dead, by the person or persons who, under
clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than
one-half of that author's termination interest.
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and
may be exercised, by his widow or her widower and his or her children or
grandchildren as follows:
(A) the widow or widower owns the author's entire termination interest
unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the author, in
which case the widow or widower owns one-half of the author's interest;
(B) the author's surviving children, and the surviving children of any
dead child of the author, own the author's entire termination interest un-
less there is a widow or widower, in which case the ownership of one-half of
the author's interest is divided among them;
(C) the rights of the author's children and grandchildren are in all
cases divided among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis according to
the number of such author's children represented; the share of the children
of a dead child in a termination interest can be exercised only by the action
of a majority of them.
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of
five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was origi-
nally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is later.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing
upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title. In the case of a grant executed
by a person or persons other than the author, the notice shall be signed by all of
those entitled to terminate the grant under clause (1) of this subsection, or by
their duly authorized agents. In the case of a grant executed by one or more of the
authors of the work, the notice as to any one author's share shall be signed by that
author or his or her duly authorized agent or, if that author is dead, by the num-
ber and proportion of the owners of his or her termination interest required under
clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by their duly authorized agents.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination, which
shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsec-
tion, and the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years
before that date. A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright
Office before the effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking
effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service
with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by
regulation.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future
grant.
(6) In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other than the
author, all rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grant revert,
upon the effective date of termination, to all of those entitled to terminate the
grant under clause (1) of this subsection. In the case of a grant executed by one or
more of the authors of the work, all of a particular author's rights under this title
that were covered by the terminated grant revert, upon the effective date of termi-
nation, to that author or, if that author is dead, to the persons owning his or her
termination interest under clause (2) of this subsection, including those owners
who did not join in signing the notice of termination under clause (4) of this sub-
section. In all cases the reversion of rights is subject to the following limitations:
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dition of subordinating the author's interests to those of the pub-
lisher.191 Section 203 provides that an author, except an author of a
(A) A derivative work prepared under the authority of the grant before
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant
after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation
after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work covered by the terminated grant.
(B) The future rights that will revert upon termination of the grant
become vested on the date the notice of termination has been served as
provided by clause (4) of this subsection.
(C) Where the author's rights revert to two or more persons under
clause (2) of this subsection, they shall vest in those persons in the propor-
tionate shares provided by that clause. In such a case, and subject to the
provisions of subclause (D) of this clause, a further grant, or agreement to
make a further grant, of a particular author's share with respect to any
right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is signed by the same
number and proportion of the owners, in whom the right has vested under
this clause, as are required to terminate the grant under clause (2) of this
subsection. Such further grant or agreement is effective with respect to all
of the persons in whom the right it covers has vested under this subclause,
including those who did not join in signing it. If any person dies after rights
under a terminated grant have vested in him or her, that person's legal
representatives, legatees, or heirs at law represent him or her for purposes
of this subclause.
(D) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right
covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective
date of the termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a
further grant may be made between the author or any of the persons pro-
vided by the first sentence of clause (6) of this subsection, or between the
persons provided by subclause (C) of this clause, and the original grantee or
such grantee's successor in title, after the notice of termination has been
served as provided by clause (4) of this subsection.
(E) Termination of a grant under this subsection affects only those
rights covered by the grant that arise under this title, and in no way affects
rights arising under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.
(F) Unless and until termination is effected under this subsection, the
grant, if it does not provide otherwise, continues in effect for the remainder
of the extended renewal term.
Id. § 304(c).
191. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 53 U.S.L.W. 4035, 4042-43 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985)
(No. 83-1153) (White, J., dissenting). See generally Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copy-
right Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rav. 477, 490 (1977) (in commenting on 1976 Act, the
Register of Copyrights noted "a shift in the philosophical base on which the copyright law of
the United States rests," which "mark[s] a break with a two-hundred-year-old tradition that
has identified copyright more closely with the publisher than with the author").
Another victory for creators is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2), which "contains the
first explicit statutory recognition of the principle of divisibility of copyright in our law."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5739. Section 201(d)(2) provides:
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any
of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and
owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent
of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by
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work made for hire, 92 may terminate any grant of a copyright or
any right under a copyright "at any time during a period of five
years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of
execution of the grant, '' 93 provided he complies with the stipu-
lated notice requirements.9 If an author is dead, his termination
interest may be exercised by his spouse and his children or
grandchildren in accordance with the terms of the termination
statute.195 The legislative history for this provision discloses an in-
tent to safeguard authors against unremunerative transfers. 96 Sim-
ilarly, section 304(c) details the circumstances in which a transfer
or license of a 1909 Act copyright may be terminated by the author
or those entitled to exercise his interest if he is dead. Section
304(c) closely tracks section 203. 97 According to the legislative his-
tory, the arguments for granting rights of termination under sec-
tion 304 are even stronger than they are under section 203 because
section 304(b) also creates a new property right by adding nineteen
years "to the duration of any renewed copyright whose second
term started during the twenty-eight years immediately preceeding
the effective date of the Act."' 198 Thus, the author, as "the funda-
this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1982). According to the legislative history, this provision "means that
any of the exclusive rights that go to make up a copyright, including those enumerated in
section 106 and any subdivision of them, can be transferred and owned separately." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5739; see Ringer, supra, at 490-94 (brief summary of the
pro-author changes wrought by the 1976 Act); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982); see also infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
193. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1982). Alternatively, if the grant covers the right of publi-
cation of the work, the "period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publi-
cation of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of
the grant, whichever term ends earlier." Id.
194. See id. § 203(a)(4).
195. See id. § 203(a)(2). Termination rights are nonwaivable. See id. § 203(a)(5).
196. The House Report states:
A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of au-
thors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has
been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical compromise that will further the objec-
tives of the copyright law while recognizing the problems and legitimate needs of all
interests involved.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5740.
197. A few differences, however, exist between § 203 and § 304(c). For example, § 203
applies only to grants executed by the author whereas § 304(c) also applies to grants exe-
cuted by those of the author's beneficiaries who could claim a copyright renewal under the
1909 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1976). For a discussion of this distinction and
other differences, see H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5756-58.
198. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5659, 5755-56. Under § 24 of the 1909 Act,
copyright protection began on the date of publication or the date of registration in unpub-
lished form and continued for a 28 year period. Subsequently, the creator could renew the
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mental beneficiary of copyright under the Constitution," should
have an opportunity to share in this new property right.'99
The foregoing analysis suggests that even an author who has
transferred his copyright interest without a royalty arrangement
retains some economic and beneficial interest in the copyright. One
commentator has suggested that section 203 might allow an author
to terminate his copyright grant if the transferee has violated any
of the creator's moral rights. 00 Although this position is consistent
with the legislative history's emphasis on the creator's economic
needs, no court yet has linked personal rights with the additional
economic safeguards offered to creators by these provisions. Courts
easily could make this correlation in an appropriate case, however,
given that a creator's economic interests in his work can be
threatened by violations of his personal rights that impair the
work's marketability.2
0 1
copyright for an additional 28 year period, for a total of 56 years of protection. See 17
U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1976). Section 304(b) of the 1976 Act adds an additional 19
years to the duration of renewed copyrights by providing:
[t]he duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is subsisting at any time
between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, or for which renewal
registration is made between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, is
extended to endure for a term of seventy-five years from the date copyright was origi-
nally secured.
17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1982).
199. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5756; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
200. Comment, supra note 67, at 810. Presumably, the moral right argument could be
made for the termination of subsisting copyrights as provided in § 304(c). Moreover, assum-
ing that a creator's personal rights survive his death, see infra notes 267-80 and accompany-
ing text, a right of termination would apply not only to the author, but also to anyone
entitled to exercise the author's termination interest under the relevant statutory provi-
sions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2) (1982).
201. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Recently, the Second Circuit relied on the legislative history in deciding another novel
question concerning the application of § 304(c). In Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music,
Inc., 720 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Mills Music, Inc., v. Snyder, 53 U.S.L.W.
4035 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985) (No. 83-1153), the court interpreted the derivative works exception
to § 304(c), which is codified in § 304(c)(6)(A). The derivative works provision allows the
grantee to continue using derivative works prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may
continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this
privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (1982).
The specific question before the court in Harry Fox was whether a middleman music
publishing company, as the grantee of the original creator, could share in mechanical royal-
ties from derivative works in the form of sound recordings that were prepared by recording
companies under license from the middleman, prior to the termination of the grant, and
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The 1976 Act has significant potential for vindicating moral
rights. A creator's rights of integrity and paternity can be safe-
guarded when authorized adapters make mutilating changes in his
work, and the resulting product is designated as "based upon" the
creator's underlying work.202 Moreover, if another party uses a cre-
ator's preexisting work to create a derivative work without permis-
sion, the creator can maintain an action for copyright infringement
and thus preserve his right of integrity.203 To the extent courts
broadly interpret the term "beneficial owner" in section 501(b) to
include all creators, regardless of the terms of their copyright
transfers,20 4 the copyright statute would preclude a creator's trans-
fer of these protections.20 5 Finally, potential judicial application of
the 1976 Act's termination provisions to safeguard a creator's per-
sonal rights would afford creators an extremely broad scope of pro-
tection for their moral rights.20 6
sold subsequent to the termination. Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 F.2d
733, 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1983). Noting that the derivative works exception was intended to
protect the owners of the derivative works because of their creative efforts, id. at 741-42,
and that the purpose of the termination provisions of § 304(c) was to protect the interests of
the creators of the underlying works, id. at 743, the court declined to accept the music
publisher's argument regarding its entitlement to the royalties. In reversing the Second Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court recognized § 304's purpose in benefiting authors, but nevertheless
found the derivative works exception sufficiently broad to support the music publisher's
right to royalties. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 53 U.S.L.W. 4035, 4038-41 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1985) (No. 83-1153).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 22 & 28, and text preceding and accompany-
ing notes 155-56 & 173-74.
203. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. The infringement action also may
enable a creator to enforce his right of paternity by compelling recognition for his work. See
supra text preceding note 22 and note 172 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. Of course, the incorporation of the
"substantial similarity" standard in adjudicating whether a derivative work is "based upon"
a preexisting work, see supra notes 169-79, would allow the adapter some leeway in altering
the preexisting work, thus precluding total inalienability of personal interests. This incorpo-
ration would result in a much fairer balancing of the diametrically opposed interests of the
creators of the preexisting works and the creators of the derivative works. See supra notes
46-48 and accompanying text; infra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text. This potential termination pro-
tection is limited by the statutory time frame for the exercise of the termination rights. See
supra note 194 and accompanying text; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(3), 304(c)(3) (1982); cf.
Comment, supra note 83, at 1558 ("[d]elaying of the moral right amounts to denial of it").
Additionally, the 1976 Act has positive implications for a creator's right of disclosure.
See infra notes 369-75 and accompanying text.
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2. The Act's Potential for Circumscribing Moral Rights
Although certain provisions of the 1976 Act have the potential
for assisting creators seeking to vindicate aspects of their moral
rights, the statute contains other provisions that pose both impedi-
ments to and limitations upon the enforcement of creators' per-
sonal interests. One such limitation is the "work for hire" doctrine,
which prevents a creator from exercising his right to compel recog-
nition for his work in certain situations. Section 201(b) of the 1976
Act provides that in the case of a work made for hire, the employer
is considered the author and copyright owner unless the parties
expressly agree otherwise in writing.20 7 The statute sets forth two
alternative definitions of a "work made for hire":
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire .... 208
This provision, which adopted one of the basic tenets of copyright
law in this country,209 rejected the proposals of motion picture
207. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
208. Id. § 101. The second definition of a "work made for hire" provides in full:
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collec-
tive work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the pur-
pose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for publica-
tion as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing,
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use
of the other work, such as forewards, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts,
table, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies,
appendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic
work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities.
Id.
209. Section 26 of the 1909 Copyright Act provided that "the word 'author' shall in-
clude an employer in the case of works made for hire." 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) (repealed
(1976)). The doctrine did not operate as a matter of law, but was "based on the presumed
mutual intent of the parties." May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368
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screenwriters and composers who sought an amendment that
would have given the employer the right to use the employee's
work as needed for business purposes while allowing the employee
to retain all rights in the work as long as he refrained from author-
izing competing uses.21° The legislative history states that although
such a change "might theoretically improve the bargaining position
of screenwriters and others as a group, the practical benefits that
individual authors would receive are highly conjectural." '211 Faced
with this perceived uncertainty, Congress refused to depart from
the well-established presumption that "initial ownership rights
vest in the employer for hire." '12
In construing the first component of the "work for hire" defi-
nition, whether a work was prepared by an employee within the
scope of his employment, courts have focused on whether the em-
ployer served as the impetus for the work by insisting upon and
funding its creation.2 3 The second component of the definition
concerning specially ordered or commissioned works represents a
"carefully balanced compromise" as to "those works written on
special order or commission that should be considered as 'works
(9th Cir. 1980). Professor Nimmer has observed that § 26 created a presumption of copy-
right in the employer that may be rebutted "only by a preponderance of evidence of a con-
trary agreement as between the parties." Id. at 1369 (quoting § 5.03[D] of an older edition
of M. NIMMER, supra note 38). In May the court concluded that extrinsic evidence such as
prevailing custom and usage may be considered when determining whether the parties in-
tended to alter this presumption of the "work for hire" doctrine. 618 F.2d at 1369.
210. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5737. This proposal was similar to the
"shop right" doctrine of patent law. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1933) ("Since the servant uses his master's time, facilities and materi-
als to attain a concrete result, the latter is in equity entitled to use that which embodies his
own property and to duplicate it as often as he may find occasion to employ similar appli-
ances in his business. But the employer in such a case has no equity to demand a convey-
ance of the invention, which is the original conception of the employee alone, in which the
employer had no part.").
211. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5737.
212. Id. The legislative history states that to exchange this presumption "for the un-
certainties of the shop right doctrine would not only be of dubious value to employers and
employees alike, but might also reopen a number of other issues." Id.; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c)
(1982) ("Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copy-
right in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the
contribution . ).
213. See, e.g., Gopman v. Edgar, No. 81 Civ. 1681 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 1981) (when
plaintiff real estate attorney prepared a disclosure document for use in promoting invest-
ments in a limited partnership of which he was the general partner and defendant subse-
quently employed plaintiff to draft documents, including a similar disclosure document,
court held that alterations made by plaintiff in adapting initial document to defendant's
needs did not provide a sufficient basis for defendant's claim that plaintiff created second
document as part of his employment for defendant).
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made for hire,' and those that should not. 2 14 Moreover, a specially
commissioned work that may qualify as a "work made for hire"
does not attain this status automatically; the parties also must ex-
pressly agree in a signed written instrument that the work will be
considered a "work made for hire."2 15 Courts have construed this
second component of the "work for hire" definition very strictly to
comport with the expressed legislative intent. For example, courts
have observed that neither architectural plans216 nor a fabric de-
sign produced by an independent contractor 217 fit into the category
of specially commissioned works that may qualify as "works made
for hire." Similarly, most works of fine art do not qualify as "works
made for hire. ' 218 Therefore, the negative effect that the "work for
214. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5737. The legislative history further
provides:
The definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in effect, spells
out those specific categories of commissioned works that can be considered 'works
made for hire' under certain circumstances.
Of these, one of the most important categories is that of "instructional texts." This
term is given its own definition in the bill: "a literary, pictorial, or graphic work pre-
pared for publication with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities."
The concept is intended to include what might be loosely called "textbook material,"
whether or not in book form or prepared in the form of text matter. The basic charac-
teristic of "instructional texts" is the purpose of their preparation for "use in system-
atic instructional activities," and they are to be distinguished from works prepared for
use by a general readership.
Id.
215. See supra text accompanying note 208. Once a work is classified as a "work made
for hire," however, the employer or person for whom the work is prepared will own the
copyright unless the parties expressly agree otherwise in a signed written instrument. 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982); see Arthur Retlaw & Assocs., Inc. v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 582
F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (neither an oral "understanding" nor a letter signed by
only one party satisfies "statute's requirement that the agreement be a written instrument
signed by both parties"); cf. Black v. Pizzatime Theatres, No. C-83-20049-WAI (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 15, 1983) ("employer's material breach of the employment contract would give rise to a
claim to rescind the contract including the implied right to authorship").
216. See, e.g., May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1980); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D.N.J. 1981).
217. Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court apparently agreed with the defendant's argument that an indepen-
dent contractor who produced a fabric design for another party would be the "author" and
copyright proprietor of the work, but concluded that plaintiff had a sufficient co-ownership
interest to maintain suit).
218. Section 101 includes, however, pictorial illustrations as an example of "supple-
mentary works" that fit within the category of specially commissioned works potentially
qualifying as "works made for hire." See supra note 208; cf. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939) ("If. . . [an artist] is solicited by a patron to execute a
commission for pay, the presumption should be indulged that the patron desires to control
the publication of copies and that the artist consents that he may, unless by the terms of
the contract, express or implicit, the artist has reserved the copyright to himself.").
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hire" doctrine may have upon a creator's right to compel recogni-
tion for his work is reduced by the doctrine's exclusion of all spe-
cially ordered or commissioned works that are not enumerated spe-
cifically in the statutory definition.
2 19
Section 202 of the 1976 Act provides that the ownership of a
copyright is "distinct from ownership of any material object in
which the work is embodied. ' 220 Therefore, the transfer of owner-
ship of any material object in which the copyrighted work is fixed
does not convey any copyrights in the work.221 The common law
indulged in a presumption that authors transferred their common-
law literary property rights upon the sale of their works, unless
such rights were specifically preserved.22 Section 202 of the 1976
Act, when coupled with section 204(a), which requires a signed
written instrument to transfer any copyright ownership interest,
reverses this presumption.223 Therefore, section 202 is properly
viewed as beneficial to creators.224
219. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. The statutory requirement of an ex-
press written agreement that a specially commissioned work shall be considered a "work
made for hire" also lessens the effect of the doctrine on a creator's paternity rights. See
supra text accompanying note 215.
220. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). Section 202 provides:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer
of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the
work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embod-
ied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a
copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any
material object.
Id.
221. Id. The legislative history for section 202 provides:
The principle restated in section 202 is a fundamental and important one: that
copyright ownership and ownership of a material object in which the copyrighted work
is embodied are entirely separate things. Thus, transfer of a material object does not of
itself carry any rights under the copyright, and this includes transfer of the copy or
phonorecord-the original manuscript, the photographic negative, the unique painting
or statue, the master tape recording, etc.-in which the work was first fixed. Con-
versely, transfer of a copyright does not necessarily require the conveyance of any ma-
terial object.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5739-40.
222. See, e.g., Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249
(1942).
223. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5740. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) provides: "A
transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an in-
strument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed
by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." 17 U.S.C. §
204(a) (1982); see also id. § 301 ("Preemption with respect to other laws"); infra notes 291-
319 and accompanying text.
224. See Ringer, supra note 191, at 492-93.
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Nevertheless, from the standpoint of moral rights, the advan-
tages of section 202 are reduced by the operation of section 109 of
the 1976 Act, which delineates the effect of transferring a particu-
lar copy or phonorecord.22 5 Section 109(a) codifies the "first sale
doctrine" and provides that the owner of a lawfully made copy is
entitled to "sell or otherwise dispose" of the copy without the per-
mission of the copyright owner.226 Thus, section 109(a) is a limita-
tion upon the copyright owner's exclusive right under section
106(3) "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership ....
The copyright owner's exclusive right to sell a copy of his copy-
righted work extends only to his first sale of the copy, after which
time he retains no control over subsequent sales.2"" As one court
has observed, "[t]he first sale thus extinguishes the copyright
holder's ability to control the course of copies placed in the stream
of commerce.
2 29
225. 17 U.S.C. § 109 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular
copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is enti-
tled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either
directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at
the place where the copy is located.
(c) The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) do not, unless authorized
by the copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy
or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan or otherwise, without
acquiring ownership of it.
17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982). Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines a "copy" to include the first
fixation of the work:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.
Id. § 101 (emphasis supplied); cf. supra note 122.
226. Id. § 109(a); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1964) (repealed (1970)) ("nothing in this title
shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work
the possession of which has been lawfully obtained").
227. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982).
228. See American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978).
Moreover, "[e]ven if the copyright holder places restrictions on the purchaser in a first sale
. . . the buyer's disregard of the restrictions on resale does not make the buyer or the per-
son who buys in the secondary market liable for infringement." Id.
229. Id; see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 494,
498 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (plaintiff motion picture producers and distributors who sold video
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Another consequence of section 109(a) is that it eliminates a
creator's right of withdrawal upon the initial sale of a copy of his
work.230 Perhaps this consequence is not terribly significant given
the well-deserved criticisms of this aspect of the moral right doc-
trine.23 ' More troubling, however, is the legislative history's sugges-
tion that the copyright owner cannot prevent the owner of a law-
fully made copy of his work from destroying the copy.23 2 Although
those countries that have adopted the moral right doctrine gener-
ally do not recognize a creator's right to prevent the destruction of
a copy of his work by its owner,33 this lack of recognition is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the doctrine's concern for the personal inter-
ests of a creator in his work and for the public's interest in pre-
serving its cultural integrity.234
The interaction of sections 109(a) and 106(2) raises a related
question regarding the scope of rights properly exercisable by the
owner of a lawfully made copy of a work. May a copy owner muti-
late his copy or make alterations? Although section 109 does not
specifically address this issue, the copyright proprietor's exclusive
right to prepare derivative works under section 106(2) should pre-
vent alterations that constitute the creation of a derivative work,
at least in those instances in which the copy owner is not the copy-
right proprietor. 23 ' The issue remains whether a "mutilation"
should be regarded as an alteration or a destruction for section
106(2) purposes. Creators who retain copyrights in their works will
argue that any mutilating act short of complete destruction consti-
tutes an alteration rather than a destruction of the work, and thus
violates the exclusive right to create derivative works. This posi-
tion is completely consistent with the argument presented earlier
that a mutilation of a creator's work resulting in a new work which
is not "substantially similar" to the creator's original work, com-
bined with an attribution of authorship to the original creator, is
an infringement of section 106(2).236 Thus, when an owner of a law-
cassette copies of their copyrighted motion pictures to defendants waived their exclusive
distribution rights).
230. See supra text accompanying note 19.
231. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
232. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5693.
233. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
234. See supra text accompanying note 35. The California Art Preservation Act pro-
hibits the destruction of a work of fine art. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text
and note 123; see also infra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
236. See supra text preceding and accompanying notes 155-56 & 173-74.
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fully made copy of a creator's work makes mutilating changes in
the work but still represents it as the work of the creator, the copy
owner should be viewed as an infringer of the creator's right to
prepare a derivative work. Of course, if a creator's work is muti-
lated beyond recognition but not attributed to him, the creator's
rights under section 106(2) have not been infringed. In such a situ-
ation, the creator probably cannot protect against the mutilation
under the copyright law.
Section 109 contains another limitation on creators' moral
rights. Section 109(b) provides that the owner of a lawfully made
copy237 may, without the authorization of the copyright owner,
"display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of
no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place
where the copy is located."2 38 This provision places a limitation
upon a copyright owner's exclusive right to display his work pub-
licly.2 39 Section 109(b) is problematic, however, because it leaves
no recourse for a creator who objects to the context in which the
copy owner is displaying his work.240 Thus, a deeply religious artist
whose work is displayed in an exhibit with an atheistic theme has
no remedy under the statute.24'
Returning to our hypothetical playwright, let us now compen-
237. Section 109(c) provides that ownership of the copy rather than mere possession is
a prerequisite to exercising the privileges provided in § 109(a) and § 109(b). See supra note
225; see also Shuptrine v. Brown, No. 81-5628 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 1983) ("[a] necessary ele-
ment of a 'first sale' is the transfer of legal title"); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp.,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 183 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982).
239. Id.; see also id. § 106(5). The legislative history for § 109(b) discloses that the
committee's intention in incorporating § 109(b) was "to preserve the traditional privilege of
the owner of a copy to display it directly, but to place reasonable restrictions on the ability
to display it indirectly in such a way that the copyright owner's market for reproduction and
distribution of copies would be affected." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5694.
240. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text; cf. Shostakovich v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948), aff'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
241. The legislative history for § 109(b) provides that "[tihe exclusive right of public
display granted by section 106(5) would not apply where the owner of a copy wishes to show
it directly to the public, as in a gallery or display case, or indirectly, as through an opaque
projector." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5693. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines the "dis-
play" of a work as "to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, televi-
sion image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audio-
visual work, . . . [showing] individual images nonsequentially." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
Although this discussion focuses on the potential conflicts between creators as copyright
proprietors and owners of lawfully made copies, similar conflicts can occur when a creator
assigns his copyrights and the copyright proprietor wishes to display or reproduce the crea-
tor's work in an objectionable manner. For a discussion of these issues, see infra part III,
section C and part IV.
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sate her for difficulties with the movie company by assuming that
her play was an instant success and that the subsequent screenplay
was a satisfactory treatment which afforded her even more na-
tional recognition. Her happiness, however, only lasts until she
learns that a repertory company is performing a musical produc-
tion of her play consisting of original songs and dance routines in-
terspersed throughout a script which is remarkably similar to her
own. The musical production uses backdrops similar to the major
settings in her play and features the same characters, whose names
have been altered in such a way as to "conjure up" those of the
original characters.242 Outraged by what she believes to be an in-
ferior performance and a perversion of her original theme, she sues
the repertory company for copyright infringement.
In this hypothetical situation, section 106(2) could protect not
only the playwright's copyright interests, but also her personal in-
terests in her work.243 Indeed, because she never authorized the
repertory company's production, its musical adaptation arguably is
a derivative work, and the new production constitutes a violation
of the playwright's exclusive right to authorize the preparation of
derivative works based upon her copyrighted work.244 If she is
granted relief on this ground, her interest in preserving the integ-
rity of her work also will be vindicated. Nevertheless, there is an-
other limitation on the protection of moral rights in the 1976 Act.
Section 107 provides that the "fair use of a copyrighted work...
for purposes such as criticism [or] comment. . . is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. '245 Therefore, if the playwright's copyright is
242. See infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text; cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (musical production
alleged to infringe Gone with the Wind).
243. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 521.
244. See supra notes 152 & 169-72 and accompanying text.
245. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides in full:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
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not infringed because the musical company's use of her work quali-
fies as a fair use, presumably any coextensive protection for her
personal rights in the work will be lost.246
On balance, this result is justifiable. The reasons underlying
the incorporation of the fair use doctrine into the copyright law's
protections for a creator's economic rights are equally compelling
in the context of protections for a creator's personal rights. The
limited monopoly the copyright law confers upon an author is the
means by which Congress achieves its ultimate goal of enhancing
the public welfare by promoting the "useful arts. '2 47 As the Su-
preme Court recently observed, Congress, in defining the scope of
this limited monopoly, must balance carefully authors' interests
"in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow
of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand .... .
As a result of this balance, certain forms of expression which in-
fringe the exclusive rights granted to creators under the statute are
proscribed. 249 Arguably, such restrictions, if literally applied, actu-
ally could inhibit creativity2 50 and create a potential conflict be-
tween the copyright law and an element of the first amendment's
guarantee of free expression. Section 107 of the 1976 Act provides
a safeguard for this situation,2 51 and to the extent that protection
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
246. See infra notes 258-67 and accompanying text.
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct.
774 (1984), the Supreme Court observed: "The monopoly privileges that Congress may au-
thorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved." Id. at 782; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
248. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984).
249. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189-90 (1970) (emphasizing that copyright law
protects the "expression of ideas" rather than "ideas per se"); see also supra notes 140 &
151; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (providing that copyright protection does not extend to any
idea).
250. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (doctrine of fair use created to avoid rigid application of the
copyright laws when that application would defeat the law's original purpose of fostering
creativity); see also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
251. An interesting question outside the scope of this Article is whether the first
amendment concerns are subsumed completely under the "fair use" doctrine or whether the
first amendment constitutes a special defense to a charge of copyright infringement. Com-
pare Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.
Fla. 1978), afl'd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (lower court maintaining that defenses are
separate, holding that defendant's television display of plaintiff's copyrighted magazine
cover was not "fair use" but was protected by the first amendment-Fifth Circuit did not
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for a creator's personal interests will result in similar restrictions
on creativity and on free expression, such protection also must be
circumscribed by section 107. Thus, section 107 has the potential
for limiting significantly the scope of the moral right doctrine in
our country.252
Section 107, which codifies well-established fair use doctrine
created by the judiciary, 53 posits four factors to be considered by
courts in determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted
work is a fair use and thus not an infringement:254 (1) the purpose
of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
used in relation to the entire copyrighted work; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the value of the copyrighted work.255 Congress did
not intend these factors to be exhaustive, but only to restate the
the preexisting law by focusing on the criteria most frequently
used by the courts for determining a fair use.256 The legislative his-
tory states, however, that "since the doctrine is an equitable rule of
reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts.
''2 57
Applying the fair use doctrine to the hypothetical playwright's
case, the playwright's cause of action for infringement of both eco-
nomic and personal interests may fail if the court views the musi-
cal production as a spoof or parody of her original work. The fair
reach first amendment issue, but affirmed decision on ground that "fair use" was a valid
defense) with Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp.
957 (D.N.H. 1978) (court accepts premise that application of the "fair use" doctrine will
resolve conflicts between the first amendment and the copyright laws); see also infra note
262. To the extent the first amendment does function as an independent defense to copy-
right infringement, it also would be applicable to alleged violations of a creator's personal
interests. See infra text accompanying note 252 and notes 258-67 and accompanying text;
see also Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970)
(analysis of the conflicting interests secured by copyright law and the first amendment).
252. The precise interplay between the first amendment and the fostering creativity
rationales of the fair use doctrine may be outlined definitively by the Supreme Court when
it decides the case of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., cert. granted, 52
U.S.L.W. 3860 (U.S. May 29, 1984) (No. 83-1625). See infra notes 258-67 and accompanying
text.
253. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5678.
254. Professor Nimmer has observed that the issue of "fair use" arises when it is es-
tablished "that the defendant has copied sufficiently from the plaintiff so as to cross the line
of substantial similarity." In these circumstances, "[t]he result must necessarily constitute
an infringement unless the defendant is rendered immune from liability because the partic-
ular use which he has made of the plaintiff's material is a 'fair use.'" 3 M. NIMMER, supra
note 38, § 13.05, at 13-64 (1982).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); see supra note 245.
256. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5679.
257. Id.
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use doctrine often is at issue in cases concerning parodies because
many parodies "involve the type of original critical comment" that
section 107 is intended to protect.15 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc.,2 59 a case con-
cerning a musical production's alleged infringement of Gone with
the Wind, the court adopted a strict standard for the type of par-
ody eligible for fair use protection. Although the court accepted
the premise that a parody mimics the protected work "for comic
effect or ridicule," the court also required that the parody "make
some critical comment or statement about the original work which
reflects the original perspective of the parodist - thereby giving
the parody social value beyond its entertainment function."'260 Af-
ter examining the defendant's musical production from the stand-
point of the four fair use factors, the court concluded that the de-
fendant's production was a derivative work rather than a critical
commentary of either the film or the novel Gone with the Wind,
and therefore was a copyright infringement. The court also held
that to the degree the production could be characterized as a par-
ody, it was not a fair use because the defendants used more of the
original copyrighted work than is permissible under the fair use
doctrine and the musical was likely to harm the potential market
for the original work.
261
As Showcase Atlanta suggests, even if the alleged infringing
work initially qualifies as a legitimate protected form of expression,
it still may not constitute a fair use of the original copyrighted
work if it incorporates more material than is permissible or has an
adverse effect upon the potential market for the original work.
2 62
258. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp.
351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
259. Id.
260. Id.; cf. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per
curiam, 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (Second Circuit stated that a parody is "enti-
tled at least to 'conjure up' the original" and that "[e]ven more extensive use would still be
fair use, provided the parody builds upon the original, using the original as a known element
of modern culture and contributing something new for a humorous effect or commentary.").
But see Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (district court concluded that the defen-
dants' production of a play featuring performers simulating the Marx Brothers' unique
style, appearance, and mannerisms did not qualify as a parody because it simply duplicated
the original, rather than building upon it by adding its own creative elements).
261. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351,
356-61 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
262. Id. at 361. Professor Nimmer suggested that the incorporation of such other fac-
tors into the fair use analysis requires that fair use be viewed separately from the limitation
on copyright mandated by the First Amendment:
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In applying the "fair use" doctrine, courts typically balance the
four factors to determine whether a particular use of a work consti-
tutes a fair use. 63 Nevertheless, the fair use doctrine affords a sig-
nificant degree of protection to works, such as parody and satire, 64
that use the copyrighted work "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, [or] news reporting." 6 5
Our deep rooted tradition of free speech stemming from the
first amendment's mandate266 requires the same balance of inter-
ests when a creator alleges violations of his personal, rather than
pecuniary, rights. The musical production in the hypothetical case
that arguably mutilates the playwright's theme presents a poten-
tial conflict between moral rights and free speech concerns. The
same potential conflict exists when a film critic illustrates his tele-
vision review of a movie with a series of excerpts from the film
that, in the screenplay writer's estimation, distorts the movie. Im-
portant social policies underlying section 107 may compel a crea-
tor's acceptance of perceived mutilations, unwarranted criticisms,
and even objectionable contextual uses267 of his work. The doctrine
of fair use thus limits the scope of moral rights in the United
States.
The policies of public access to information, enhanced creativ-
I would suggest that a grave danger to copyright may lie in the failure to distinguish
between the statutory privilege known as fair use and an emerging constitutional limi-
tation on copyright contained in the first amendment. The scope and extent of fair use
falls within no discretion of the Congress. The limitations of the first amendment are
imposed upon Congress itself. Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by
others which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied.
The first amendment privilege, when appropriate, may be invoked despite the fact that
the marketability of the copies work is thereby impaired.
Nimmer, supra note 249, at 1200-01 (footnote omitted); see also supra note 251.
263. See, e.g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1143-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defendant's use of six Charlie Chaplin films to which plaintiffs held the
exclusive rights not a fair use because the films were created for commercial gain, the defen-
dant's use was qualitatively great, and there was evidence of bad faith), afl'd, 672 F.2d 1095
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
264. A satire illuminates and ridicules the vices or failures of an individual or institu-
tion, usually for the purpose of promoting change. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pus-
sycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp. 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). A satire
differs from a parody in that a satire uses the protected work as a vehicle for ridiculing a
larger concern while a parody may ridicule only the original work itself.
265. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); see supra note 245.
266. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
267. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text; cf. Shostakovich v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948) (court noted defendant's
incidental use of plaintiff's music), aff'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
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ity, and the free flow of ideas supporting section 107268 also bear
upon the interesting question of the appropriate duration for
moral rights protection. As discussed in part I, two approaches to
duration exist in those countries that have adopted the moral right
doctrine. Some countries terminate a creator's moral rights at the
expiration of his copyright, while other countries endorse perpetual
moral rights. 69 Perpetual protection for moral rights may be in-
consistent with our guarantee of free speech. In discussing why the
common-law concept of perpetual copyright is inconsistent with
the policies underlying the first amendment, Professor Nimmer
suggested that the speech interest in expressions rather than ideas
should be given less weight than the copyright interest in encour-
aging creativity, except when dealing with copyright protection
"beyond the life expectancy of the author's children and
grandchildren. '27 0 Years after the author's death, the balance be-
tween speech and copyright shifts and the "real, if relatively slight,
speech interest in expression remains constant, while the copyright
interest in encouraging creativity largely vanishes."2 7' 1 Similar rea-
soning arguably applies to perpetual protection for a creator's
moral rights. Indeed, protection for both the economic and per-
sonal rights of creators can be justified as making society the ulti-
mate beneficiary by enhancing creativity, and therefore, once the
benefits that society obtains from extended copyright protection
are sufficiently diminished, the free speech concerns should pre-
vail. This analogy would be compelling if encouraging creativity
was society's only interest in extending protection for a creator's
moral rights. Protection for creators' personal rights, however, also
enables society to preserve the integrity of its cultural heritage.27 2
The public's right to enjoy the fruits of a creator's labors in origi-
nal form and to learn cultural history from such creations has no
time limit. This rationale, therefore, strongly favors perpetual pro-
tection for moral rights.
Despite society's interest in preserving its cultural heritage,
perpetual protection for moral rights should not be sanctioned in
the United States. The copyright clause of the Constitution only
authorizes Congress to "promote the progress of . . .useful arts,
268. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
269. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
270. Nimmer, supra note 249, at 1193.
271. Id.
272. See supra text accompanying note 61.
273. See Diamond, supra note 6, at 249.
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by securing for limited times to authors ... the exclusive right to
their respective writings. 2 74 Congress derives its authority to pro-
tect creators' personal rights from this clause, and therefore, any
protection must be limited in its duration by virtue of the constitu-
tional mandate. Although the question whether it is constitutional
for Congress to protect moral rights in conjunction with copyrights
has received little attention,275 the courts have addressed the scope
of congressional power under the copyright clause in other con-
texts. In Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Thea-
ter 2716 the court emphasized that the Constitution grants Congress
the authority to make any law that is "necessary and proper" for
the exercise of any of its Article I powers, which includes the copy-
right power, and courts, therefore, have a limited role in determin-
ing whether Congress has exceeded its Article I powers.2 77 In mak-
ing this judgment, "the courts will not find that Congress has
exceeded its power so long as the means adopted by Congress for
achieving a constitutional end are 'appropriate' and 'plainly
adapted' to achieving that. end. '2 78 The court in Mitchell Brothers
relied on this reasoning to sustain its position that the protection
of all writings, including those whose content may be obscene, "is a
constitutionally permissible means of promoting science and the
useful arts. 2 79 Similarly, Congress has the power to protect moral
rights so long as it concurrently fosters the constitutional goal of
promoting the useful arts. Two important rationales for protecting
moral rights, the encouragement of creativity and the preservation
of our cultural heritage, both promote the useful arts.280 These
objectives, therefore, enable Congress to legislate moral rights
under its grant of authority from the copyright clause. An impor-
tant caveat, however, is that any moral rights legislation must be
limited in duration to comply with the language of the copyright
clause.2 81
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
275. See A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 383 (1981) (raising
issue in context of Congressman Drinan's proposal).
276. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
277. Id. at 860; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
278. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir.
1979) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980).
279. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858-60 (5th
Cir. 1979); see also Phillips, Copyright in Obscene Works: Some British and American
Problems, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 138, 164-66 (1977).
280. See supra text accompanying note 273.
281. Presumably, a time limitation for moral rights protection also would be appropri-
[Vol. 38:1
COPYRIGHT AND THE MORAL RIGHT
If the United States recognized explicitly a variation of the
moral right doctrine, the limitations discussed in this section un-
doubtedly would influence its scope. A creator whose work is con-
sidered a "work made for hire" probably could not compel recogni-
tion for his work, given the well-entrenched position that the
"work for hire" doctrine occupies in our copyright law.282 The op-
eration of the "first sale doctrine" codified in section 109(a)
2 3
might preclude a creator who also is the copyright owner from
withdrawing his work once he has placed it in the stream of com-
merce.284 Similarly, a creator cannot prevent either the destruction
of a copy of his work by the legal owner, 8 5 or mutilations by the
owner that amount to more than "alterations," unless the owner of
the work also attributes authorship of the mutilated version to the
creator.86 Section 109(b)'s limitation upon a copyright owner's ex-
clusive right to display a work publicly also is a problem for those
creators who object to the context in which their works are dis-
played by the rightful owners.287 The fair use doctrine embodied in
section 107 represents a particularly significant limitation upon
moral rights protection in this country. s Of course, such a limita-
tion is justifiable as a "necessary concomitant" of living in a demo-
cratic society.2 9 Equally important is the time limit for protection
imposed by the copyright clause of the Constitution.29 °
Notwithstanding the limitations that the existing copyright
law places upon any proposed moral rights protection, the federal
statutory framework could accomodate explicit recognition for an
American variation of the moral right doctrine. The specific con-
tent of such protection will be discussed more fully in the final
ate in the event the individual states were to afford such protection. See supra notes 108-25
and accompanying text; infra note 375 and accompanying text. Given the clear mandate of
the copyright clause and the relationship between moral rights and copyrights, the states
should not be allowed to sanction perpetual protection when such a result could not be
achieved under federal law. See generally infra notes 291-397 and accompanying text; cf.
Nimmer, supra note 249, at 1193-94 (in discussing whether common-law copyright is uncon-
stitutional, Nimmer observed that "it is open to the state courts to construe their respective
laws of common law copyright in such manner as to bring them within the limitations of the
first amendment").
282. See supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
283. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982); see supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
284, See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text and text following note 236.
287. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 242-67 and accompanying text.
289. Nimmer, supra note 249, at 1187.
290. See supra notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
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part of this Article, but first, the possibility of protection for moral
rights on a state, rather than a federal, level must be explored.
C. The 1976 Act and Preemption of State Protection for Moral
Rights
Section 301 of the 1976 Act29' governs the compatibility be-
tween federal copyright law and protection for moral rights on a
state level. This provision sets forth a two-part test for determin-
ing whether a particular state law is preempted by the 1976 Act.
The first prong of the preemption test focuses on the nature of the
work protected by the state law. Specifically, preemption will not
occur if the state law does not pertain to "works of authorship that
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright. 2 92 The states, in other words, are free
291. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The legislative history terms this provision "one of the
bedrock provisions of the bill," because it adopts a single system of federal statutory protec-
tion, thereby eliminating the prior dual system of "common law copyright" for unpublished
works and federal protection for published works. H. R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at
5745; see supra note 1; infra note 374. Section 301 provides in full:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether
created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law
or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) Subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any
tangible medium of expression; or
(2) Any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1,
1978; or
(3) Activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106.
(c) With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or rem-
edies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited
by this title until February 15, 2047. The preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall
apply to any such rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from
undertakings commenced on and after February 15, 2047. Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of section 303, no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject
to copyright under this title before, on, or after February 15, 2047.
(d) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any other federal
statute.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
292. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (b)(1) (1982). Sections 102 and 103 of the 1976 Act specify
the subject matter of the copyright law. See supra note 151 for text of § 102. Section 103
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to regulate all works that are not protected by the copyright law
because of their nature or form of expression.293 The second prong
of the preemption test emphasizes the nature of the rights that the
state law attempts to safeguard. If the state seeks to protect rights
that are "not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright," the state's law will not be preempted
by section 301.294 Preemption of a state law will occur only if both
prongs of the test in section 301 are satisfied. 9 Therefore, if a
state law grants "equivalent rights" to a work that does not come
within the scope of federal copyright law, no preemption will re-
sult.296 Similarly, a state may protect federally copyrightable works
as long as such protection does not encompass rights equivalent to
1976 Act protections.
Although Congress purported to enact an unambiguous statu-
tory mandate concerning the issue of preemption,297 application of
section 301 can be exceedingly difficult. 98 In the specific context of
provides that "[t]he subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compi-
lations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has
been used unlawfully." 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982); see also supra note 151.
293. See infra notes 300-09 and accompanying text.
294. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (b)(3) (1982). Section 106 of the 1976 Act details the
rights protected by the copyright statute. See supra note 140 for text of § 106; see also infra
notes 310-96 and accompanying text.
295. See Schuchart & Assocs., Professional Eng'rs, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F.
Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1982); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-9.
296. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-22; see infra text accompanying
notes 306-10.
297. The legislative history states that "section 301 is intended to be stated in the
clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinter-
pretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the
development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5745-46.
Prior to the adoption of the 1976 Act, common law protected unpublished works. See
supra note 291; 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (repealed 1976) ("Nothing in this title shall be con-
strued to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at
common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor."). This dual system of protection
was entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's 1973 ruling in Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973), that the states did not relinquish to the federal government exclusive con-
trol of the power to grant copyrights. In Goldstein the Court upheld a California statute
outlawing "record piracy," thus rejecting the petitioner's contentions that the statute in
question exceeded the state's powers under the Constitution and conflicted with the federal
copyright law. See infra note 367 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict
aspect of preemption. The adoption of § 301 has eliminated, for all practical purposes, the
significance of the states' concurrent copyright powers. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, §
1.01[B], at 1-6.
298. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-8.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
the moral right doctrine, the primary difficulty lies in interpreting
the term "equivalent" as it pertains to those rights that states can-
not protect by the second prong of the preemption test.299 The de-
termination under the first prong of the test, whether a particular
work comes within "the scope of the Federal copyright law," 300 is a
far less complicated inquiry. If a work consists of copyrightable
subject matter,30 1 preemption will result under this prong unless
the work is not a "work of authorship" that has been "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. '30 2 According to the definitional
section of the 1976 Act, a work is "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression" when, "by or under the authority of the author," it is
embodied in a copy or phonorecord that is "sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.
'30 3
Examples of works that are not "fixed" within the meaning of the
statute include choreography, extemporaneous speeches, and im-
provised dramatic sketches or musical compositions which have
never been recorded or written down.30
299. See Francione, supra note 67, at 202. ("The issues surrounding the equivalence of
state and federal rights are amongst the most difficult raised by the copyright law
revision.").
300. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5746.
301. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
302. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (b)(1) (1982).
303. Id. § 101. Section 101 also provides: "A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work
is being made simultaneously with its transmission." Id. According to Professor Nimmer,
"Congress' copyright power extends only to an author's 'writings,' and a 'writing' in the
constitutional sense probably requires that the work be fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-23 (footnotes omitted).
304. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5741. The statute thus permits common-
law copyright protection with respect to such works, because "unfixed works are not in-
cluded in the specified 'subject matter of copyright.'" Id. If, however, a work does fit within
one of the categories of copyrightable subject matter as specified in § 102 and § 103, and
constitutes a work of authorship fixed in a tangible form, it probably cannot receive protec-
tion under state law "even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is too
minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain."
Id.; see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 919 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980); 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-22, 1-22.1.
A complicated question, however, arises as to the appropriate preemption resolution in
those instances in which the 1976 Act omits protection for a certain category of works that
nevertheless falls within the subject matter of copyright. For example, is state protection for
recipes proscribed by § 102(b)'s mandate that "copyright protection for an original work of
authorship does not extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such works"? 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Alternatively, can the
states protect a rock group whose sound recording is the subject of an unauthorized public
performance on the ground that § 114 of the 1976 Act does not offer sound recordings pro-
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The first prong of the test set forth in section 301 will be satis-
fied for the vast majority of creations that could be subjects of al-
leged moral rights violations. Most creations today are fixed within
the broad meaning of the 1976 Act, and most works whose moral
rights are worth infringing can satisfy the low standard of original-
ity required for works of authorship. Nevertheless, a genre of vis-
ual art recently has evolved that is not confined by the canvas and
instead interacts directly with the viewer and the exhibition
space.30 5 Two interesting works illustrative of this category are
"Crucifixion," by Chris Burden, in which the artist is crucified
onto a Volkswagen, and "Seedbed," by Vito Acconci, in which the
artist sits under a wooden ramp covering the gallery floor and mas-
turbates for eight hours a day for a two week period during which
time he voices his sexual fantasies about the audience through a
loudspeaker.0 6 State protection for such works clearly would be al-
lowable under section 301 because neither of these works is fixed
within the meaning of the 1976 Act. For example, no preemption
problem would exist with respect to a state law prohibiting the un-
authorized photographing of such creations .30  Although the right
protected by such a state law is "equivalent" to the right of repro-
duction granted the copyright owner by section 106(1),308 the sub-
ject matter at issue is not a work of authorship "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. ' 30 9 Similarly, a state could allow a creator
such as Chris Burden or Vito Acconci to bring an action against
one who photographs his work but fails to attribute the original
work to the artist or alters the photograph is such a way as to mis-
represent the nature of the original work. State laws that vindicate
the rights of paternity and integrity in such circumstances would
survive federal preemption under the first prong of section 301's
test because the original works are not considered fixed under the
tection against such activity? Id. § 114. For a discussion of these issues, see Goldstein, Pre-
empted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the
Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1110-23 (1977); see also Comment, Federal
Copyright Protection and State Trade Secret Protection: The Case for Partial Preemption,
33 AM. U.L. REV. 667 (1984).
305. See D. DAVIS, ARTCULTURE: ESSAYS ON THE POST-MODERN 33 (1977).
306. Mitchell, Body Art: A Legal Policy Analysis, 1 LAw, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 3-162, 3-168, 3-170 (J. Merryman, ed. 1979).
307. Of course, if either of these creations were photographed or filmed while the art-
ist was in the "creation process," the resulting picture or movie could acquire copyright
protection as a derivative work under § 103(a), assuming the artist consented to such use.
308. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982) (granting copyright owner the exclusive right to
reproduce the copyrighted work).
309. Id. § 301(a), (b)(1).
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1976 Act.
The application of the second prong of the preemption test
necessitates a determination whether a particular state law creates
rights that are "equivalent" to any of the following five rights pro-
tected by section 106 of the 1976 Act: reproduction, adaptation,
distribution, public performance, and display.3 10 The 1976 Act does
not define the term "equivalent," but the legislative history indi-
cates that a state cause of action will not be preempted if it con-
tains elements that are "different in kind" from copyright infringe-
ment.31' In applying this standard, several courts have followed
Professor Nimmer's suggestion that an "equivalent" right "is one
which is infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance,
distribution or display. 3 12 Essentially, this approach requires an
analysis of the state law in question to determine what acts will
constitute an infringement. If the exercise of one or more of the
five rights protected by federal copyright law is all that is neces-
sary to constitute an infringement of the state law, preemption will
occur.3 13 If, however, other elements also are required to infringe
310. Id. § 106; see supra note 140 for text of § 106.
311. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5748.
Section 301(a) states that "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . .are
governed exclusively by this title." Further, that subsection provides that "no person is enti-
tled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or stat-
utes of any State." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982). According to the legislative history, § 301(b) is
the "obverse" of § 301(a) in that it broadly delineates, "without necessarily being exhaus-
tive, some of the principal areas of protection that preemption would not prevent the States
from protecting." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5747. One of the specified areas
available for state protection are "activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106." 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1982). See supra note 291 for full text of § 301.
312. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-11, 1-12; see e.g., Crow v. Wain-
wright, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983) (action for sale of "bootleg" eight-track tapes under a
state law prohibiting dealing in stolen property preempted); Uncle Jam Records v. Warner
Bros., COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,580 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1983) (plaintiff's claims for
conversion of the material embodiment of a phonorecord and unjust enrichment not pre-
empted); Ipec, Inc. v. Magenta Films, Ltd., No. 81 Civ. 3341 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1982) (mis-
appropriation aspect of unfair competition doctrine preempted); Schuchart & Assocs., Pro-
fessional Eng'rs, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 943-48 (W.D. Tex. 1982)
(misappropriation aspect of unfair competition doctrine preempted; cause of action for un-
just enrichment not preempted); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 501 F.
Supp. 848, 852-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (claims for conversion and tortious interference with con-
tract preempted), rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52
U.S.L.W. 3860 (U.S. May 29, 1984) (No. 83-1625).
313. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-11, 1-12.
For example, in Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983), the court had to
determine whether a defendant's conviction for selling "bootleg" eight-track tapes in viola-
tion of a state statute prohibiting dealing in stolen property was preempted by the 1976 Act.
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the state law, no preemption will result.
14
Applying the elements test, the court concluded that the elements of the crime-wrongful
distribution of a copyrighted work-were the same under either the state law or the 1976
Act, and thus held that the state law cause of action was preempted. The court reached this
conclusion despite the additional state requirement of scienter, which is not an element of
copyright infringement. The court apparently believed, however, that this distinction did
not differentiate significantly the necessary elements of the respective causes of action. See
also infra notes 350-56 and accompanying text.
Professor Nimmer also noted that a state law will not be saved from preemption just
because it is either "broader or narrower than its federal counterpart." 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-11, 1-12. He observed:
It is irrelevant that certain reproductions, performances, distributions, or displays
would not be regarded as infringing under the Copyright Act, but would violate the
state created right, or would infringe under the Copyright Act, and not under the state
created right. If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution or
display, no matter whether the law includes all such acts or only some, will in itself
infringe the state created right, then such right is preempted.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). The legislative history supports this position:
"The preemption of rights under State law is complete with respect to any work coming
within the scope of the bill, even though the scope of exclusive rights given the work under
the bill is narrower than the scope of common law rights in the work might have been."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5747.
314. Courts have upheld state laws over copyright preemption claims in a variety of
contexts. In Schuchart & Assocs., Professional Eng'rs, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp.
928 (W.D. Tex. 1982), the court concluded that an action by plaintiff architectural and en-
gineering firms for unjust enrichment based on defendants' unauthorized use of plaintiffs'
copyrighted architectural and mechanical drawings was not preempted. In so ruling, the
court observed:
The rights Plaintiffs seek to enforce in their action for quantum meruit are not
equivalent to the exclusive rights of the Copyright Act. By their action for unjust en-
richment, Plaintiffs seek to recover the value of the architectural and mechanical ser-
vices rendered to Defendants by Defendants' acceptance and use of Plaintiffs' drawings
and specifications. The rights Plaintiffs seek to enforce are fundamentally different in
kind from the exclusive rights in copyrighted works to reproduce a copyrighted work,
to prepare a derivative work or to distribute copies of copyrighted work. Plaintiffs seek
not to enforce their rights to copy and distribute their plans and drawings. Nor do
Plaintiffs seek to recover damages analogous to the actual damages provided by
§ 504(b). Rather, Plaintiffs seek to recover under quantum meruit theory the value of
the services rendered by Defendants' use of the plans and specifications prepared by
Plaintiffs. Thus, both the rights Plaintiffs seek to enforce and the measure of damages
under the unjust enrichment theory differ from those under copyright law. Section 301
has not preempted Plaintiffs' cause of action for unjust enrichment.
Id. at 945 (footnote omitted); see also Uncle Jam Records v. Warner Bros., COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 1 25,580 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1983) (unjust enrichment not preempted); Werlin
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 465-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("elements of a quasi-
contract claim are significantly different from those of a federal copyright claim" and "the
rights that the doctrine of quasi contract seeks to protect are qualitatively different from
those that federal copyright law endeavors to preserve"). Contra 1 M. NIMMER, supra note
38, § 1.01[B], at 1-21 ("a state law cause of action for unjust enrichment or quasi contract
should be . . . preempted insofar as it applies to copyright subject matter").
Similarly, in Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), the court noted that an action under New York's Penal Law, providing that a person
is guilty of theft of services when he obtains telecommunications services with intent to
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A second approach to the "equivalency" dilemma focuses on
the interests protected by the state law at issue. Specifically, a
state law will be preempted if its only objective is to protect the
creator's economic interest in his work. 15 This standard will yield
a different result than a pure "elements" test316 when applied to
those state laws purporting to confer more than economic benefits,
but which are capable of being infringed merely by the perform-
ance of one or more of the rights safeguarded by the copyright
statute.31  The application of an "elements" test to state laws will
result in preemption, whereas these laws may be preserved using
an "objectives" standard.
On balance, however, a standard focusing solely on the respec-
tive objectives of a particular state law and the federal copyright
law is not satisfactory. An "objectives" standard could undermine
significantly the thrust of section 301, for in many cases it would
not be especially difficult for the proponents of the state law to
identify relevant objectives of a noneconomic nature.3 18 An "objec-
avoid payment, arguably is not preempted because the New York cause of action, unlike the
copyright law, includes the element of intent to avoid payment. A state law prohibiting
"blind bidding" of motion pictures also survived preemption in Allied Artists Pictures Corp.
v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 441-48 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part and remanded in part on
other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). In so holding the court rejected the argument
advanced by the plaintiff motion picture producers and distributors that the Ohio law was
preempted because its compulsory trade screening requirement compels a performance
under the 1976 Act. The court was persuaded by the state law's limited effect on the per-
formance right and its remedial effect on the prior inequitable marketing system for films.
Id. at 447-48; see also notes 320-64 and accompanying text; cf. Associated Film Distrib.
Corp. v. Thornburgh, 683 F.2d 808, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1982) (appellate court concluded that
lower court had erred in holding that a Pennsylvania law prohibiting blind bidding was
preempted in the context of a summary judgment motion).
315. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 67, at 207-08 (discussing "objectives" test in the
context of the moral right doctrine); Katz, supra note 1, at 211 ("non-equivalent rights are
those rights which do more than merely provide an economic reward for writers or artists to
encourage their respective endeavors").
316. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
317. Consider, for example, that aspect of the California Art Preservation Act that
grants to the artist the right to prevent "alterations" of his work. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1)
(West 1982); see supra note 108 and accompanying text. This right would be "equivalent"
to the right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work" even though the
California statute purports to protect an artist's personal, rather than economic, interests.
See supra notes 152-81 & 235-36 and accompanying text; infra notes 385-93 and accompa-
nying text; see also 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21[D], at 8-261 (concluding that under
California Art Preservation Act, "the right to prevent an 'alteration' which does not amount
to a 'defacement' or 'mutilation' would appear to be subject to federal preemption, and is,
therefore, invalid under state law").
318. The Florida law at issue in Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983),
which prohibited dealing in stolen property, certainly would be justified by social policies
other than protecting a plaintiff's economic interests. Had the "objectives" standard been
COPYRIGHT AND THE MORAL RIGHT
tives" standard also is considerably murkier than an "elements"
test and may require courts to engage in unwelcomed speculation
when the objectives of a given state law are not clearly defined.
Although it may seem somewhat unsettling to deemphasize the
goals and origins of a given cause of action in a preemption deter-
mination, this discomfort should be mitigated by the recognition
that a significant difference in objectives generally will be mani-
fested by a difference in the elements necessary to support the
state cause of action.3"9
Moral rights presently are protected to a limited extent by the
states through alternate legal theories.32 0 If a creator's moral rights
cause of action simultaneously fits the framework for another legal
theory, the elements of the moral rights claim will be coextensive
with those of the substitute legal theory.321 In this context, applica-
tion of the pure "elements" test to these substitute causes of ac-
tion is the most feasible means of determining preemption of
moral rights claims.322 Nevertheless, the question whether states
can protect moral rights through a discrete moral rights statute
similar to that which exists in California2 3 and New York 32 4 de-
mands a different mode of analysis. In these states the moral right
doctrine possesses its own statutory framework that would have to
be measured directly against the protections of the 1976 Act. Be-
cause of the special relationship between moral rights and copy-
rights, 25 the relevant inquiry for equivalency in this context is the
extent to which a creator can protect adequately, or is precluded
from protecting, his moral rights under the 1976 Act.3 26 In other
invoked by the court, a finding of no preemption might have resulted. See supra note 313;
see also Francione, supra note 67, at 208; Goldstein, supra note 304, at 1113.
319. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text; infra notes 339 & 364 and accom-
panying text.
320. See supra notes 70-95 and accompanying text.
321. See supra text preceding note 84 and notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
322. See infra notes 334-64 and accompanying text. Of course, to the extent that state
protection for any rights conflicts with the objectives of the federal copyright law, preemp-
tion also would result. See infra note 367 and accompanying text.
323. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West 1982); see supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
324. N.Y. ARTS & CULTURE LAW § 14.52-59 (McKinney 1984); see supra notes 121-25
and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 146-290 and accompanying text.
326. This equivalency analysis presumes that a work of authorship "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression" which comes "within the subject matter of copyright" is at issue. See
17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (b)(1) (1982). A state can regulate freely works that are not so classified,
regardless of whether it is protecting rights equivalent to those provided in the 1976 Act.
See supra notes 292-93, 295-96 & 300-09 and accompanying text and text following note
309.
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words, any aspect of a state moral rights statute that protects
rights which also could be vindicated by the 1976 Act should be
preempted.2 7 Similarly, preemption should result if the state stat-
ute seeks to protect moral rights interests that conflict with the
interests protected by the federal copyright law. 25 Analysis under
this inquiry essentially parallels that of the prior sections concern-
ing the 1976 Act's potential for vindicating and circumscribing
moral rights.
32 9
As originally drafted, section 301(b)(3) provided specific exam-
ples of "nonequivalent" rights that the states could continue to
protect under common law or statute.3 30 The stipulated rights were
"breaches of contract, breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defa-
mation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false
representation,"3' 31 but the legislative history clearly states that the
list was intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 32 The
version of the bill that was enacted did not contain any such exam-
ples, although this absence was not a result of a rejection of the
foregoing examples but rather of a controversy generated by the
subsequent inclusion of "misappropriation" in the House version
of the bill.
33 3
327. Conversely, no preemption should occur if state law guarantees creators rights
that are not safeguarded by federal copyright law.
328. See infra note 367 and accompanying text. Compare Professor Nimmer's remarks
as to why the copyright law preempts the California Resale Royalties Act, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 986 (West 1977), which grants to visual artists the right to receive royalty payments every
time their works are resold:
The California Resale Royalties Act does not in any way limit reproduction, perform-
ance or display of works of authorship, but it precisely inhibits the privilege to dis-
tribute certain works of authorship. . . From a slightly different perspective, it may
be said that the federal policy contained in the "first sale" doctrine, which permits
uninhibited resale of a work of art following its initial sale, may not be countered by a
contrary state law, even though the state law's inhibition is by way of royalty rather
than prohibition.
2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.22[B]; see also Katz, supra note 1, at 219-22 (state protec-
tion for resale royalty rights is preempted because such rights are completely economic in
nature). But see Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.) (California Resale Royalties
Act not preempted by 1909 Copyright Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
329. See supra notes 150-290 and accompanying text; infra notes 368-97 and accom-
panying text.
330. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5659, 5747-48.
331. H.R. REP. No. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24064 (1966).
332. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5747-48.
333. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-14.3; Diamond, supra note 1, at
212. The Department of Justice vigorously objected to the inclusion of "misappropriation"
in the enumerated examples of nonpreempted rights, and after a series of ambiguous ex-
changes the bill was passed in an amended version that deleted all of the proposed exam-
ples. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-14.3 to -16 (provides a history of this
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The majority of courts and commentators correctly maintain
that defamation and privacy actions are not preempted under sec-
tion 301."" The predicates of these causes of action are, respec-
tively, injury to one's professional reputation3 5 and injury to one's
feelings.33 6 Although a moral rights claim concerning rights safe-
guarded by the 1976 Act certainly can appear in the guise of these
causes of action,337 the "essence" of defamation and privacy torts is
not in the rights protected under the copyright law."3 ' The special
aspect of the statute); see also infra notes 348-62 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 444 (S.D.
Ohio 1980) (state laws of privacy and defamation not preempted), afl'd in part and re-
manded in part on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). The legislative history
states:
The evolving common law rights of "privacy," "publicity," and trade secrets, and the
general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the causes of
action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust of
confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5747-58; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, §
1.01[B], at 1-14.1 to .2; Jorgensen & McIntyre-Cecil, The Evolution of the Preemption Doc-
trine and Its Effect on Common Law Remedies, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 105-06 (1983); Katz,
supra note 1, at 216-17. But see Najarian v. Tobias, COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,595 (D.
Mass. Oct. 20, 1983) (state law claim for damage to business reputation preempted on
ground that it arose "wholly from the alleged copyright infringement actions").
335. See supra notes 79-81 & 91 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 82-83 & 91 and accompanying text.
337. The publication of a mutilated version of the creator's work under the creator's
name arguably is a violation of the adaptation right, see supra notes 155-56 and accompany-
ing text, but the resulting injury to the creator's professional standing also can give rise to a
defamation action. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Similarly, the publication of a
creator's work without his authorization violates the right of reproduction, but the creator
may seek to redress his injured feelings through an action based on invasion of privacy. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
338. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-14.1 to .2.
As noted above, the legislative history also suggests that the copyright law would not
preempt right of publicity actions. See supra note 334. Most courts that have addressed this
issue in the context of both the 1909 and 1976 Acts have concluded that the copyright laws
do not preempt protection for the right of publicity. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (approving district court's
conclusion); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Apigram Publishing Co. v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. 78-525, slip op. (N.D. Ohio July 30, 1980);
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (1909 Act does not
preempt a state-based right of publicity). But see Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 840-41 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting possibility of
preemption).
The right of publicity should survive preemption under § 301 because the attributes
protected by the right of publicity do not constitute "works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). According to Professor Nimmer, an indi-
vidual's name or likeness "does not become a work of authorship simply because it is em-
bodied in a copyright work such as a photograph." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B],
at 1-14.2 n.49. For a different perspective on this issue, see Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It
Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 673
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elements of proof required by these common-law torts thus pre-
clude preemption under a pure "elements" test.3 39 The same result
would occur for moral rights violations based on breach of contract
claims340 because the contractual promise supplies the additional
element of proof that negates preemption. 4' Indeed, the legislative
history of the 1976 Act provides that "[n]othing in the bill dero-
gates from the rights of parties to contract with each other and to
sue for breaches of contract.
342
When a moral rights claim is adjudicated under an unfair
competition cause of action, the question of preemption becomes
somewhat more complicated. Moral rights claims in the form of an
action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 3 43 are saved auto-
matically from preemption by virtue of section 301(d)'s caveat that
"[n]othing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under any other Federal statute. 3 44 Claims based on state unfair
competition laws also survive preemption to the extent they con-
cern deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false repre-
sentation, even though the subject matters at issue are within the
scope of the 1976 Act. 45 These state unfair competition causes of
(1981) (arguing that to the extent the interests protected by the right of publicity also are
protected under the 1976 Act, preemption is appropriate).
339. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The same result would occur under
the "objectives" standard, see supra notes 315-19 and accompanying text, given that these
common-law causes of action also are supported by different theoretical bases from that of
copyright law. See supra notes 84-95 & 247-48 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 73-77 & 92-95 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-13; Jorgensen & McIntyre-
Cecil, supra note 334, at 106; cf. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) ("To the extent plaintiff rests his contract claim not on breach of the terms of the
contract but on [defendant's] . . . having copied his property . . . it is of course
preempted.").
342. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5748.
343. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982); see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
344. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1982).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 330-31. The legislative history notes that this
example was originally included in § 301(b)(3) "to distinguish between those causes of ac-
tion known as 'unfair competition' that the copyright statute is not intended to preempt
and those that it is." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5659, 5748. Specifically,
"[s]ection 301 is not intended to preempt common law protection in cases involving activi-
ties such as false labeling, fraudulent representation, and passing off even where the subject
matter involved comes within the scope of the copyright statute." Id.
Although all the examples originally provided in § 301(b)(3) ultimately were deleted,
see supra note 333 and accompanying text, courts tend to follow this approach in construing
§ 301's application to unfair competition actions. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) ("to the extent that plain-
tiffs are relying on state unfair competition law to allege a tort of 'passing off,' they are not
asserting rights equivalent to those protected by copyright and therefore do not encounter
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action require the element of deception, which is not an element
for copyright infringement. 46 For example, no preemption would
occur in an unfair competition action by an artist against a poster
manufacturing company for falsely advertising posters produced
by the company as "originals" of the artist. 47
A problem exists, however, with those unfair competition ac-
tions that are based on misappropriation rather than consumer de-
ception.3 48 The controversy generated by the inclusion of misap-
propriation as a nonequivalent right prompted the deletion of all
of the examples originally contained in section 301(b)(3), and the
legislative history is unclear as to whether Congress intended this
deletion to alter the previously existing state law of misappropria-
tion .34  Given this murky state of affairs, many courts have
adopted the approach suggested by Professor Nimmer and have
found a misappropriation cause of action preempted when the con-
duct that constitutes misappropriation does not "require any ele-
ment other than the mere act of reproduction, distribution, per-
formance or display. '350 In applying this test courts frequently
preemption"); DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (New York's unfair competition law saved from preemption because, by requiring a
showing of misappropriation of economic value and a likelihood of public confusion, it pro-
tects a right not equivalent to those granted under the 1976 Act).
346. See Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-13 to -14; see also supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
347. Cf. Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1975) (action by band leader Shaw against record company for advertising records that it
produced as "Artie Shaw Versions" of Swing Era Classics).
348. One of the seminal cases establishing misappropriation as an aspect of unfair
competition is Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
796, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (1950), af'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). In Metro-
politan Opera the court prohibited the sale of unauthorized phonograph records made from
opera performances on the radio and candidly eliminated unfair competition's deception
and competition elements. Instead, the court protected the original producer's investment
against a misappropriation by another for a commercial advantage.
349. See supra note 333 and accompanying text; see also Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home
Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
350. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-17; see also supra notes 312-14 and
accompanying text. Of course, if the unfair competition action does not concern misappro-
priation of a "work of authorship," no preemption will result. Id.; see, e.g., Whitfield v. Lear,
582 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (unfair competition claims based on misappropria-
tion of plaintiff's noncopyrightable ideas not preempted); see supra note 326; see also H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5748 ("state law should have the flexibility to afford a
remedy. . . against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of
the facts. . . constituting 'hot' news"). Contra Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("To the extent that plaintiff relies on unfair competition to recover profits
defendants derived from the use of his ideas, he is stating a claim based on rights equivalent
to those protected by copyright.").
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have adopted a strict standard for which additional elements will
negate preemption. Thus, in Rand McNally v. Fleet Management
Systems351 the court held that the additional element of commer-
cial immorality required for a misappropriation claim was insuffi-
cient to allow the plaintiff's state law claim of misappropriation to
escape preemption. 52 Similarly, in Schuchart & Associates, Pro-
fessional Engineers v. Solo Serve Corp.3 53 the plaintiffs' unfair
competition claim alleged misappropriation of their architectural
and engineering drawings and specifications. The Schuchart court
held, however, that the additional element of the defendants' use
of the materials in competition with the plaintiffs to their commer-
cial detriment did not render the rights under the state law "dif-
ferent in kind" from the rights under the federal law.3 54 Therefore,
the plaintiffs' state law claim simply was an attempt to enforce
rights "equivalent" to the federal copyright law's right to
reproduce and distribute and was preempted.3 55
Application of the "elements" test to misappropriation claims
requires a determination whether the elements required to prove
the defendant's conduct under the state law establish rights pro-
tected by the state law that are different from rights protected by
the federal copyright law. As the cases discussed above illustrate,
additional elements such as commercial immorality or competitive
use are not sufficient to show a different right or to avoid a finding
of preemption.3 56 Assuming, then, that the plaintiff's work consti-
tutes "a work of authorship" fixed "in a tangible medium of ex-
pression" within "the subject matter of copyright,"3 57 it is difficult
to conceive of a misappropriation claim that would escape preemp-
351. COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,624 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1983).
352. Id. Professor Nimmer appears to agree with this strict standard. See 1 M. NIM-
MER, supra note 38, § 1.01[B], at 1-21 (arguing that New York's unfair competition law's
requirements of "unfairness and an unjustifiable attempt to profit from another's expendi-
ture of time" does not automatically satisfy the "elements" test so as to escape preemption).
353. 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
354. Id. at 944.
355. Id.; see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 919 (2d Cir. 1980)
(unfair competition claim seeking protection against copying is based on an "equivalent"
right); Ipec, Inc. v. Magenta Films, Ltd., No. 81 Civ. 3341, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1982)
(plaintiffs unfair competition claim based on defendant's unauthorized exhibition of a
copyrighted film to which plaintiff claimed an exclusive license asserts an "equivalent"
right); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (al-
leged misappropriation claim concerning the right to exhibit audiovisual works for a profit
equivalent to copyright law's performance right).
356. See supra notes 351-55 and accompanying text.
357. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
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tion because it is based on a nonequivalent right.58
Section 301 is likely to have a wide preemptive scope in ac-
tions alleging moral rights violations under a misappropriation the-
ory. In Suid v. Newsweek Magazine,5 9 for example, the plaintiff
author brought an action against a magazine publisher in which he
alleged unfair competition because of an article's use of material
resembling passages in his book. 60 Specifically, the plaintiff al-
leged that the magazine's copying without giving him proper attri-
bution damaged him monetarily and that this failure to attribute
constituted an additional element that enabled the state claim to
protect nonequivalent rights.3 6 ' The court rejected this argument,
however, finding that there was no such thing as a common-law
action for failure to attribute, and, therefore, a nonexistent doc-
trine could not supply the additional element needed to preclude
preemption.38 2 Nevertheless, section 301's preemptive effect on un-
fair competition actions seeking to protect a creator's integrity
oraternity interests will be negated in those actions that also in-
clude the additional element of consumer deception. 63 In fact, this
element has been present in many of the decisions vindicating
moral rights interests under an unfair competition theory. 64
Having determined that states normally may continue to re-
dress moral rights violations by using substitute state law claims
without running afoul of the equivalency prong of the preemption
test, the issue of preemption of a state statute providing direct,
358. Significantly, all the examples of nonpreempted misappropriation actions pro-
vided in the legislative history concerned works not subject to copyright protection rather
than actions based on nonequivalent rights. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at
5747-48; cf. Sargent v. American Greetings Corp., 588 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (plain-
tiff's claim for breach of confidential relationship and misappropriation not preempted);
Warrington Assocs. v. Real-Time Eng'g Syst., 522 F. Supp. 367, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (copy-
right statute does not preempt cause of action for trade secret misappropriation).
359. 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
360. The author also alleged copyright infringement, but the court found that some of
the material used by the defendant was not subject to copyright protection and the copy-
righted material that was used was justified by the fair use doctrine. Id. at 147-48; see also
supra notes 251-67 and accompanying text.
361. 503 F. Supp. at 149.
362. Id.
363. See supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
364. See cases cited supra note 72 (discussing applications of state unfair competition
law to cases concerning false attributions). The doctrine of misappropriation also is similar
to the copyright law in that it focuses on economic rights, in contrast to traditional unfair
competition, which is concerned with preventing public deception as well. See supra note 86
and accompanying text and notes 89 & 348. This distinction provides another example of
how the theoretical justifications for an action influence the necessary elements of proof. See
supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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comprehensive protection for moral rights still must be ad-
dressed.3 65 Claims under a moral rights statute cannot escape pre-
emption simply because they also fortuitously include elements
that allow them to be sustained in the guise of alternative state
theories. 66 Instead, the rights safeguarded by a state's comprehen-
sive moral rights law must be compared directly to those rights
that are protected by the 1976 Act. If the state scheme protects
only rights that a creator also could protect under the 1976 Act
and covers works that are protected under that Act, the state law
will be preempted. Those portions of the state law that conflict
with the protections granted by the 1976 Act also will be pre-
empted.367 The moral right doctrine encompasses three major com-
ponents: the right of disclosure, the right of paternity, and the
right of integrity.36 8 The relevant question, then, is the extent to
365. Although a specific examination of the potential for preemption of the New York
and California statutes will not be attempted here, such a determination can be made in
accordance with the proposed analysis. See supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text; see
also 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21[C], at 8-260 to -261 (brief discussion of whether the
California Art Preservation Act is preempted by the federal copyright law); Francione,
supra note 67, at 201-07.
The following preemption analysis is framed in terms of state protection for moral
rights by statute, but the analysis also can be applied to assess preemption of common-law
protections.
366. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text.
367. This aspect of the preemption analysis stems from a basis independent of § 301.
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964), courts have held state forms of protection that "[clash] with the objectives
of the federal patent [or copyright] laws" preempted. Id. at 231; see, e.g., Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state statute prohibiting "record piracy" not preempted); Mor-
seburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 976-78 (9th Cir.) (California Resale Royalties Act not pre-
empted under 1909 Copyright Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980); Schuchart & Assocs.,
Professional Eng'rs v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 946-49 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (plain-
tiffs' action for unjust enrichment based on defendants' unauthorized use of their architec-
tural and mechanical drawings not preempted); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496
F. Supp. 408, 441-42 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (state statute prohibiting "blind bidding" of motion
pictures not preempted), afl'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 697 F.2d
656 (6th Cir. 1982). According to one court, the necessary showing of conflict "can require
no more than a mechanical demonstration of potential conflict between federal and state
law to no less than a showing of substantial frustration of an important purpose of the
federal law by the challenged state law." Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d at 976.
368. See supra text preceding note 16 and notes 16-36 and accompanying text. These
three components will be the focus of the preemption discussion, but the 1976 Act's poten-
tial for preempting a state-created right of withdrawal for works within the scope of copy-
right protection should not be overlooked. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
The federal scheme would preclude a creator from withdrawing his works once he has as-
signed the copyrights, unless he exercised his termination rights in accordance with the stat-
ute. See supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text. In addition, the "first-sale" doctrine
eliminates a creator's right of withdrawal upon the first sale of his work. See supra notes
226-31 and accompanying text. Thus, state protection for the right of withdrawal would
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which state protection for each of these rights would survive pre-
emption under section 301.
Any state-created protection for a creator's right of disclosure
would be redundant of the protections offered by the 1976 Act, and
thus would be preempted to the extent the disclosure protection
applies to works within the scope of copyright protection.3 69 Sec-
tion 201(a) of the 1976 Act provides that the copyright "in a work
protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of
the work. ' 37 0 Further, a work is "created" under the copyright law
"when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time. 3 7 1
Under the statute, therefore, the creator is the only one who can
possess any rights in the uncompleted work and retains exclusively
the right to decide upon the timing of disclosure. 2  A significant
limitation imposed upon the author's right of disclosure, however,
is the limited period of time for which copyright protection lasts.
Section 302(a) provides that copyright protection in a work created
after January 1, 1978, "subsists from its creation and. . . endures
for a term consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after
the author's death. '3 7 3 Thus, all of a creator's works fall into the
public domain fifty years after his death, and his heirs cannot pre-
"[stand] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), and therefore, be preempted.
See Katz, supra note 1, at 219 (arguing that preemption of the withdrawal right is war-
ranted because "a right of this magnitude would consequently disrupt the commercial
processes by which artistic expression is distributed").
369. See supra notes 300-09 and accompanying text and text following note 310; see
also supra note 326.
370. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). An exception exists, of course, in the case of a "work
made for hire." Id. § 201(b). See supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text; see also infra
text accompanying notes 377-78. A state law granting the creator a right of disclosure for
works made for hire would be in conflict with the federal policy embodied in the 1976 Act
and, therefore, would be preempted. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
371. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 101 also provides that "where a work is prepared
over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes
the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different versions, each
version constitutes a separate work." Id.
372. See Treece, supra note 68, at 502; see also supra text preceding and accompany-
ing note 16. Professor Treece has observed:
[A] sculptor will be protected by the federal statute from the time he first forms his
clay into some remote precursor of a future finished work, and a playright who creates
a final version of a play by agonizing revisions of a series of drafts will find protection
under the federal statute. . . for the first draft and the last, even though the first draft
is a poor thing that he would never consent to publish.
Treece, supra note 68, at 502.
373. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982); see also id. §§ 303 (providing minimum period of statu-
tory protection for unpublished works created before January 1, 1978), 304 (duration of
subsisting copyrights); supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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vent their disclosure at that time. 74 Any state law that attempted
to guarantee a creator a perpetual right of disclosure clearly would
undermine the "limited time" and "public domain" concepts criti-
cal to the federal scheme 5 and therefore would be preempted.7
With the exception of the "work for hire" doctrine, nothing in
the 1976 Act specifically bears upon a creator's right of pater-
nity.37 7 The "work for hire" doctrine precludes an employed crea-
tor from exercising a right to compel recognition for a work made
under the scope of his employment.3 7 8 In all other situations a
state-created right to compel recognition for one's work would not
violate directly the 1976 Act. Moreover, because the 1976 Act does
not protect specifically a creator's rights to compel recognition for
his work and to prevent the designation of anyone else as the crea-
tor,3 79 such state-created rights technically are not equivalent to
those specified in the 1976 Act. Although a creator may be able to
compel recognition for his work in conjunction with his injunctive
relief in a successful copyright infringement action, this remedy
would be available solely because of the scope of discretion af-
forded courts in fashioning injunctions under section 502 of the
1976 Act, rather than under a specific statutory dictate.380 Never-
theless, state protection for the right of paternity may clash with
the federal copyright scheme in instances in which the owner of a
lawfully made copy of a work who is not the creator wishes to dis-
play the work publicly under section 109(b). 8 1 The 1976 Act does
not require the owner of the copy to attribute authorship of the
displayed work to the creator, and a state law that would condition
any public display upon such attribution probably would conflict
374. See Treece, supra note 68, at 502. Prior to the adoption of the 1976 Act, unpub-
lished works were protected in perpetuity under the common law; cf. Chamberlain v. Feld-
man, 300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949) (literary heirs of Mark Twain enjoined publication
of one of his stories many years after Twain's death). As a result of § 301, "[c]ommon law
copyright protection for works coming within the scope of the statute . . . [was] abrogated,
and the concept of publication . . . [lost] its all-embracing importance as a dividing line
between common law and statutory protection and between both of these forms of legal
protection and the public domain." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5745. The legis-
lative history cites the elimination of perpetual protection for unpublished works as one of
the arguments justifying the elimination of the prior dual system of protection. Id. at 5745-
46.
375. See Treece, supra note 68, at 502.
376. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
377. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
378. See supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
379. See supra text accompanying note 22.
380. See supra note 172 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 204.
381. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
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with the spirit of section 109(b) and would be preempted. Further,
because the copyright statute protects the copyright owner rather
than the creator, a similar potential for conflict exists with respect
to the copyright owner's exclusive rights of performance and dis-
play. 3 2 These rights may allow the copyright owner to perform and
display a creator's works without identifying the creator. Arguably,
a state-created right of paternity could "inhibit" the copyright
owner's rights to display and perform the work.3 83 Although such
protection for a creator's paternity interests surely is appropriate,
protections must be enacted at the federal level to avoid any pre-
emption problems.38 4
The right of paternity meshes with the right of integrity when
a creator's name is attached to an altered or mutilated version of
his work .38 5 A creator who is also the copyright owner can obtain
relief under section 106(2) of the 1976 Act for attributed mutilated
adaptations even if the creator initially assigned the adaptation
right to the person performing the mutilation.38 6 Moreover, even if
the creator has assigned all of his copyrights in exchange for royal-
ties, he still can bring an infringement action as the "beneficial
owner."38 7 Carrying this argument to its logical conclusion, there-
fore, state laws affording a right of integrity to creators confronted
with attributed mutilated adaptations seek to vindicate rights
equivalent to 1976 Act protections and, therefore, would be pre-
empted. Moreover, any state protection prohibiting mutilation or
alteration potentially could vitiate the application of the fair use
doctrine, which would permit certain alterations with attributions
in appropriate circumstances.8
This same analysis applies to state protection prohibiting the
performance of modifications and mutilations of a creator's work
without an attribution of authorship. A creator who is the copy-
right owner can prevent alterations and modifications of his work
382. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1982).
383. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.22[B], at 8-272.5 ("If a state law creates a
right which inhibits the reproduction, performance, distribution or display of a 'work of
authorship,' it is a right 'equivalent' to copyright, and therefore preempted, even if the
state-created right is either broader or narrower than the comparable right under the Copy-
right Act.").
384. Cf. id. at 8-272.5 to .8 (suggesting that only federal protection for resale royalties
is appropriate because a comparable state-created right "inhibits" the right of distribution).
385. See supra note 28.
386. See supra notes 153-80 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
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under his exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work" specified in section 106(2).111 If the creator
has assigned his copyrights, he still can sue as a "beneficial owner."
Therefore, a state law that sought to protect a creator's right of
integrity against unattributed mutilations would offer a right
equivalent to a 1976 Act right and be preempted. The 1976 Act,
however, does not safeguard a creator-copyright owner's right to
prevent destruction of his work or mutilations that would alter his
work beyond recognition. In this context, a state prohibition
against both destruction and egregious mutilations would not ap-
pear to be equivalent to any rights protected under the 1976 Act.
Nevertheless, a preemption problem may exist even with these
limited state protections, if lawfully made copies of a creator's
work that are owned by other individuals are at issue. The legisla-
tive history apparently sanctions an owner's right to destroy his
lawfully made copy,390 and therefore, states probably cannot pro-
hibit an owner from destroying a creator's work or, arguably, from
performing mutilations that either amount to a destruction of the
work or so alter its character that the original work is beyond rec-
ognition.391 This aspect of the preemption problem is compounded
in the case of a creator who assigns the copyrights in his work to
the owner of a lawfully made copy. Once again, the owner of the
copy arguably has the right to destroy the work. In addition, how-
ever, the owner also gains the right to alter the work because of the
creator's assignment of the right to prepare derivative works.
Under the federal scheme, a creator in this situation will be pre-
cluded from taking immediate action against the owner-copyright
proprietor who objectionably alters the creator's work in the course
of preparing a derivative work, unless the owner also attributes
some form of authorship of the altered work to the creator. Of
course, the creator faced with this dilemma long after his copyright
assignment could exercise his termination rights if he acted within
the statutory time limits.32 In any event, state protection for the
creator's right of integrity in these circumstances will be pre-
empted as a result of a potential conflict with the federal
scheme. 93
389. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
390. See supra text accompanying note 232.
391. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text and text following note 237.
392. See supra notes 200-01 & 206 and accompanying text.
393. See Francione, supra note 67, at 214-17. The author provides several interesting
hypotheticals illustrating this conflict. Id. at 216-17.
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Finally, a creator's right of integrity can be violated by contex-
tual displays or performances of his work that he finds objectiona-
ble. State protection for creators in these circumstances also is
problematic for such protection could conflict with appropriate ap-
plications of the fair use doctrine,394 the right of an owner to dis-
play his lawfully made copy of the creator's work under section
109(b),39  and, if the creator has assigned his copyrights, the right
to perform or display the work guaranteed to the copyright owner
under section 106 of the 1976 Act.396
This preemption analysis illustrates the difficult situations
that could arise as a result of state protection for various aspects of
the moral right doctrine as applied to works within the scope of
the 1976 Act. State protection of most moral rights is inappropri-
ate either because such protection would vindicate rights
"equivalent" to those protected by the 1976 Act or would conflict
with the overall federal scheme of copyright protection. Ironically,
states may continue to protect moral rights through substitute le-
gal theories without risking preemption, while a state's comprehen-
sive moral rights statute probably would be vulnerable to preemp-
tion in many significant respects. Nevertheless, this preemption
analysis bolsters the argument that federal safeguards would pro-
vide the most extensive form of protection for creators' personal
rights. Comprehensive federal protection for moral rights also com-
ports with the portion of the legislative history for section 301 that
emphasizes the need for national uniformity and avoidance of "en-
forcing an author's rights under the different laws and in the sepa-
rate courts of the various States.
3 97
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that an American marriage be-
tween copyright and moral right is a promising prospect. Specific
federal recognition for the personal rights of creators would foster
creativity, protect our cultural heritage, and obviate the need for
reliance on alternate theories that currently provide only partial
protection for moral rights. The copyright clause empowers Con-
gress to incorporate into the copyright statute protections for
moral rights that last for a limited period of time. 98 Although the
394. See supra notes 242-67 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
396. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1982).
397. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 149, at 5745.
398. See supra notes 274-81 and accompanying text. Many countries that have
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1976 Act currently fails to recognize explicitly a creator's moral
rights, it nevertheless contains more than a skeletal structure of
protections for personal interests. The copyright statute also con-
tains, however, several provisions that could limit significantly the
scope of any moral right doctrine adopted in this country. There-
fore, the integration of the moral right doctrine into our copyright
statute will necessitate balancing the interests of creators, copy-
right proprietors, owners of copyrighted works, and the public.
A balancing approach clearly is the most appropriate means of
protecting adequately the interests of all concerned parties. Cer-
tainly creators have much to gain by the explicit adoption of the
moral right doctrine, as they have a compelling interest in safe-
guarding the form of their works and demanding proper attribu-
tion. Nevertheless, we must consider the loss that would be suf-
fered, if we were to adopt a moral right doctrine, by producers and
publishers, whose interests are opposed diametrically to those of
creators. These entities have a legitimate economic interest in
making reasonable modifications to the works of creators to suit
their particular needs. Any proposed statutory scheme, therefore,
must weigh carefully all of the competing interests and strive for a
feasible and equitable balance.
The 1976 Act easily could accomodate express recognition for
a creator's paternity interests. Creators, regardless of whether they
hold the copyrights in their works, should have the right to compel
recognition for their work and to prevent others from being desig-
nated falsely as the creator. The rights of copyright owners and
owners of particular copies should be subordinated to those of cre-
ators in this respect, because requiring these parties to credit the
creator causes a minimal degree of intrusion to their pecuniary in-
terests. Therefore, incorporating a right of paternity into the 1976
Act would foster creativity without unduly burdening the financial
incentive underlying the present copyright scheme.
The extent to which the 1976 Act should protect a creator's
right of integrity raises issues that cannot be resolved as readily as
those concerning the right of paternity. Although express recogni-
tion for a creator's right of integrity could be incorporated into the
1976 Act without any difficulty, the scope of this right is problem-
atic in several respects. One issue that requires further attention
adopted the moral right doctrine simultaneously terminate protection for a creator's moral
rights and copyrights. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. This approach certainly
would be feasible in the United States.
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by Congress is whether the owner of a lawfully made copy of a
work should be allowed to destroy it. Perhaps the strongest argu-
ment that favors permitting destruction is the deep seated West-
ern notion that a property owner should be able to do as he pleases
with his personal property. Yet, property ownership does not nec-
essarily entail unlimited authority.399 Thus, an owner of a lawfully
made copy who is not the copyright proprietor presumably does
not have the right to alter the work because such conduct is tanta-
mount to preparing a "derivative work based upon the copyrighted
work. '40 0 Similarly, even when a creator assigns his copyrights in
his work to the copy owner, the assignment is subject to the termi-
nation provisions in the 1976 Act.401 The effect of these provisions
would be significantly reduced if the owner-copyright proprietor is
allowed to destroy the material object embodying the work. A bal-
ancing of the competing interests at issue demonstrates the need
for prohibiting destruction by a copy owner. Society's interests in
fostering creativity and preserving its cultural heritage weigh heav-
ily in favor of the creator's right to prevent destruction by the copy
owner. Thus, a creator's right of integrity should be defined to en-
able him to prevent the destruction of his work in all reasonable
circumstances.40 2 If the 1976 Act incorporated "reasonableness" as
399. For example, an owner of real property does not necessarily have the right to
exclude others from his premises. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971)
(landowner-employer of migrant farm workers not entitled to prevent a legal aid attorney
and social worker from entering his property to provide services to the workers); see also
Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (application of New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law).
In the context of personal property, ownership of a causa mortis gift theoretically is
transferred to the donee at the time of delivery, but because such a gift may be revoked at
any time before the donor's death, the donee may not destroy the gift. See generally
Lumberg v. Commonwealth Bank, 295 Mich. 566, 568, 295 N.W. 266, 267-68 (1940) ("A gift
causa mortis does not vest absolute title in the donee in praesenti but remains subject to
recall by the donor .... and rights thereto remain changeable during the lifetime of the
donor.").
400. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982); see supra note 152 and accompanying text and note
317.
401. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (1982); see supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
402. Sometimes the assertion of this right will not be reasonable. If, for example, a
creator's artwork is incorporated into the structure of a building that is scheduled to be
demolished, it would not be feasible for the creator to expect that the building should not be
destroyed so that his artwork will be preserved. Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(h)(1) (West 1982)
(unless expressly reserved, artist's rights under California Art Preservation Act waived when
work cannot be removed from a building without physical defacement of work).
Prohibiting destruction of a creator's work will be most beneficial to creators of visual
art, as opposed to creators of literary or musical works. Cf. infra text accompanying and
following note 407.
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the governing standard, courts would have the discretion to apply
the statutory mandate in appropriate circumstances.
Under the 1976 Act a creator who holds the copyrights in his
work presently can prevent violations of his integrity interests that
constitute an infringement of his exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works under section 106(2).403 Therefore, this aspect of the
right of integrity could be recognized expressly in the statute quite
easily. The problematic issue stemming from the recognition of the
integrity right is the extent to which a copyright proprietor who is
not the creator can alter the work in the course of exercising his
exclusive right to prepare a derivative work. The balancing analy-
sis employed in this Article suggests an approach that could be
adopted to protect adequately the competing interests. First, a
right of integrity violation would occur when the copyright owner
mutilates the creator's work and attributes some form of author-
ship to the creator. In these circumstances, the copyright owner
would have exceeded the scope of his license,40 4 and no valid inter-
est would be served by allowing the owner to use the creator's
name in a manner that impunes the creator's reputation. If, how-
ever, the copyright proprietor mutilates the copy without an ac-
companying attribution of authorship, and the resulting work is
not "substantially similar" to the original work, a court should not
construe the statute to sustain an integrity violation.40 5 Courts
should recognize that the "resulting work" is not a "derivative"
work at all, but a new work. The creator's interest, therefore, is
only slightly affected by a proprietor mutilation. In the case of less
extreme alterations, the copyright owner still could alter a creator's
work in an objectionable manner while exercising his rights to pre-
pare derivative works. A creator should have some means of pro-
tecting his integrity interests in these situations. One feasible solu-
tion is to allow the creator an immediate termination of the
copyright owner's interests upon a showing that the alterations will
prejudice the creator's honor and reputation. 40 6 Again, courts
would have the ultimate responsibility for determining whether a
creator has met his burden of proving prejudicial effect.
The question of whether moral rights should be alienable is
extremely problematic. On the one hand, an inalienable moral
403. See supra notes 152 & 389 and accompanying text.
404. See supra text preceding and accompanying notes 155-56.
405. See supra text preceding note 155.
406. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 200 and accompanying
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right may force producers and publishers to negotiate with fewer
creators, resulting in a diminished level of artistic creativity. Ulti-
mately, the public might suffer due to reduced access to creative
works.4 07 On the other hand, a freely alienable moral right dis-
serves the very interests that the right seeks to protect because
producers and publishers usually enjoy a superior bargaining posi-
tion 0 8 and will always secure releases of a creator's moral rights
during the initial contract negotiations. Perhaps the 1976 Act
should adopt the approach of those countries that maintain an ina-
lienable moral right but enforce contracts allowing for reasonable
alterations of a creator's work that do not distort the spirit of the
work.409 Courts would have the discretion to determine the reason-
ableness of any given alteration.41 e
In the case of visual art, however, any permanent alteration of
the original copy in which the copyrighted work is embodied
should be treated as a destruction of the work, and defined as a
violation of the creator's integrity interest.41' Although any such
exception is contrary to the present statutory scheme in which the
copyright owner acquires an unlimited right to prepare derivative
works, a visual art exception is a necessary addition to the statute
if creators of visual art are to be given any significant protections
for their integrity interests. Indeed, once a piece of visual art is
permanently altered, the creator may never be able to recapture
the work in its original form. In the case of most visual art, soci-
ety's interest in preserving its cultural heritage and the creator's
interest in preserving his work outweigh both the copy owner's in-
terest in exercising his property rights and society's limited inter-
est in fostering the copyright owner's creativity at the expense of
the original artist's work.
The creator's right to prevent objectionable contextual uses of
his work arises in connection with a copy owner's rights to display
a copyrighted work under section 109(b) and with the public's
rights safeguarded by the fair use doctrine. A balancing analysis
similar to the one applied to objectionable alterations is applicable
407. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 and supra note 48.
408. See supra text accompanying note 95.
409. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
410. Even if the 1976 Act were to adopt such an approach, the work for hire doctrine
still could thwart the interests of creators to the extent that producers and publishers
choose to deal with creators as employees rather than independent contractors. See supra
notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
411. Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West 1982).
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to the problem of objectionable contextual uses. Therefore, a crea-
tor who can prove that an owner's display of his work will
prejudice his honor and reputation should be able to enjoin the
display. Similarly, a creator's objections to the use of his work,
contextual or otherwise, should be considered when a party uses
the fair use doctrine as a defense to an alleged moral rights viola-
tion. In fact, the authority for considering a creator's personal
rights in a fair use determination already exists to the extent that
the four delineated factors are not intended to be exclusive.412 A
specific addition to section 107 that calls for consideration of a cre-
ator's objections to any proposed use certainly would comport with
the present statutory framework and balance the effected interests.
The task of drafting specific amendments incorporating the
foregoing proposals is left to those far more experienced in such
matters. This Article, however, has demonstrated not only the nec-
essary limitations upon an American version of a moral right doc-
trine, but also the facility with which stronger personal rights pro-
tections could be incorporated into our copyright law. Most
importantly, this Article has attempted to illustrate this country's
need for more effective protections for the personal rights of cre-
ators. Let us toast the proposed union - American style - of
copyright and moral right.
412. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
The following moral right protections exist in the copyright laws of
the countries designated below:
Argentina* ..... author has inalienable right to require mention
of name or pseudonym and no assignee of copy-
right can alter the title, form, or contents of work
(Law No. 11,723 on Copyright, Sept. 28, 1933, as
amended up to June 25, 1976, arts. 51, 52);
Austria* ........ author has rights of paternity and integrity
(Copyright Act, Apr. 9, 1936, as amended up to
July 2, 1980, arts. 19-21);
Bangladesh ..... moral rights, including the rights of paternity
and integrity, recognized (Copyright Ordinance,
Feb. 27, 1967, and Copyright (Amendment) Act,
July 25, 1974, § 62);
Belgium* ....... no specific moral rights provision, but Belgian
nationals may claim the benefits of the Berne
Convention whenever its provisions are more
favorable than those of the Belgian copyright law
(Law on Copyright, Mar. 22, 1886, as amended
up to Mar. 11, 1958);
Brazil* ......... author has rights of paternity, integrity, and
withdrawal (Law on the Rights of Authors and
Other Provisions, No. 5988, Dec. 14, 1973, arts.
25-28);
Bulgaria* ....... author has inalienable right of paternity, the
right of disclosure, and the right of integrity
(Law on Copyright, Nov. 16, 1951, as amended
up to Apr. 28, 1972, arts. 3, 4);
Canada* ....... author has rights of paternity and integrity, even
after assignment of copyright (Act Respecting
Copyright, June 4, 1921, as amended up to Dec.
23, 1971, § 12(7));
Chile* .......... author is exclusive owner of all moral rights, in-
cluding the rights of paternity and integrity
(Law on Intellectual Property, No. 17336, Aug.
28, 1970, as amended up to Oct. 18, 1972, Regu-
lations under Law No. 17336 on Intellectual
Property, No. 1122, May 17, 1971, art. 14);
Colombia ....... rights of paternity and integrity recognized (Law







. right of integrity recognized (Decree No. 40, June
27, 1896, as amended up to May 25, 1948, arts.
19, 28);
.......... author has right of paternity, right to defend in-
tegrity, and right to authorize disclosure (Law on
Copyright, No. 14, Dec. 28, 1977, art. 4(a) - (ch));
........ moral rights include rights of paternity and in-
tegrity (Copyright Law No. 59, Dec. 3, 1976,
amended Oct. 29, 1977, § 7(4));
slovakia*. inalienable rights of paternity, integrity, and dis-
closure recognized (Copyright Law concerning
Literary, Scientific and Artistic Works, No. 35,
Mar. 25, 1965, arts. 8(1), 12(1)(a), (1)(b), (2), &
14(1));
Ecuador ........ moral rights include inalienable rights of pater-
nity, disclosure, integrity, and withdrawal (Law
on Copyright, No. 610, Aug. 13, 1976, arts. 17-
18);
Egypt* ......... author has rights of disclosure, paternity, integ-
rity, and in certain instances, withdrawal upon
payment of equitable indemnity (Law relating to
the Protection of Copyright, No. 354, June 24,
1954, arts. 5, 7, 9, 42);
El Salvador ..... moral rights include rights of disclosure, pater-
nity, withdrawal, and integrity (Copyright Law
(Decree No. 376), Sept. 6, 1963, art. 5);
France* ........ author has inalienable right of paternity, right of
disclosure, and right of withdrawal upon pay-
ment of indemnity (Law No. 57-298 on Literary
and Artistic Property, Mar. 11, 1957, arts. 6, 19,
32);
Germany* ...... author has rights of disclosure, paternity, integ-
rity, and the right to revoke a license upon pay-
ment of indemnity if the work no longer reflects
his views (Act dealing with Copyright and Re-
lated Rights, Sept. 9, 1965, as amended up to
Mar. 2, 1974, arts. 12-14, 42, 46(4));
Guinea* ........ moral rights include rights of disclosure, pater-
nity, and withdrawal upon payment of indemnity
(Law No. 043/APN/CP Adopting Provisions on
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Aug. 9, 1980,
arts. 3(a), 23);
[Vol. 38:1
COPYRIGHT AND THE MORAL RIGHT
Haiti ........... rights of paternity and integrity recognized (De-
cree Relating to Copyright in Literary, Scientific
and Artistic Works, Jan. 9, 1968, arts. 4, 19, 20,
46);
Italy* .......... moral rights include rights of paternity, integrity,
and withdrawal subject to payment of indemnity
(Law for Protection of Copyright and Other
Rights Connected with the Exercise Thereof, No.
633, Apr. 22, 1941, as amended up to Jan. 8,
1979, arts. 20, 142);
Ivory Coast* .... provides for rights of disclosure, paternity, integ-
rity, and withdrawal subject to payment of in-
demnity notwithstanding assignment (Law on
the Protection of Intellectual Works, No. 78-634,
July 28, 1978, arts. 22, 27);
Japan* ......... moral rights include rights of disclosure, pater-
nity, and integrity (Copyright Law, No. 48, May
6, 1970, amended by Law No. 49, May 18, 1978,
arts. 17-20, 59);
Lebanon* ....... moral rights include rights of paternity and in-
tegrity (Decree No. 2385, Jan. 17, 1924, as
amended up to Jan. 31, 1946, arts. 145, 146, 152,
168);
Libya* ......... moral rights include rights of paternity and in-
tegrity (Law on the Protection of Copyright, No.
9, 1968, art. 9);
Mali* .......... moral rights include rights of paternity, integrity,
and withdrawal upon payment of indemnifica-
tion notwithstanding assignment (Ordinance
Concerning Literary and Artistic Property, No.
77-96 CMLN, July 12, 1977, arts. 30, 77);
Morocco* ....... moral rights include inalienable rights of disclos-
ure, paternity, and integrity (Dahir [Act] relating
to Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, No.
1-69-135, July 29, 1970, art. 2);
Netherlands* ... moral rights include rights of paternity and in-
tegrity (Law Concerning New Regulation of
Copyright, Sept. 23, 1912, as amended up to Oct.
27, 1972, art. 25);
Panama ........ moral rights, including right of integrity and pa-
ternity, recognized (Administrative Code, pt. V,
Aug. 22, 1916, arts. 1901, 1904);
1985]
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Peru ........... moral rights include rights of disclosure, pater-
nity, and integrity (Copyright Law No. 13,714,
Sept. 1, 1916, arts. 32-34);
Phillipines* ..... moral rights include rights of paternity, integrity,
and disclosure (Decree on the Protection of In-
tellectual Property, No. 49, Nov. 14, 1972, § 34);
Portugal* ....... author has rights of paternity, integrity, and
withdrawal upon payment of indemnity (Decree-
Law No. 46,980, Apr. 27, 1966, arts. 55, 58);
Senegal* ....... moral rights consist of rights of disclosure, pater-
nity, integrity, and withdrawal (Law on the Pro-
tection of Copyright, No. 73-52, Dec. 4, 1973,
arts. 3(a), 22);
Thailand* ...... author has right of integrity (Copyright Act, B.E.
2521 (1978), § 15);
Tunisia* ....... author has rights of paternity and integrity (Law
Relating to Literary and Artistic Property, No.
66-12, Feb. 14, 1966, as amended up to Jan. 4,
1967, art. 7).
* Indicates that the designated country is a member of the Berne
Convention. The foregoing data is from information available in
World Intellectual Property Organization, Copyright Law Survey
(1981).
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